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Abstract

Time from the physicist’s perspective is not inclusive of our lived experience of time; time
from the philosopher’s perspective is not mathematically engaged, in fact Henri Bergson
asserted explicitly that time could not be mathematically engaged whatsoever. What
follows is a mathematical engagement of time that is inclusive of our lived experiences,
requiring the tools of storytelling.
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For Ann Callaghan
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1 There

is no inside. Only outsides.

2

2 “The
actual
(Whitehead 227)

cannot

be

reduced

to

mere

matter

of

fact

in

divorce

from

the

potential.”

“Virtual problems are the ground of all things; an adequate conception of actuality must involve virtuality; the topological
structure of a virtual problem acts upon its actual solutions just as those solutions act back upon that topological structure.”
(Paetsch 298)

3

3A

story never begins at the beginning, a story always begins in the middle.

“[The rhizome] has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills.”
(Deleuze, ATP 21)
“A haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points,
only of lines. It is a rhizome.” (Deleuze, ATP 263)
“Why is this so difficult? [. . . ] It’s not easy to see things in the middle, rather than looking down on them from above or
up at them from below” (Deleuze, ATP 23)

4

4 The ground was shifting beneath her feet stably in place of currents sweeping gyres inside her head. Stillness agitated.
Jordan waved her arms, looking, searching for balance. Equilibrium never produced anything. Leaning on one heel, then
swaying to her toes. Swiveling, a half-step forward, catching herself. No one else had ever been there to catch her; she
didn’t need her then she didn’t need her now. Her vision had doubled, tripled, spiraling divergently, overlapping: eyes shut.
Fluctuation, impetus, feet pushed back again, overcompensation. Humming, looking, searching for balance: a calming, soft,
repetitive rhythm to hold her movement in sync. Labyrinth, Grouper. Eddies to tides. 85 beats per minute. Chaos to dancing.
The distinction was never so clear. Jordan collapsed.

5

5

It is hard to resist the (very philosophical) temptation to denigrate something apparent to consciousness
but resistant to every means of expression. Yet it is precisely duration’s resistance to discourse that (like
Lautman’s “mathematical reality”) prevents it from being dismissed as a subjective illusion or a discursive
residue. Even if it is present for us only in immediate experience, it is incommensurate both to the discourses
that emerge from this experience and to the discourses that might condition this experience. How could
we hallucinate it, if we can neither imagine it nor cognize it? How could it arise from discourse, if it’s
incommensurate with every discourse? Precisely because time does not allow itself “to be seen, but only to
be lived” it remains alien to us—in this attesting eloquently to its reality, even its autonomy (Bergson 2001:
191). (Paetsch 205-206)
Duration is Bergson’s construction of time. Our project involves an engagement of time that follows Bergson, but it also
is engaging the domain of mathematical physics. As a balancing act between what will be best for a wide audience while
emphasizing that what we are engaging here is not some o↵shoot of time but rather time itself, our terminology of choice will
be time. However, in much of the literature we will encounter both duration and time, sometimes interchangeable in their
meaning, and sometimes not (with duration referring to Bergson’s construction specifically and time referring to spatialized
time specifically).
It is through recognizing, accepting, and embracing the fact that time does not allow itself to be seen but only to be
lived that the methodology chosen for our physics, the examples constructed, the experiment conducted, is by means of
lived experiences through the tools available for communicating such lived experiences: storytelling. The physics is the
storytelling, the storytelling is the physics. No analogies. “There is no ‘like’ here, we are not saying ‘like an electron,’ ‘like
an interaction,’ etc. The plane of consistency is the abolition of all metaphor” (Deleuze, ATP 69).
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6 What makes a character real? When she feels real. When she has memories that contextualize her thoughts and feelings,
experiences that inform her decisions, opinions formed through having lived and connected, habits developed from repetition.
In a phrase: her past is present for her. If all that was said was “Alice sent x to Bob” it is overwhelmingly apparent that
neither Alice nor Bob are real people, even if they could be. They are mathematical constructs meant to stand in for anyone
amongst everyone. But what it means to be someone is in stark contrast to being anyone amongst everyone: Alice is Alice
and no other. Experience is emphatically local. Reading a narrative through Alice’s eyes, if she were to feel real, would not
read like a narrative through Bob’s eyes, if he were to feel real.
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Aequorea victoria
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8 Stability dissipated, speech cut short, accumulation of a rising fog, Jordan’s head heavy, hand to the bridge of her nose.
Swiveling, a half-step forward, her mother Victoria caught her arm, holding her in place.
“Woah, Jordan are you feeling okay? Why don’t you sit down?”
Her mother guided her gently to the ground. Eyes shut, expending e↵ort to blow the fog away; senses dragged elsewhere,
music inside her head as a grounding mechanism, a way to dislodge her from the nausea of dancing, searching for chaotic
clarity in the blur of busyness, Helix, Kelly Moran; the dirt beach beneath was warm. The two of them left at dawn but
she could feel the sun shining on her face.
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With Kant, Deleuze insists: we can begin only with our experience. But we must beware of the temptation
to hypostasize its current form. This form is as local as it is unique. [. . . ] The medial, occasional domain
possesses nonetheless a unique transcendental structure. If we can trace the latter’s genesis, there is hope that
we can capture the genetic mechanism for all transcendental fields. Then we can set aside “our” experience.
(Paetsch 18)
The methodology, the process, of conducting a lived experience experiment through the tools of storytelling is meant as
an engaged example, both as a form of an intuition check before the reader tests it against her own lived experience, as well
as a communication vehicle. But any particular lived experience is a local and unique one, how time works in one particular
lived experience. We will always have the end goal in mind of passing from one particular lived experience that is possessed
by time over to time itself.

10

10 “C’mon

Jordan, get up, it’s dangerous lying around out here.”
Jordan didn’t know how long she had been out for. Blinking, trying to wipe away the blur as best she could. Wrists
grabbed.
“Up you go, you’ve got this. You alright? Gotta get you walking, get you somewhere else, yeah?”
The voice was clearer, her coworker Krzys. She’s on the job. Construction. Or maybe landscaping. The task was always
changing, never well-defined. Jordan planted her feet, feeling herself come into more control. “Thanks, Krzys,” she said,
patting him on the back.
“This is the fourth time this week. Everything okay with you? Are you dehydrated? Not sleeping well?” They were
walking away from a dirt lot back towards the road where their cars were. They had arrived at dawn but she could feel the
sun shining on her back. This may have been the fourth time Krzys noticed, but Jordan’s been sick for as long as she can
remember, fainting included, what she had always assumed was her body briefly shutting down for emergency repairs. She
learned not to rely on her body.
And neither could she rely on people. People always let others down. Why would someone want to have to rely on someone
else? “Yeah, you know, a bit under the weather.”
Krzys walked her all the way to her car. Sedan: convenient, easy, invisible. A facade of reliability.
He opened her driver’s side door for her. “Maybe go home and sleep for a bit? We can handle today without you. I’ll
cover for you. No sweat.”
Never really here. As intended.
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Duration is a condition for life, not the converse. Lived experience is inseparable from duration, but duration
is not reducible to lived experience: organisms are durative modes. Something lives if its past is virtually
present for it—present not as an inert sack trailing behind it but as a force overflowing its vaporous presence.
Defining life in terms of durative force suggests that duration has a being independent of life. The profligacy
of life—its endlessly ramifying evolutionary lines, its fathomless individuals—expresses only its inability to
actually exhaust virtual duration: the latter is always in excess of the former. Life could no more contain
all modes of durative being than one species could resolve every aspect of the problem of Life. (Paetsch
215-216)
This independence that time has from lived experience, time as something that infects and possesses us rather than as
something whose reality is contingent on us, thus makes our endeavor a cosmological engagement. We are exploring the
universe, not the mind.

12

12 Jordan had her knees to her chest, her mother beside her, having joined her on the ground, holding her hand, her veins
jutting out, both of them looking out at the water. A few boats in the distance. Hikers came and went behind where they
sat. Even when she was with her mom, surrounded by people living their lives, she felt alone.
“I was feeling woozy myself on our way over. It’s still weird coming here. Visiting a past life.”
She squeezed Victoria’s hand, unsure if more of an attempt to comfort or a desperate e↵ort at feeling present, visible to
her mother, to someone, anyone, as if she belonged here. “I barely remember the day we first came here.”
“You were just a baby, so small, so fragile.”
Jordan looked at her mother. She seemed lost in a memory, her eyes glassier than the water. “I meant with just the two
of us. I can’t remember further back.”
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Despite ourselves, we remain tethered to a radically alien durative domain. It is not “our” duration at all:
we do not possess it, we are possessed by it. Does duration ground only lived experience? If life was a
condition for duration, instead of duration a condition for life, duration would be essentially inexistent: by
every measure—cosmological, geological—life is vanishingly rare. Is duration only “in” us? It is difficult to
maintain that duration exists only for living things. Duration di↵ers in kind from extension. How did an
“intensive domain” (pure duration) that di↵ers in kind from the “extensive domain” (space, filtered by the
supple diagrams of praxis) get “in” us at all? Do we really have the power of generating a domain that
di↵ers in kind from the extensive world? Is duration then “in” nature? If it is in nature, we confront another
problem: we encounter duration only in immediate experience. There can be no mediate experience of real
duration: mediating mechanisms only distort durative structure. So if nature is possessed of time, how to
grasp it? Can we “generalize” our experience of duration? But the means of generalization only falsify it.
It seems that the only way out is through. Deleuze’s wager: beyond the turn, once it becomes impersonal,
“our” duration expresses the structure of whatever duration infects nature. “How do we pass from this inner
time to the time of things” (Bergson 1965: 45)? If lived experience is the first clue, durative continuity is
the true key. The structure of durative continuity is a structural invariant of all durative processes. E↵acing
the di↵erences amongst the elements of a durative flow does not annul all of its structure. There is still
the structure of its continuity: if we retain “of it only the continuation of what precedes into what follows
and the uninterrupted transition, multiplicity without divisibility and succession without separation, [we]
rediscover basic time” (Bergson 1965: 44). This kind of continuity is a structural invariant of duration, one
“inherent in and temporally co-extensive with its dynamic content” (Capek 1971: 170). It is a “concrete
universal” of duration, something “inseparable from and inherent in all” durative processes (Capek 1971:
173). Deleuze’s next wager: this continuity secretes a logic adequate to nature. (Paetsch 214-215)
This kind of temporal continuity was what Bergson asserted was unable to be grappled with mathematically. Contra
Bergson, we follow Deleuze and the logic of sense that he develops in order to be able to engage time mathematically on
time’s terms.

14

14 Her

bed still had Kaede’s box resting at the foot. Jordan lay down on the other side, ignoring it, intent on heeding
Krzys’s instructions, but only because she agreed and not because he had said to.
Jordan eyed the box, feeling taunted, caught in a staring match. She needed a distraction. She grabbed the pack
of cigarettes she left beside the hair-trigger, now-batteryless, smoke alarm. Jordan’s body has been in disrepair for as
long as she could remember, there was no use trying to protect it from tobacco–a drag o↵ered one of the only sources
of relief available. She lit up and inhaled, searching for the calm clarity in the blur of slowing down, closing her eyes,
Hoyt-Schermerhorn, Vicky Chow, Christopher Cerrone. Serenity was conceived when Jordan could get lost in a plodding
hum, something just barely alive but all-consuming, piercing every corner, inescapable. Being entirely enveloped by the
drone erased anything else Jordan was thinking, feeling. Jordan squinted her eyes open, the box was still staring.
“Fine.”
The box didn’t have a top, the boundary of what belonged inside and what belonged outside not clear. Jordan skimmed
through from above. A few shirts she had left behind. The red one Kaede had actually stolen. Borrowed, now, she guessed.
Along the bottom edge she noticed a few pens. Kaede was giving back pens? Jordan grabbed the handful of them and
turned towards her desk. She already had pens. She threw them back into the box. Jordan didn’t have a junk drawer. If it
was junk, what was the point in trying to save it? It was just more bogging her down. It had to be trashed. Kaede didn’t
feel the same way.
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Physical processes cannot be reduced to actual processes; we need something other than actuality to conceive
adequately of nature. “But why the virtual? Why not the possible?” “The possible” is a false notion. It
falsifies temporal processes—and all physical processes take time. Reasoning with “the possible” is reasoning
with mutually external elements. Filling the future with possibilities—all of which resemble the present, all
of which are mutually external—falsifies it. Durative elements reciprocally interpenetrate one another, and
the flow of time does not respect the regime of resemblance: it is absolutely heterogeneous. (Paetsch, 7,
Footnote 14)
An adequate mathematical-physical engagement of time is necessarily an engagement of the virtual. Einstein’s relativity
theory is a profound development for time in the domain of the actual and spatial, but it does not involve the domain of
the virtual and temporal.
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For Bergson, duration becomes the metaphysical correlate of modern science. He, of course, wrote a book,
Duration and Simultaneity, in which he considered Einstein’s Relativity. This book led to so much misunderstanding because it was thought that Bergson was seeking to refute or correct Einstein, while in fact he
wanted, by means of the new feature of duration, to give the theory of Relativity the metaphysics it lacked.
(Deleuze, Bergsonism 116)
It is here that we intend to arm ourselves with a metaphysics adequate to engaging the virtual, from which we seek to
construct a mathematical-physical engagement of time, one that respects time temporally rather than spatially. What is it
that we mean when we say the virtual?

17

17 “I’m

going to say hello.”
Her mother retreated her hand, o↵ering a smile, still staring straight out at the water. “Don’t go out too far. You’ve
never been one to get sea legs. I was feeling woozy myself on our way over.”
Jordan walked down to the water before sliding her flip-flops o↵. She waded in a few inches deep. Blue, clear, still. No
matter how far in Jordan descended, she could see straight through to her feet, as if nothing was between, no one was
between.
No matter how many times Jordan came here, she never felt his presence. She danced her fingertips along the surface of
the water. It didn’t feel welcoming, inviting, rather it felt like the water was displacing her, pushing her fingers away. It was
important to try. “Sometimes it feels like I never knew who you were.”
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What is the nature of this one and simple Virtual? How is it that, as early as Time and Free Will, then in
Matter and Memory, Bergson’s philosophy should have attributed such importance to the idea of virtuality
at the very moment when it was challenging the category of possibility? It is because the “virtual” can
be distinguished from the “possible” from at least two points of view. From a certain point of view, in
fact, the possible is the opposite of the real, it is opposed to the real; but, in quite a di↵erent opposition,
the virtual is opposed to the actual. We must take this terminology seriously: The possible has no reality
(although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses a reality.
Here again Proust’s formula best defines the states of virtuality: “real without being actual, ideal without
being abstract.” (Deleuze, Bergsonism 96)
Actuality is related to what is present. For example, Jordan in this moment has an actualization, her body is physically
wading in the Puget Sound, physically standing in her bedroom looming over a box of unwanted possessions, the ways
that she is right now. Who Jordan was in the past is still relevant to this present-Jordan, the Jordan who is right now is
very much impacted by the in-the-past loss of her father, by the in-the-past breakup with Kaede. But these past-Jordans
aren’t manifested here as being identical to present-Jordan, they are di↵erent Jordans. Who Jordan was on the last day
that she saw her father, that she saw Kaede, is di↵erent than the Jordan who is standing here now, knee-deep in the water,
eyeball-deep in a box of memories. However, these past-Jordans inform, contextualize, constrain who these present-Jordans
are, will be, will become. The Jordan who traveled to the ocean with her mother, the Jordan who took yet another day
o↵ from work has her decisions, her thoughts, her emotions overfilled, a↵ected, by the past. Thus past-Jordan is real, as
past-Jordan is present in such a way as to contextualize, inform, constrain the space that the system, present-Jordan, is in
but it is present-Jordan that is actual. Past-Jordan is thus aligned on the side of the virtual. The virtual is related to what
is past. An adequate mathematical-physical engagement of time is necessarily an engagement of the past.
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19 Even Jordan’s room was smothering her too much, the cigarette, the drone in her head, unable to pacify the lingering
su↵ocation; she escaped to her keyboard. Set the metronome. Begin. A mistake so soon? She didn’t bother stopping the
metronome. Refocus. From the top. Begin. Dissonance overwhelmed her ears, banging the keys out of frustration. Same
mistake every time. It was difficult to unstuck herself, to get past even a single thing in her path. Grief had a way of
shackling her when what Jordan wanted to do was play o↵, soar over into the next piece. Her nose was running. Again.
Jordan ran to the bathroom and clogged her nostrils with toilet paper. Being able to continue playing, attempting to push
forward, was important. She needed her hands.
Loss of a hand: her cell phone rang: Krzys. “Hey, sorry about you getting cut loose today. I wanted you to know that I
did everything I could to keep you on the project.”
Jordan held the metronome arm in place, waiting to release it, waiting to hear a better reason for the interruption.
“Maybe you’d want to grab a drink and talk about it?”
“No.”
“Are you sure? I’m buying.”
“Is that supposed to be a joke?”
“No, but, I’m just,” fumbling with his words. “I figured since we’re no longer co-workers.”
Jordan stopped the metronome. Escalation. “Krzys, I’m not in the mood right now.”
“Right, yeah, of course, sorry. What about dinner though? Not a date, just, you gotta eat and I know that whenever I
have a bad day I like to escape into other things.”
Jordan pulled the rolled-up pieces of toilet paper out of her nostrils, the mucus continuing to drip like a heavy reverb
long after a chord was struck; she caught the trailing line with another wad of toilet paper, cutting o↵ the reverberations
with a dampening pedal, jamming a fresh clog back up her nose. “I’m sick, Krzys. Can’t you hear how congested I am?”
He laughed. “You’re always congested, I thought this was your normal voice.”
“I don’t want to make you sick.”
“Let me make that decision. I don’t care if you get me sick, I want to see you.”
“Are you not listening to me? I don’t want to see you, regardless if you want to see me. I’m sick. I feel like shit. I mean,
fuck.”
Jordan hung up. She shivered at the thought of being on another date so soon. Relationships were so dependent on
one another. No part of them was stable. Do people actually feel comfortable living in that sort of environment? Knowing
that at any moment life could come crashing down, and it could have nothing to do with anything in their control? Kaede
had asked too much of her. Kaede was controlling too much of her. And here Krzys was actively pursuing the same thing.
Something came up into her throat, either the bug or the thought of a date.
The metal trash can in her room was overflowing with tissues. To think Krzys wanted to add more instability to her life
when her body can’t even keep itself together. She needed to move to a di↵erent thought, a di↵erent location: the kitchen.
Something easy, today’s been hard. Bread. Jelly. Peanut butter.
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On the other hand, or from another point of view, the possible is that which is “realized” (or is not realized).
Now the process of realization is subject to two essential rules, one of resemblance and another of limitation.
For the real is supposed to be in the image of the possible that it realizes. (It simply has existence or reality
added to it, which is translated by saying that, from the point of view of the concept, there is no di↵erence
between the possible and the real.) And, every possible is not realized, realization involves a limitation by
which some possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while others “pass” into the real. (Deleuze,
Bergsonism 96-97)
The possible is said to have no reality as its very construction is a delimited set of mutually exclusive paths, one of which
is to be realized. The mutually exclusive, mutually external paths, paired with a realization that assumes and utilizes a logic
involving both the principle of excluded middle (at least one is true) and the principle of noncontradiction (at most one
is true) is already to frame time in terms of space. Additionally, the possible paths do not dynamically act back upon the
real, their realization assumes a homogeneously topological time. Whereas the virtual dynamically informs, contextualizes,
constrains the actual, as the actual dynamically does back to the virtual. Each passing moment, her frustrating phone call
with Krzys, her one-sided conversation with a now absent father, adds to and changes the whole of Jordan’s virtual, of
Jordan’s past; this accumulating and morphing whole past informs who Jordan is and what Jordan will do, her present
colored by the countless previous not-quite-as-subtle-as-he-would-have-hoped attempts Krzys had made to go out on a
date, her present colored by the previous anniversaries of her father’s death, anniversaries when her mother was more lucid,
making this moment feel particularly alone, this moment feel particularly unnerving, that Jordan’s mother is only around
the corner from being her own anniversary, these presents, these actuals, will in turn add to and change the whole of Jordan’s
virtual, of Jordan’s past, which as a new whole will inform, contextualize, constrain the new present, the new actual, which
will in turn add to and change the whole of Jordan’s virtual, of Jordan’s past. . . . The topology of the virtual, and thus the
topology of time, is not homogeneous. The space inhabited is di↵erent from every previous one due to the novel constraints
(past, virtual) on each novel space (present, actual).
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The virtual, on the other hand, does not have to be realized, but rather actualized; and the rules of
actualization are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of di↵erence or divergence and of creation.
When certain biologists invoke a notion of organic virtuality or potentiality and nonetheless maintain that
this potentiality is actualized by simple limitation of its global capacity, they clearly fall into a confusion
of the virtual and the possible. For, in order to be actualized, the virtual cannot proceed by elimination
or limitation, but must create its own lines of actualization in positive acts. The reason for this is simple:
While the real is in the image and likeness of the possible that it realizes, the actual, on the other hand does
not resemble the virtuality that it embodies. It is di↵erence that is primary in the process of actualization
— the di↵erence between the virtual from which we begin and the actuals at which we arrive, and also
the di↵erence between the complementary lines according to which actualization takes place. In short, the
characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being di↵erentiated and is forced
to di↵erentiate itself, to create its lines of di↵erentiation in order to be actualized. (Deleuze, Bergsonism 97)
The present is the way the past di↵erentiates itself, actualizes itself. The elements of the virtual, of the past, that act as
the impetus of the creation of the present are not mutually external, it is not the case that a single set-theoretic path (a
possible) will be realized in accordance with the principles of excluded middle (at least one is true) and noncontradiction
(at most one is true); the topology of the present, of the actual, is constituted (but not fully determined) by the past, the
virtual. This new topology, this new space of the present, of the actual, is totally di↵erent from all that came before in
the past: the present moment will always only happen once. The present moment could not happen again through time
travel back to the same moment, nor through a realigning of all the atoms in the universe to the same identical positions,
because in each of these cases time will have passed, and with time passing comes with it an accumulation of the past,
of the virtual, that contextualizes, informs, constrains the present. “‘Being virtual’ means ‘having an efficacious topology’”
(Paetsch, 177 Footnote 261). In each of these scenarios, the past, the virtual, the topology, the space that the present, the
actual, is situated within will be di↵erent for each present, despite the presents in question, the actuals, being identical.
Thus these two moments are not identical.
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22 Even

the highways felt empty. “Can you grab me a tissue out of my bag? My nose is running.”
Her mom grabbed her bag down at her feet, pulling out a pack of tissues. “Are you sure you need one, your nose looks
fine.”
“Yes, mom, I can feel when my nose is running.”
“I know, I know, but you always think you’re sick and you never are. Haven’t been since you were just a girl.”
The gas light switched on. “This truck seriously eats right through gas. Gonna have to go to a gas station before we get
back.”
“If we’re stopping anyway can we go to the grocery? I’m out of cat food.”
“No, mom, you don’t have a cat.”
“Of course I do. She’s black, her pupils spill out into her irises, she’s–” Victoria paused.
“Yerka?” Jordan finished her thought for her.
“Yes, Yerka, my cat Yerka, I need to stop at the grocery, I’m out of cat food.”
“Yerka’s been dead for a long while now, mom.”
Victoria slouched, staring out the passenger side window.
Jordan knew that her mother was aware enough to know her awares were fading. She needed to move to a di↵erent
thought, a di↵erent location: the dredging. “Did I tell you that my next project is that beach?”
Her mom was staring out the passenger side window. “What do you mean?”
“Digging up the earth, taking the soil, moving it somewhere else. Not sure what for, that part’s beyond my pay grade.”
Jordan chuckled.
Victoria turned and looked at her, what felt like the first time all day really seeing her. “Why would you do that?”
“It’s my job. Someone wants to build their own beach somewhere else or something, I don’t know.”
“Well tell them that you won’t do it,” her voice finding life, catching an edge.
Blinker. Merge. “He’s been dead for a long while too,” Jordan said as softly as she could.
Back out the window. “I can’t believe you would do this to me. Do this to him.”
It wasn’t her favorite thing to do but she needed the money. Her supposedly free decisions always feeling su↵ocated,
smothered, constrained by the necessity to take care of herself, of her mother. Jordan scratched her neck, then readjusted
her grip on the steering wheel. At least she’d be spending some more time with him.
Another shot; di↵erent thought, di↵erent location. “Are you coming to the bar tonight? I can pick you up on my way
over.”
Silence. Separation. Scratching.
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Why does Bergson challenge the notion of the possible in favor of that of the virtual? It is precisely because
— by virtue of these preceding characteristics — the possible is a false notion, the source of false problems.
The real is supposed to resemble it. That is to say, we give ourselves a real that is readymade, preformed,
pre-existent to itself, and that will pass into existence according to an order of successive limitations. Everything is already completely given: all of the real in the image, in the pseudo-actuality of the possible. Then
the sleight of hand becomes obvious: If the real is said to resemble the possible, is this not in fact because
the real was expected to come about by its own means, to “project backward” a fictitious image of it, and
to claim that it was possible at any time, before it happened? In fact, it is not the real that resembles the
possible, it is the possible that resembles the real, because it has been abstracted from the real once made,
arbitrarily extracted from the real like a sterile double. Hence, we no longer understand anything either of
the mechanism of di↵erence or of the mechanism of creation. (Deleuze, Bergsonism 97-98)
The sleight of hand is from overcoding the real production of time, creation, as discovery of what was always there, a
possibility amongst a set of mutually external delimited possibilities to be realized. But as we saw, possibilities and their
realization do not dynamically act back upon the real, they are projections from the perspective of a present, of a certain
space, a certain topology, and the changing, morphing, unending becoming nature of the space, topology, virtual, past, that
the actual, present, is embedded within, is di↵erentiated from, thus becomes muted, assumed homogeneous, unchanging.
“The possible is always the enemy of creation, since it’s always the projection of sedimented formations” (Paetsch 13,
Footnote 20). Because the virtual, the space, the topology, is not changing, Deleuze notes that “everything is already
completely given”, as it is the actual where we can find, for example, our current spatial physical laws. So if we fix the
virtual, the space, the topology, then we would have a shot at describing a deterministic picture, “everything is already
completely given”. This is one sense of what it means when Bergson and Deleuze refer to the spatialization of time: denying
the real production of time, creation, as discovery of what was always there and a supplanting of the dynamic heterogeneous
relationship between virtual and actual with the static homogeneous relationship between possible and real.
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24 “You’re

allergic to peanuts. Why did you eat a PB&J?” The doctor put his clipboard down at his side.
Jordan tried her best not to itch. “I wasn’t allergic to peanuts yesterday.”
“Well, now you know. These hives should fade away in a few hours. If they are still present by tomorrow, give us a call
and we’ll have you come in again. Avoid eating anything with peanuts in them, okay? It’s a common allergy so you should
be able to glance at food labels and see if you’re in the clear. Taking some Benadryl will help calm down what you are
experiencing right now if you need it.”
Jordan headed back towards the exit, trying to move swiftly and quietly.
“Remember to give us a call once you locate your insurance card, okay?”
Losing her job couldn’t have been timed any worse. “Absolutely. I’m sure it’s in my junk drawer with everything else!”
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But this leads to the question of how the Simple or the One, “the original identity,” has the power to be
di↵erentiated. [. . . ] We know that the virtual as virtual has a reality; this reality, extended to the whole
universe, consists in all the coexisting degrees of expansion (détente) and contraction. A gigantic memory,
a universal cone in which everything coexists with itself, except for the di↵erences of level. On each of these
levels there are some “outstanding points,” which are like remarkable points peculiar to it. All these levels
or degrees and all these points are themselves virtual. They belong to a single Time; they coexist in a Unity;
they are enclosed in a Simplicity; they form the potential parts of a Whole that is itself virtual. They are
the reality of this virtual. This was the sense of the theory of virtual multiplicities that inspired Bergsonism
from the start. (Deleuze, Bergsonism 100)
The past is real and is being accumulated throughout the entirety of the universe, from which we all live through,
experience, are contextualized by, informed by, constrained by this same accumulation, the entire past, the virtual. We must
be clear, this one unified time is not a return back to the absolute time of Newton. Both Newton’s time and Einstein’s
time are times of the actual. Neither involve the virtual in their engagements. This one unified time is virtual and both
grounds and impels the time of the actual, like Einstein’s time. We can feel this through the loose lines we drew of allying
the virtual with the past and the actual with the present: the actual-times of Newton and Einstein are concerned with
efficient causality exclusively, the role of cause and e↵ect is only concerned with direct local interaction in the immediate
moment, like a particle or a force pushing on the object in question. By affirming the virtual, we are affirming that history
meaningfully e↵ects and a↵ects the present, meaningfully e↵ects and a↵ects causality, in a way that isn’t restricted to
efficient causality.
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When the virtuality is actualized, is di↵erentiated, is “developed,” when it actualizes and develops its parts,
it does so according to lines that are divergent, but each of which corresponds to a particular degree in the
virtual totality. There is here no longer any coexisting whole; there are merely lines of actualization, some
successive, others simultaneous, but each representing an actualization of the whole in one direction and
not combining with other lines or other directions. Nevertheless, each of these lines corresponds to one of
these degrees that all coexist in the virtual; it actualizes its level, while separating it from the others; it
embodies its prominent points, while being unaware of everything that happens on other levels. (Deleuze,
Bergsonism 100-101)
Lifting helpful verbiage from Paetsch, the levels of the virtual and the corresponding lines of the actual are akin to “modes
of being” of time. A human is one such temporal mode, as would be anything else in time. Even more particular, within
humanity’s temporal mode, Jordan’s level is di↵erent from Victoria’s, di↵erent from Krzys’s. They are all each local actuals
of this global virtual, which is to say that each of their pasts accumulate as part of the whole past of the universe: the
way Jordan feels about never being able to eat peanuts again impacting her subsequent decisions, thoughts, feelings, the
way Jordan feels about her mother no longer being able to attend her performances impacting her subsequent decisions,
thoughts, feelings, the way Krzys feels about asking a girl out directly and still getting rejected impacting his subsequent
decisions, thoughts, feelings, the way Victoria feels about realizing she must have asked about her cat Yerka numerous times
but can’t remember doing so impacting her subsequent decisions, thoughts, feelings; all of these experiences are particular
and emphatically local, yet they are together, coexisting, insofar as their pasts coexist in the one unified virtual, all of the
past, the whole past. This unification is made clear because all of these emphatically local, totally di↵erent local experiences
are nevertheless the same insofar as the “structural invariants” that persist across each of them. The way time works is
the same, even if every expression of a “mode of being” in time is completely di↵erent from every other. On the side of the
actual, where each are particular local experiences, they have their own line, level, by which their past accumulates and
informs, constrains, their present. Crucially, these lines are divergences, which is to say that Jordan’s past is not Krzys’s
past, is not Victoria’s past, and they have no way of meeting, there is no way for Jordan to ever call to mind a memory of
Krzys’s or Victoria’s, intentional nor accidental, despite all of their pasts being part of the one unified virtual, the entire
past. Nevertheless, time has a singular unified structure independent from any particular local subjective instance on the
side of the actual because of this unity of the virtual.
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27 “Excuse

me, miss?”
Jordan held out the last note she was playing. Playing local bars was a nice way to make a few extra bucks while holding
her day job with the dredging. In truth, Jordan also wanted to get out of her apartment. She never felt at home there. Sure,
her things were there, but sometimes they felt like other people’s things. Over the years, the same issues bubbled up in
more difficult places, not feeling at home even around her mother. Jordan thought that this was just what life after losing a
parent was like. It will never be the same as before, that Jordan is gone now. But being behind a piano, playing, balancing,
juggling the contrapuntal melodies, the polyphonies, the syncopations, an overloading of physical, intellectual, emotional
stimulations, Jordan could manage to lose herself and this sense of not-belonging that somehow belonged to her. “Do you
have a request for me?”
“Actually, I was hoping to buy you a drink.”
“I’m sorry, I don’t drink anything except my water and I already have some.”
“Fine. In that case, Bach’s Fugue #17.”
Fugues were Jordan’s favorite pieces to play. No longer was the right hand bound to melody and the left hand bound to
harmony, rhythm, what felt like a too common occurrence, a capturing and taming of the feelings she so desperately craved
out of being behind the piano. Both hands took on all roles now, as they together formed something completely new. Her
nose was running. This was not the sort of piece she could just use one hand to deal with her nose while the other carries
through, both parts were too important to the whole, they contextualized, informed, constrained each other, they were each
other. Jordan tilted her head back a bit, trying to remain inconspicuous in her unnatural movements. She hit the fermata.
Tempo change. The prelude was concluding; the fugue was starting. This was her chance. She quickly reached down into
her bag and grabbed a pack of tissues and decided blowing her nose would call too much attention when in the middle of
the piece. She quietly wiped away, but didn’t feel anything. Jordan opened up the tissue and saw nothing inside. Her hands
quickly moved to her upper lip and her nose was indeed dry.
“Hey, what gives? That was just the prelude.” The man who made the request earlier was walking back over, annoyed.
Jordan looked back at the piano and thought about all of the other performers who have played on it. How many of them
blew their noses and then went right back to playing, because there wasn’t time to throw it out and wash their hands?
Jordan had felt sick for as long as she can remember; how can other people be so careless with their health? She grabbed
some disinfectant wipes from her bag and cleaned each individual key, ba✏ed at why she hadn’t started the evening by
doing this.
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We must think of it as follows: When duration is divided into matter and life, then life into plant and animal,
di↵erent levels of contraction, which only coexist insofar as they remain virtual, are actualized. And when the
animal instinct is itself divided into various instincts, or when a particular instinct is itself divided according
to species, levels are again separated, or are actually cut out in the region of the animal or of the genus.
And however strictly the lines of actualization correspond to the levels or the virtual degrees of expansion
(détente) or contraction, it should not be thought that the lines of actualization confine themselves to tracing
these levels or degrees, to reproducing them by simple resemblance. For what coexisted in the virtual ceases
to coexist in the actual and is distributed in lines or parts that cannot be summed up, each one retaining
the whole, except from a certain perspective, from a certain point of view. These lines of di↵erentiation are
therefore truly creative: They only actualize by inventing, they create in these conditions the physical, vital
or psychical representative of the ontological level that they embody. (Deleuze 101)
The past coexists but the present is di↵erentiated. As we saw, the actual does not trace the virtual by resemblance, this
is only a feature of the possible and the real, and this feature erases the dynamic relationship between the two sides. The
virtual grounds and impels (but does not fully determine) the actual. The virtual is in unending becoming, the past growing,
accumulating, and looming over the actual. The virtual cannot be summed up because the virtual is continuous whereas
the actual is discrete. This temporal continuity is di↵erent from what we are typically used to in mathematics; each part
retains the whole, each part is interpenetrating every other part. If each part has the whole, then summing up higher than
just one part will already not work, we’d have more than the whole. What each part has, despite each retaining the whole,
is a certain perspective, a certain point of view on the whole.
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Jordan got home, she stuck more toilet paper up her nose and applied some Benadryl.
She grabbed the jar of peanut butter that was still on the counter. Trying to rationalize in her head, she did nothing
wrong. Jordan didn’t feel like she ate too much peanut butter, nor too little peanut butter. Often with food it only took
the slightest push for her stomach to go downhill; she always bought high quality stu↵ from those organic markets.
She sat down on the couch and took her shoes o↵ for the first time all day. She needed to get new shoes, the ones she
had been wearing were far too constricting.

30

30 Pausing

for a moment, what is it that we are doing here? No doubt we are becoming more familiar with the virtual
and the actual, as we have argued that we must involve the virtual in order to construct a complete mathematical-physical
engagement of time that is not spatialized. But notice, through developing tools and understandings of the domain of the
temporal rather than the spatial, we are concerning ourselves with how a subject is produced. Who is Jordan? Who is Kaede?
Who is Victoria? Who is Krzys? A spatial, set-theoretic construction doesn’t care who or what we are talking about, nor
how this who or what came to be. It is the mathematical analog of only concerned ourselves with the actual, erasing the the
virtual. But each of these processes are of vital importance to causality, and each is the result of a process in time. To erase
these processes from the model, leaving only the final point that has been arrived at, is akin to erasing the virtual from our
understanding of the actual, and towards a growing tradition in the natural sciences to assert that reality is timeless. It is a
proclamation that history does not matter outside of the efficiently causal. Part of taking time seriously, taking the virtual
seriously, is affirming that we are not surrounded by static objects, but rather we must account for how an object has come
to be, through a process in time, through the dynamic relationship between the virtual and actual. This understanding also
shows that no one and no thing are ever a finished product. Every one and every thing are in a constant state of unending
becoming, undergoing a process of the formation of who or what they are in time. To speak of objects as ontologically
distinct and static, through which only external relationships are made, is another sense of what we mean when we speak
of time being spatialized.
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[T]he classical, conventional conception of the relationship between [a] ‘physical object’ as ontological extant, and [b] ‘history of facts’ as epistemic construct by which physical objects are characterized, must be
reversed if quantum mechanics is to be coherently understood as an ontologically significant theory. That
is, the classical conception of a history as essentially contextual and therefore primarily epistemic—a particular story expressing particular knowledge of fundamental physical objects—must be reconceived, such
that physical objects are not merely understood by their fundamental histories, but rather understood as
fundamental histories of quantum events. (Epperson xvi)
Epperson and Zafiris have developed a quantum mechanics formalism from the process-theoretic perspective of Whitehead
that resonates with much of what we are discussing. In particular, for us, they develop tools that allow us to engage the
real, which involves both the actual and virtual, that is inclusive of the temporal process that is constitutive of what we
are engaging, as opposed to only engaging the actual. The switch that they outline here is an understanding that subjects,
objects, are the products of processes, and not distinct, static, Platonic essences that exist first that are then put into
relationships.
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32 Jordan finished the fugue and grabbed another tissue. Blank. Empty. Her stomach felt like it was taking up more space
in her body than it was allowed to. She got up from the piano and made her way through the red ambience to the bathroom.
“Jordan?” a woman’s voice said.
She turned. “Hi.”
“Hey.”
The girl wasn’t initiating any further conversation. What was the polite way to handle this sort of interaction? How
did she know her name? There were notices on posters advertising her playing tonight, she was sure that was all it was.
Although, it’s still weird to have someone address you by name without there having been proper introduction. No one ever
leaves the register at a market by saying “Thanks, Andy,” because they read his name tag without him supplying his name.
Perhaps this was yet another sign that being at a piano club was Jordan’s truest sense of home. She is known without an
introduction.
“Look, I need to use the bathroom. I’ll be back on the piano in a few minutes, okay?”
“Okay.”
Jordan dropped her bag by the sink and instinctively took out the tissues, expecting to use them. She looked at herself
in the mirror; her nose was fine. Maybe a bit red from the amount of tissues she was using. Her throat felt itchy. She put
the tissues back and grabbed her water bottle. It was one of those reusable water bottles that had a mega filter built in, if
she filled the thing with pure sludge it would still come out as normal water. The cool sensation of the liquid didn’t calm
anything down. Jordan opened her mouth as wide as she could and tried to inspect herself in the mirror. Did her throat
look red? Throats are usually red in color. It looked like there might be one spot that was atypically colored. That must
have been it. Jordan took another swig from her water bottle, trying to swish it around, targeting that part of her throat,
gargling. Still scratchy. Still distressing. She coughed, not because her body was physically reacting to anything, but because
Jordan needed to try anything to get this spot wiped clean. She forcefully coughed some more, trying to make di↵erent
sounds to hit di↵erent areas.

33

33

Kant’s table of categories is a “sedentary distribution”; it fixes the domain of possible experience. If we attack
Kant’s assumptions about necessity, we reject his use of possibility. “Possible experience”—a ridiculous
notion! Of course, Kant had his reasons to invoke it: if the conditions of experience were universal and
invariant, they would indeed delimit an experiential domain. Since we reject the conditional, to insist
instead that conditions are local and variable, we reject the antecedent: there is no finally delimited domain
of possible experience. But what if we let the contours of this domain fluctuate? Would this satisfy you? No:
the notion of “possible experience” is a monstrous pairing, a false notion, one obscenely inadequate to real
experience. “Possibility” is not a correlate of necessity; it is a parasite upon reality (the interesting relation
is that between necessity and reality). Critique should be allergic to as derivative a notion as “possibility”.
For “the possible” is not even a projection of reality; it is a projection of a consensus about reality—nothing
more than an image of historical biases and metaphysical prejudices. Transcendental philosophy cannot be
dazzled by anything involving “the possible”, whether “possible experience” or the “fitness landscape of all
possible species”. (Paetsch 72-73)
Kant’s project set out to determine the limits of experience, and in so doing determined the limits of “possible experience.”
Thus, in much the same way that the possible does not dynamically interact with the real, the table of categories that Kant
constructed was a fixed, static, rigid set of delimited classifications that were said to exhaust all of experience, that were
not in an unending morphogenesis of reciprocal dynamic interaction with experience. Following Paetsch in his following of
Deleuze, we reject the endeavor of determining all “possible experience” from the outset. Rather, the range of experience
is more dynamic and indeterminate than what could be claimed to be determinately exhaustive at a particular moment in
time to a fixed set of categories. Experience is emphatically local. Instead, we turn to the dynamic relationship between
the virtual and the actual, and we conclude that the conditions (the virtual, the levels) are as local and variable as the
conditioned (the actual, the lines). Due to the conditions and the conditioned being entwined in a reciprocally determining
dynamic process in time, including the emphatically local nature of each actual, “there is no finally delimited domain of
possible experience,” as the range of real experience will be contingent on the virtual context constraining the actual, and
the virtual and actual are always changing, and the actual (with its level of virtuality) is always local, and this process is
unending.
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For his use of the possible, Deleuze convicts Kant of being insufficiently critical. To resist “the possible”
is not to reduce either experience to actual experience or physical reality to actual reality. Resisting “the
possible” is a part of Deleuze’s robustly anti-reductive approach. He objects to possibility because it is an
inert projection, one that resembles actuality. In its place, we affirm a genetic virtuality, one irreducible to
actuality even though it interacts ceaselessly with it. (Paetsch 73-74)
An affirmation of the virtual is an affirmation of time and the processes of becoming that lie within time. To (impossibly)
reduce the real to the actual or to only engage the actual is to deny the reality of time and the value and meaning of history,
a process in time, that is constitutive of all things. Thus an affirmation of both the virtual and the actual is an engagement
of the real. “Genetic” is referring to a process of internal relation as opposed to external relation. Earlier we assessed that
the times of Newton or Einstein were times that only engaged the actual, not the virtual, and here we conclude that an
engagement of time of this kind would lead to erasing the productive and creative forces of time and history, thus pushing
towards a picture of the universe that is timeless. We also mentioned that the times of Newton and Einstein were concerned
with an engagement of causality that was restricted to the efficiently causal. This aligns with external relation, or what
Whitehead calls “coordinate division”. We are seeking to account for and to be inclusive of internal relation, as a mechanism
of creation, a process of becoming in time that is constitutive of objects, or what Whitehead calls “genetic division”.
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see you are still pursuing throat singing as your next instrument?” the woman from before laughed to herself.
Jordan got herself under control. “There was something stuck in my throat. It took a bit of maneuvering is all.” She
wiped her mouth, then ran the sink to clean herself up.
“So how have things been with you?”
This girl was practically shaking. Jordan flicked her hands in the sink and tried to place her. Maybe this was a déjà vu
thing. “What do you mean?”
“Have things been going well for you? I see you’re still playing piano, so that’s good.” The girl’s lip looked like it was
being bitten from the inside.
“I’m sorry, I don’t know who you are. I hope you have a great rest of your night though.” Jordan walked past her and
out the door, ready to have her fingertips dance the awkward interaction away. Her stomach grew another few inches within
her, pressing on all of her insides, and the pain became unbearable. She about-faced and sped right back through into the
bathroom, past the girl who was still standing there, and into one of the stalls.
“If you want to pretend like you don’t know me, that’s fine with me.”
Jordan sat on the toilet, skirt around her ankles. Nothing was coming out but it burned as if she had diarrhea. “Could
you wet some toilet paper for me?”
A few moments later, a hand appeared from under the stall door with the damp toilet paper. Jordan pressed it against
herself gently.
“Diarrhea again?”
“What are you talking about?”
“Come on, Jordan.”
“I don’t know who you are.” She let go of the toilet paper. “Could you get me another, please?”
Her hand reappeared once more. “Here.”
Jordan kept pushing but nothing was coming. She stifled a groan, the burning was getting worse. The cooling of the toilet
paper was only helping so much. Jordan picked her skirt back up and walked to the sink.
“Are you feeling any better?”
Jordan ignored her, finished washing her hands, and marched straight back into the stall. Knees. She was going to get
whatever was inside of her out of her, one way or another. No one, not even her body, was going to be this much in control of
her. Her mother was right, she couldn’t remember the last time she was really sick, despite always feeling sick. The feelings
had to stop. Jordan shoved her index finger down her throat. Gag. She coughed the finger back up.
“Do you want me to get you some water from the bar?”
Jordan coughed up some saliva and spit into the toilet bowl. “I don’t drink water from anywhere but my water bottle.”
Determined, Jordan took both her index and middle finger and jammed them most of the way back. A flinch away from
her uvula. Eyes watering. Head fogging. She plunged the last bit, holding her fingers there, her stomach contracting. The
scratchy part of her throat from earlier spasmed and Jordan violently coughed her hand out, saliva and mucus with it.
“Here, I took the water bottle out of your bag.” Her hand reappeared underneath the stall.
There was no room for talking. Nothing was going down before things came up. Two fingers again. Her tongue swelled up
and down. Her throat opened at the base. Jordan let out a war cry as she tried to force up everything inside her. Success.
Vomit. She laid her head down on the spit covered toilet seat. She jumped up, quickly remembering how dirty a public
toilet seat probably was, pushed through the stall door, dousing her face o↵ in the sink.
Jordan stuck her tongue out trying to get everything o↵ of her.
The girl laughed. “I guess this answers my how you’ve been question pretty well, huh?”
Jordan dried her face with paper towels. Her head was pounding, the room was spinning. She looked back in the mirror
and held the back of her hand up to her forehead. It didn’t feel especially warm. “I think I need to go home. I don’t know
what’s wrong with me right now.”
“Let me drive you.”
“No.” Jordan picked up her bag and strode past her, but the girl grabbed her by the arm.
“Yes. You are in no shape to be driving yourself home right now. I hate seeing you like this. Please,” she tugged a bit on
Jordan’s arm, demanding her eye contact. “Just let me help you.”
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Even though it is premature to characterize “real experience”, we can say this: if Kant’s devotion to a
“sedentary distribution” of categories was sustained by uncritical assumptions, it is not too much to expect
that the conditions of real experience will follow a “nomadic distribution” resisting every attempt at fixity
and universality. We encounter only mutable sets migrating along variable trajectories. A genetic perspective
pursues an “immanent principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distribution, radically distinct from
fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the syntheses of consciousness” (Deleuze 1990: 102).
Without forgoing any of the force of necessity, Deleuze renounces every pretension to invariant universality.
Transcendental fields will secrete conditions that are only ever local and variable. Here’s a précis of the genetic
viewpoint: The transcendental field, after interfacing with a virtual problem, solicits the solutions that
generate local conditions. Rather than submit something to the categories for processing, select occasions
generate conditions along with conditioned. And though they bifurcate, these two aspects of a genital
occasion—conditions and conditioned—continue to act upon each other, spurring irremediable mutation
and further divergence. Real experience just is this tensed, mutable, reciprocally determining relational field
that opens perpetually between conditions and conditioned. It can be no more “harmoniously resolved” than
an energetic system definitively closed. (Paetsch 74)
Paetsch follows the development of Deleuze’s logic of sense, equivalently logic of expression, which is constructed to be a
logic for problems, where problems are understood to be on the side of the virtual. This is in contrast to what Deleuze refers
to as our logics for solutions, which we familiarly know as our formal logics. This brings about an important conclusion.
Bergson spent his life developing a theory of time in its full generality, one not subjugated to the domain of the spatial,
which is to say (using some puzzle pieces of what we’ve learned thus far) an engagement that includes both the virtual and
the actual and that doesn’t seek to erase the creativity of time by fixing either condition or conditioned to a static domain,
and throughout his oeuvre Bergson maintained that this was an engagement of time that was completely impossible via
logic and mathematics. But here we see Deleuze developing a new logic, a logic of sense, a logic for problems not solutions,
a logic of the virtual, and thus Deleuze constructs a logic adequate for time. Paetsch a↵ords us a peek behind the curtain
regarding how this will intuitively function in our endeavor of engaging the mathematical-physical construction of time: the
field of real experience interfaces with a virtual problem (a past), which solicits the solutions (presents) that generate local
conditions (the unending becoming of the virtual, the past), which progress, become, ad infinitum.
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If problems are continuous [...], if logic is grounded in problems, if time is itself problematic, Deleuze will
have a means of overcoming Bergson’s prohibition upon using mathematics to investigate time. (Paetsch
38-39)
We know that our construction of time must involve both the virtual and the actual. Bergson claimed that a
mathematical-physical engagement of the virtual was not possible, but Deleuze’s development of a logic of sense pushes
back against this claim. In the same way we have said that the virtual grounds and impels the actual, we say that the past
grounds and impels the present, and that the logic of problems grounds and impels logics of solutions (formal logics). In
e↵ect, this means that logics of solutions (the only logics available to Bergson) are not adequate for time, for the virtual.
What is it about logics of solutions that make them incompatible with time?
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stumbled a bit. She didn’t have the will to fight. “Okay.”
The girl shifted her hand from Jordan’s arm to her hand, interlacing her fingers, and led the way out to her car.
“Make a left out of here, then a right at the first light.”
“A left? Are you sure?”
Jordan reclined her seat back far enough to feel relaxed, but not far enough for any more potential vomit to be flopping
around inside of her. She gave the girl her address to punch into a GPS so she could close her eyes and ride in silence,
focusing on calming down through the blur of some chaos, leviathan, mouse on the keys.
“We’re here.”
Jordan opened her eyes. She still felt like her body was imploding, but she felt together enough to hopefully be able to
walk around. By the time Jordan sat up, the woman had already walked around to her passenger side door and opened it
for her.
“Here, let me help.”
“I’m fine. I can get out myself. Thanks, though.” Jordan’s arms buckled as she pushed herself up, but she managed to
stand up. She stretched her arms upwards, then let them collapse back on top of her head. “So, you know my name is
Jordan. What’s your name?”
The girl looked right at Jordan.
“Kaede.”
Hemiola. Arrhythmia. Organs jumping inside of her.
Kaede hugged Jordan. “I hope you start feeling better. I really do.”
Jordan was still getting accustomed to the new heartbeat. “Why don’t I give you my number, in case I ever need help
again?”
Kaede smiled, looking away, wiping her face. “Sure, I’d love that.”
“But you are to never bring tonight up again.” Jordan wiped her own face of some running eyeliner she missed in the
bathroom. “This is so embarrassing!”
“As you said, never happened. I’m capable of playing along.”
Jordan closed the door behind her, leaning against it. The door felt much more stable than Kaede did. She couldn’t
believe she just gave her number out; she thought about vomiting some more. Her stomach felt empty, it would probably
help to force herself to eat a little something before crashing. Jordan opened the cupboard and grabbed her favorite snack.
Peanuts.
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Bergson has undermined the very notion of an “enduring identity”: such a notion verges on outright
contradiction, as duration pre-empts every form of identity. But this does not mean that durative flux
lacks consistency, structure, or organization! It lacks metrical structure, quantitative order, and logical
consistency. It is not hard to perceive that the consistency of durative flux is a very peculiar sort of consistency. How to conceive of it? Not as the logical consistency of an axiomatic system. That kind of consistency
is unthinkable without the forms of identity: minimally, the elements of such systems must be self-identical.
Further, certain logical elements (such as axioms) are exempt from change. This violates a central tenet of
Bergson’s philosophy: nothing not in flux. The ubiquity of fluctuation does not preclude the possibility of
discerning certain invariants amidst this flux. Crucially invariants are not transcendent but immanent. Further, they persist amidst total flux: we need not fix any substrate beneath them. They will be indispensable
for conceiving of the consistency of a continuous multiplicity without reference to any identity. (Paetsch
293)
Logics of solutions operate with the static logical consistency of an axiomatic system, they employ a form of identity, the
elements are self-identical. Symbolically encoded: x = x. Notice that this mathematical construction is not temporal but
rather spatial. In time, we have affirmed that objects are products of temporal processes, not always already constituted
beings from which only external, epistemic interactions happen. Our first clue of the spatial nature of x = x is that there
is no engagement of the virtual, no inclusion of the processes that have produced what x is, and having bracketed out the
productive nature of time brackets out time itself with it. But even more clearly, we saw that once we understood objects
temporally, affirming processes as being productive of objects, that this process of unending becoming does not stop. Thus
as time marches on, x becomes something di↵erent, such that x = x is not true through time.
Axioms are exempt from change. We saw this obstacle when discussing the virtual and actual with the possible and
real. The possible is not in a reciprocally determining dynamic relationship with the real, it consists of a delimited set
projected backward in the image of the real. Similarly, axioms are set in stone, not in a reciprocally determining dynamic
relationship with what they condition. The conclusion Paetsch follows Deleuze in reaching is of the mathematical concept
of a topological invariant. We are still gathering our tools, orienting our intuition, motivating our construction, and so we
do not yet descend into the granularity of this concept. A topological invariant is a property of a topological space such
that if a space A were to morph or change into some other space B in a way that still preserved the structure of space A,
any property that persists despite all of the changing, morphing, mutating, is a topological invariant. What makes this kind
of topological property important and distinct from a universal property is this being inclusive of change.
As a brief example, we turn to the infamous topology joke that states that from the perspective of a topologist, a co↵ee
mug and a donut are the same thing.

The topological invariant that persists between these two objects is that each only contains one hole (the handle of the
co↵ee mug and the middle of the donut respectively). Yet these two objects look quite di↵erent from each other, they seem
to have distinct identities from one another, yet within topology we can enact a process of deformation of one into the other,
always with the topological invariant persisting despite the changing identity.
Thus we are looking for a logic, a mathematics, that will not utilize a form of identity, x = x, and we are looking to
engage topological invariants of time, that allow for change, the unending becoming in time, rather than engaging universal
properties of time.
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Bergson presents a reason for the inability of the intellect to think life, motion, continuity, or becoming:
the logic of the intellect is a logic of solids—of inert, self-identical, stable figures and discrete operations
upon them. To think virtual problems themselves will require us to abandon these intellectual crutches.
Problems are fundamentally durative. Durative processes demand a di↵erent approach. Intellectual activity
is preeminently analysis: “the intellect is characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according to
any law and of recomposing into any system” (Bergson). Analysis is inadequate to the durative processes
of nature. To approach problems by means of analysis, to reduce everything to inert bodies, to proceed only
by discrete operations upon mutually-external solids in inert ambient space—this is what Deleuze means
by posing problems in terms of space rather than in terms of time: problems involving durative processes
must be cast in terms of time. It is no wonder that becoming has been flogged so often by a too-intellectual
philosophy: “the intellect represents becoming as a series of states, each of which is homogeneous with itself
and consequently does not change. Is our attention called to the internal change of one of these states? At
once we decompose it into another series of states which, reunited, will be supposed to make up this internal
modification. Each of these new states must be invariable, or else their internal change, if we are forced to
notice it, must be resolved again into a fresh series of invariable states, and so on to infinity. Here again,
thinking consists in reconstituting, and, naturally, it is with given elements, and consequently with stable
elements, that we reconstitute. So that, though we may do out best to imitate the mobility of becoming
by an addition that is ever going on, becoming itself slips through our fingers just when we think we are
holding it tight” (Bergson). It is no wonder that “the intellect is characterized by a natural inability to
comprehend life” (Bergson). Indeed, “our intellect begins by mechanizing life and is then astonished that
this mechanism subdivides indefinitely without the simple ever appearing—it is astonished by a miracle of
which it alone is the author! The infinite only induces vertigo when we conceptualize it” (Jankélélvitch).
(Paetsch 162, Footnote 237)
One problem of reductionism is what Whitehead termed the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. Reductionism posits
that an object can be understood by decomposing it down to its simple parts and then recombining the simple parts. The
“misplaced concreteness” comes with the assertion of what counts as a simple part; the methodology of reductionism breaks
down when there is something that we want to understand that can’t be broken down further. Thus something that is
unable to be engaged or unable to be understood by employing this method of decomposing into static, homogenous parts
and then recomposed feels like the least simple piece. The trick happens when the “concreteness” of a simple part is said
to be justified out of an apparent givenness — but what is apparent is contextual, contingent, local, dependent on who
and what we are talking about, and we have now seen that objects are produced (unendingly so) in a process, and thus an
appeal to a givenness is another sense of bracketing away the meaningful and impactful process that is productive of what
we are talking about.
Thus throughout our history we have taken to breaking down a temporal process into static, self-identical, mutually
external states, strung together in a homogeneous space, erasing the virtual and the productive nature of time: creativity.

41

41 Restrained,

incapacitated, Jordan’s heartbeat pulsed, throbbed, as if her blood was trying to push through her skin,
an overloading of physical, intellectual, emotional stimulations, she hadn’t had any peanut butter, heeding the doctor’s
instructions, but only because she agreed and not because he said not to. She didn’t have to place her fingers anywhere else
on her body to feel it, pumping in her temples. Her ears. Her wrists. She rubbed her wrists together, trying to wipe away
the intense feeling of the beating. Her skin was losing its sense as the boundary of her body. If not peanut butter, then
what? Jordan got rid of Kaede, why would this still be happening? It should be over. It needed to be over.
Her insides expanded again. She ran to the bathroom and vomited into the sink, not having enough time to shoot for
the toilet. Her vision had doubled, tripled, spiraling divergently, overlapping: eyes shut. Jordan grabbed a wash cloth and
wiped her face before putting her hand on the wall to trace her way back to the bathroom door. She stumbled, but finally
made it to the light switch and flicked it o↵. The blurring subsided a bit.
150 beats per minute. This was a standard playing tempo. This was way too high for a heart rate, but the bpm was
undeniable. Jordan touched her fingertips to the sides of her head and quickly withdrew them at the feeling of how much it
felt like her head was pushing outwards. She needed to verify such an insane claim. She stumbled to her keyboard and sat
down. Mami↵er. Meteoric Iron. Her heart never wavered. Crawling out of her skin. Scratching her arms, her veins flaring.
Discomfort. Fear. Jordan threw the keyboard o↵ its stand, crashing it into the wall. A low resonant hum from something
inside it persisted.
It’s because she’s still somehow here, right? That’s got to be it. Kaede might have been removed, but she is still here
in some other way. Memories of her were littered everywhere. If those objects that held a fading connection were removed,
then the purge would be complete. Jordan grabbed her metal trash can and walked about the apartment, starting with the
box she left followed by piling in practically all of her belongings. A blanket they shared on the couch. A loaned CD. Jordan
clutched her stomach and winced before running back to the bathroom and slamming herself down.
The diarrhea burned. She prayed that her body would stick to one direction out of her at time. The shower curtain was
taunting her, a witness to the showers they shared. Without moving from where she sat, she grabbed the curtain and yanked
hard. The rod it was attached to came tumbling down, hitting Jordan in the side of the head.
Jordan rubbed her head to calm the pain, her heartbeat creeping her out too much. Breathing quickly. The diarrhea
seemed like it might have subsided for now. Flush. She grabbed the toilet paper roll. Only a few squares left. She took them
all, folded them, and squatted up a little so she could reach the sink. Jordan dampened the toilet paper and pressed it up
against her. She dropped it in the toilet and prepared to get back up, rolling up the shower curtain in anticipation, but
immediately sat back down. Her body wasn’t finished burning her from the inside out. Jordan grabbed the empty toilet
paper roll and squeezed it, trying hard to subside some of the pain.
“Kaede!” Jordan grabbed the roll with both hands, twisting it in di↵erent directions.
Held longer, “Kaede!” Jordan was yelling with all she had, forcing what was inside of her out. Stamping her feet. The
toilet paper roll ripped in half.
Jordan got up and quickly used a bath towel to clean up as best she could before washing her hands for what felt like
the four hundred and seventh time. Her hands looked raw, but they felt like everything was fine compared to the rest of
her body. She marched over to the trash bucket and threw both the shower curtain and bath towel in.
Her throat, itchy on the inside, needing to come out. “Not again—are you kidding me?” She ran back to the bathroom,
opened her mouth as wide as she could. A bright red mountain had formed near the back. Undeniable. She coughed, her
body physically reacting to the new mass in her throat. She ran the sink and stuck her head underneath it, the smell
of vomit unable to penetrate the hysteria tightening its grip, holding Jordan in place. The coughing prevented her from
accomplishing much in the soothing department, keeping all liquids out of her no matter how quickly she tried to swallow.
Swiveling, a half-step forward, caught by sickness, caught by grief, caught by trauma—Jordan didn’t want to be caught,
she wanted to run.
She staggered back over to the bedroom and fell onto the nightstand. Cigarettes. Jordan lit the whole pack together
before throwing it into the metal trash can, tossing her lighter in too for good measure. The drone of the busted keyboard
continued to buzz beneath, a steady, dissonant background, raising the noise floor, grounding and impelling, the echoes
drowning out her ability to think straight. Smoke billowed, more coughing. That should be everything. Kaede should be
totally removed. Wiped. Excised. Deleted. Why won’t her body start feeling better? When there’s a cause and an e↵ect
and that cause gets removed, the e↵ect must get removed, right? When Jordan got rid of the peanut butter, her hives did
calm down. She never got hives again after that.
Jordan collapsed on her couch, continuing to cough profusely. Her tonsils felt like they were going to be coughed out,
one layer of flesh at a time. Maybe she can’t even rely on herself. The dense black air accumulating, pushing lower than
the ceiling, filling quickly. The fire roared inside of the bin sitting on the kitchen countertop. Oranges and reds flickering
as they ate apart her memories, her life, her progress. The droning from her keyboard melding with the beating in her ear,
the extension of what counted as her body blurring, her head felt hollow, the droning, the beating, bouncing around echoes
of the noise as they layered upon themselves, amplifying each other, the next layer starting before the last one finished,
contradicting and complementing themselves simultaneously. Please leave. Let this be over. Jordan dug her hand into her
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pocket: her phone. She went to the phone application and saw Kaede in her most recent calls section. Jordan so desperately
wanted to be in control, to be self-reliant, independent, but felt like she had lost all sturdiness, stability. Collapsing. Kaede
wasn’t the problem. She can’t stand on her own two feet if her own two feet are the problem. Kaede cared for her when
no one else would, went out of her way to make Jordan feel comfortable, safe. Things got too serious too quickly. Jordan
wasn’t used to that level of commitment, that level of care, appreciation, love from anyone.
It was time to reach out and ask for help. Jordan looked back towards the fire, devouring the kindling, breathing
increasingly difficult. Jordan deleted Kaede from her contacts. She deleted her conversations with Kaede in all of her
messaging applications. She deleted every picture that she had. The smoke had made it hard to see across the apartment
at this point. Jordan dialed 9-1-1.
She coughed before speaking. “I need some help.”
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The irreversibility of time exists only under such a condition. “Memory,” says Bergson, “is not a faculty of
putting away recollections in a drawer, or of inscribing them in a register. There is no register, no drawer;
there is not even, properly speaking, a faculty, for a faculty works intermittently, when it will, or when it
can, while the piling up of the past upon past goes on without relaxation. In reality, the past is preserved
by itself, automatically. In its entirety, probably, it follows us at every instant; all that we have felt, thought,
willed from earliest infancy is there, leaning over the present which is about to join it.... Doubtless we think
with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that
we desire, will, and act.... From this survival of the past it follows that consciousness cannot go through the
same state twice.... Our personality, which is being built up each instant with its accumulated experience,
changes without ceasing. By changing, it prevents any state, although superficially identical with another,
from ever repeating itself in its very depth. That is why our duration is irreversible. We could not live over
again a single moment, for we should have to begin by e↵acing the memory of all that which followed. Even
could we erase this memory from our intellect, we could not from our will.” (Capek 16)
It is not an uncommon occurrence for the brain to be compared to and treated as a computer, capable of storing files
(memories) and calling those files (memories) up when needed. This analogy easily falls prey to the forms of identity Bergson
warns about. On a computer, we can create and save a file, we can call this file x. That file has a fixed identity. It doesn’t
matter who opens it, when she opens it, how she opens it, if she puts the file on a USB stick and brings it to a di↵erent
computer to open: it always is exactly itself. x = x.
This might seem to work at first glance when applied to the past: something happened once and then it goes into the
past where that event stays the same for all eternity because we say the past can’t be changed, and we call upon that fixed
past when we remember something. This perspective is flawed. The past is nonphysical, but not fixed. There is only ever a
physical access to the present.
The past isn’t whatever we imagine it or decide it to be. There are unchangeable facts of the matter, like how Jordan
and Kaede have broken up, this much is true. However, what this fact means to Jordan or Kaede in the present is not
a set-in-stone, unchangeable, eternal, static, fact. It is precisely what this fact means to Jordan and Kaede that informs,
contextualizes, constrains their decisions, thoughts, feelings. The moment just after the breakup, Jordan understood all of
the set-in-stone facts to indicate that Kaede was overbearing, smothering, unable to be her own person and su↵ocating
Jordan from being the only kind of person she’s known herself to be. This understanding of the facts persists through
Jordan burning down her own apartment in her most desperate attempt to escape Kaede’s lingering smothering. Yet as
Jordan endures a serious bout of illness, she remembers all of those same set-in-stone facts not filled with negativity but
filled with positivity, that Kaede was the kind of person to go above and beyond in her help, sticking through these gross
and scary sickness waves, ensuring safety and comfort during moments of heightened instability, never asking for anything
in return. “The facts” haven’t changed whatsoever, but the way in which these facts manifest themselves in the present, the
way that they mean what they mean to Jordan, the way that they contribute to causality, the way in which they inform,
contextualize, constrain Jordan’s decisions, thoughts, feelings do not stay the same. They are in an unending process of
becoming.
Despite our physical reality only having access to the present, the past is nevertheless present in other ways, informing,
mutating, constraining, influencing. The key understanding here is that the past is indeed present, but not in a physical
way. What does this mean? Recall how both the virtual and the actual are real. The past is real, grounding and impelling
the present. The past informs, contextualizes, constrains, influences the present while still not being this di↵erentiated
present. A concrete objective fact we say can’t be disputed, like the event of Jordan and Kaede breaking up. But the way in
which this objective fact is perceived, felt, understood, the way in which this objective fact informs, constrains, influences
the present is not an objective fact, it is a relationship in process, unending becoming, its identity is constantly changing,
mutating, and thus is more accurately captured as lacking any fixed identity. The becoming of a past moment has no end,
it never reaches a static, self-identical being. This is unlike the file on a computer, which is always in a static, self-identical
being, never in a becoming. The way in which memory has a meaningful impact on the present is dependent on the who,
the when, the how. The actual is emphatically local. A file on a computer is always itself, x = x, but a memory belonging
to the past, outside of efficient causality yet still meaningful in a less restricted sense of causality, never remains itself, it is
always changing, x 6= x, informing, constraining, influencing the present in a di↵erent way dependent on what x means at
present in its unending becoming.
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lights. Sirens that got drowned out; the sound of the broken keyboard’s tone still echoed inside of her head. She
wanted it out, but there was no escape to anywhere else. The echoes no longer piling on in amplification, but imbricating
in depth. Stretto, a theme introduced by the first movement of drone, picked up and played by its echo before the first
concludes. Two voices at once. Together they build the line, a hum getting further and further away.

The single tone persisted.

“Pronounce her.”
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Considerably later, in an initial passage of Creative Evolution, Bergson also pointed out the connection
between persistence and novelty in psychological duration: “Let us take the most stable of internal states,
the visual perception of a motionless external object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it
from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless the vision I have now of it di↵ers from
that which I have just had, even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is
there, which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as its advances on the road
of time, is continuously swelling with the duration it accumulates: it goes on increasing-rolling upon itself,
as the snowball on the snow.” (Capek 22-23)
This is one example of an intuitive way to orient ourselves process-theoretically, of including the virtual and the productive
nature of time, creativity. Classically, we might describe this same system by saying we are ourselves, x = x, and the object
in question doesn’t change, doesn’t move, is viewed at in an identical manner and thus this object would be encoded as
y = y. There is no productive nature of time here, the entirety of the productive, creative processes has been bracketed
away. However, we can run this experiment ourselves, and we immediately understand that the successive moments are in
fact di↵erent. The first moment is contextualized, informed, by a past that has not spent any time thinking about this static
object. A moment later is contextualized, informed by a past that has been thinking about this object. This is a simple
example of the mechanism of unending becoming, process, creation, time.
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A logic need have neither an axiom of identity nor even a law of excluded middle to be a logic that enlists
the forms of identity. It is enough for it to handle “elements” that are self-identical and not radically
metamorphic. Whether in propositional logic or in set theory, the elements are only ever themselves, even
when they enter into relations with other elements. In the context of a proof, these relations explicate the
impact structure of these elements. We await a logic that dispenses not only with laws that prioritize the
forms of identity but with any presentation that fixes atomic individuals. The logic of expression—equivalent,
the dynamics of virtual problems—is just such a logic. By identifying problems with continuous multiplicities,
Deleuze was able to develop covertly a logic of duration: the dynamics of problems is a dynamics of lived
experience or of any durative whole. (Paetsch 293, Footnote 452)
Deleuze develops this logic of sense, and thus our logic of time, but neither the mathematical formalism nor the physical
application of this mathematical formalism. This is what we set out to do. We must learn, develop, enlist the tools necessary
for this process-theoretic, temporal engagement. Namely: the virtual is not representable but only expressible (lack of any
fixed identity, x 6= x, di↵erent expressions of the internal structure, topological invariant, that persists); the virtual di↵ers in
kind from what it conditions (times of the actual do not have the temporal continuity of a time of the virtual); the virtual
is a temporal continuity that is heterogeneous, not homogeneous (the virtual of each novel moment is completely di↵erent
having been a↵ected by a novel actual); each change of the virtual changes the whole of the virtual (each element of the
virtual retains the whole within it, thus a change to any one part immediately changes the entirety of the virtual) (Paetsch
118).
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phone buzzed. Without looking at the screen she stared at the ceiling of her bedroom. Eventually she pushed
aside the comforter and got out of bed. Obstacle course, piles of dirty clothes, Jordan made her way to the bathroom.
Staring in the mirror at herself, she went through her new routine. Two fingers on her wrist. Nothing.
There was no questioning, this much was sure, she was absolutely dead. No one can be alive if they don’t have a heartbeat.
Jordan moved herself to the couch and sat there. The wall was blank, but she stared at it anyway.
Her phone vibrated again. It was all the way in her room, she felt no motivation to check it. Dead people don’t use phones.
Jordan placed two fingers at the top of her neck. Nothing.
Knocking. “Open up the door. It’s Kaede.”
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Bergson informs Deleuze’s critique of projection. Besides decrying the projection of time onto space, Bergson
provides an explanation for its prevalence: it is much easier to print ourselves in homogeneous space, where
any “division” is local (in that it does not implicate a whole that it acts upon) and stable (in that it will not
be contaminated by successive states). “We introduce [space] unwittingly into our feeling of pure succession;
we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in
one another, but alongside one another; in a word we project time into space, we express duration in terms
of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch
without penetrating one another” (Bergson 2001: 101, emphasis mine). Continuity is not here the enemy. It
is just that the structure of geometrical continuity is antithetical to that of a durative continuity. (Paetsch
69, Footnote 101)

The real line is a mathematical construction composed of extensionless points. These points are extensionless by means
of the reductionism methodology discussed earlier: the decomposition of something static to simpler parts. These simpler
parts, the extensionless points, are arrived at through an infinity of divisions on this line. These extensionless points each
have a rigid boundary and are only ever in external relationship with any other extensionless point. Each extensionless point
has an identical internal structure (specifically, a shared lack of internal structure other than having a static identity) that
ensures this real line is homogeneous with respect to internal structure. The internal structure is what we mean by internal
relationships, genetic processes, unending becoming in time, not a static being separate from time.
As we have been arguing, in motivation of our mathematical-physical engagement, this erases the virtual, the productive
nature of time, creativity, the internal relational genetic process of becoming that an object is always undergoing, x 6= x.
The consequence of having these extensionless points as our models of states external to one another, the meaningful way
in which the virtual is erased from our engagement, is that we have no sense of how x is in y, not simply next to y; no sense
of how the events of Jordan falling o↵ the grid and not answering any of Kaede’s texts or calls is informing from within
the decision to march over to Jordan’s apartment to find out if she’s doing okay, and not that these are simply isolated,
external events, where Jordan’s lack of answering Kaede has no bearing whatsoever on Kaede’s decision to show up on her
doorstep, to rather be entirely reduced to a chain of efficiently causal particles and forces. The virtual, the past, informs,
constrains, the present, and thus from our process-theoretic perspective, the full understanding of y, of Kaede’s action of
showing up at Jordan’s apartment, inclusive of the process that produced y, that produced this decision of Kaede’s, is one
with an understanding of how x, the past of y, the virtual of y, Jordan’s lack of answering any texts or calls, grounds and
impels y, grounds and impels the causal action of Kaede’s showing up. The moment y does not exist as a Platonic essence
in isolation of all things, Kaede’s decision to show up at Jordan’s cannot be fully understood in complete isolation, cannot
be reduced down to just particles and forces, the moment y is the (ongoing) result of a process, and thus y is situated in a
contextual space, its virtual, its past, Jordan’s lack of answering, a space that is productive of y, a space that grounds and
impels y, a virtual x to the actual y.
Thus the continuity spoken of in relation to the real line, a string of extensionless points that are all external to one
another, is not adequate to our engagement of time that includes the virtual, where each element is in every other and not
simply next to others. A di↵erent continuity must be engaged.
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placed her hands on her ears. Why did she have to experience all of this if she were dead?
“Open up, Jordan. I know you’re in there.”
This was going to get annoying quickly. Jordan begrudgingly went to the door and opened it, letting in more light than
she had seen in weeks.
“Look at all of this mail! Are you popular now or what?” Kaede’s arms were overflowing with Jordan’s mail as she walked
inside.
“Your place is a wreck! What happened here?”
Jordan headed back to the couch and sat down. This was pointless. This must be some sort of hell.
“Have you eaten anything today?” Kaede asked.
Jordan kept staring at the wall. Kaede hurried over to the other side of the couch and sat with one of her legs beneath
her. “Hey, Jordan. What’s going on? You haven’t answered a single call, text, and now you’re acting really weird.”
“I’m dead.”
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Both Weyl and Poincaré pointed out that the term “mathematical continuity” is misleading since in the
continuum of real numbers the elements are as external with respect to each other as natural numbers. This
again was in agreement with Bergson who correctly recognized that the so called “mathematical continuity”
is nothing but “discontinuity infinitely repeated”, i.e. infinite divisibility. (Capek 52)
Typical mathematical continuity deceives us. It is still discontinuity: extensionless points are only themselves, x = x,
and are external to all others. What we want is a temporal continuity, equipped not with extensionless points that are
external to one another, but with the ability to engage process-theoretic, internal, genetic relationships. The past inside
of the present is what distinguishes mathematical continuity from temporal continuity. The terminology “mathematical
continuity” is a misnomer, an artifact from Bergson’s assertion that time cannot be engaged mathematically. We follow
Deleuze in repudiating this diagnosis. We intend to engage this temporal continuity mathematically, thus neither continuity
is more or less mathematical than the other. In the interest of clarity as we refer to each of these, we refer to the “discontinuity
infinitely repeated” external, coordinate continuity as spatial continuity, and the “past inside the present” internal, genetic
continuity as temporal continuity.
In what follows is an engagement with the history of this temporal continuity. This began with Poincaré and Russell
engaging with a perceptual continuity; there is a stronger focus on subjective perception than temporal structure here. As
such, this is not yet the fully-formed temporal continuity which we seek to engage, but we will trace this history to better
orient ourselves. After all, history matters.
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[Perceptual continuity’s] most paradoxical feature is that the relation of equality does not seem to be
transitive in it; while its two contiguous terms are indistinguishable from each other, the non-contiguous
are: A = B, B = C, A 6= C (Capek 64)

We flag from the outset, so that neither confusion with what preceded nor an incorrect intuition ossifies, that we’ve already
discussed how temporal continuity does not employ any form of identity. This means that we don’t even have A = B or
B = C, as we know B is novelly informed, constrained, grounded, impelled by the virtual inclusive of A, and the same is
said for C but by another novel virtual inclusive of B. We employ language like “inclusive of A, B” to help build intuition,
but we know that the virtual is a unity and cannot be subdivided like the real line, all of the “elements” are mutually
interpenetrating one another, they are not mutually external to one another, they are not separable in the spatial sense we
are used to. We continue to trace the history of the perceptual continuity, as we believe following how the intransitivity is
dealt with is important to our orientation, motivation, and understanding.
There seems to be an obvious way out of both Poincaré’s and Russell’s paradox [regarding the intransitivity
of the perceptual continuity] and this way was already indicated before. All we have to assume is that
qualitative continuum, whether its terms are simultaneous or successive, is merely ‘apparent’ or ‘illusory’,
and that the alleged logical difficulty stems from its ‘haziness’. In other words, this difficulty disappears
when we focus our attention on the underlying physico-mathematical continuum which is allegedly ‘the only
real’. Illustrated by a concrete example: when we gradually increase weight, pressing on our hand, from 10
to 12 grams, the only thing we must consider is the continuous range of magnitudes through which the
physical stimulus passes; within this continuum each term is sharply distinguished from any other and the
logical absurdity of the non-transitive equality can then never arise. The whole difficulty is removed, if the
scheme above A = B, B = C, A 6= C, is replaced by the following one: ‘A is indistinguishable from B, B
is indistinguishable from C, but C is distinguishable from A’. In other words, the paradox arises merely
out of the limited capacity of consciousness to di↵erentiate the minutely di↵erent stimuli. The same is
true of the intuited temporal continuum: the underlying mathematical continuum is the only real and in
it the transitivity of simultaneity is fully preserved. The apparent intransitivity of ‘temporal togetherness’
or ‘psychological simultaneity’ is due to the haziness of our temporal experience, more specifically, to the
fact that our psychological present is merely ‘specious’, without definite boundaries. The only true present
is the mathematical, instantaneous, ‘knife-edge’ present in the physico-mathematical continuum of events.
(Capek 65)
One of the moves used to explain our experience of time from a position that the universe is timeless is to assert that our
experience of time is a deficiency of consciousness. Running through the same formula Capek gives, much of our scientific
tradition can be shown to follow a faith in strict determinism, that the entirety of the past and future are completely given,
that the only thing missing is our knowledge of the relevant information to conclude the future, that it is us with our pesky
consciousness that are deficient and not the universe that is indeterminate. Once we develop more computing power we
might be able to crunch the numbers in our more complicated systems to accurately predict the future of these systems,
because it’s already available knowledge that has simply not been obtained yet. It is this series of moves that denies our
empirical experience, a pillar that science is built upon, of time in dogmatic faith towards determinism. This argument
brackets away an incredible amount of our empirical experience, calling it all a deficiency, an illusion of consciousness, said
unrigorously and then never to be engaged again because illusions would not be the kind of thing a well-respecting physicist
would involve herself with. We oppose this view.
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51 “What

do you mean? Someone threaten you down at the bar or something?”
“No. I am dead. Right now.”
“I don’t understand.”
Jordan grabbed one of Kaede’s hands and pressed it into her wrist.
“I don’t get it, what are you trying to tell me?”
“There’s no pulse.”
“Of course there’s a pulse.”
Jordan darted her eyes towards Kaede. She was lying. She grabbed Kaede’s same hand and placed it on her neck.
“I still feel a pulse.”
She moved Kaede’s hand to her chest, on top of her heart.
“Yep. You are most certainly alive.”
Jordan threw Kaede’s hand away. “You’re lying.”
“No I’m not.”
Jordan held back, not really feeling the will to fight.
Kaede jumped o↵ the couch. “You stink. When was the last time you took a shower?”
“Dead people don’t shower.”
“Shut the fuck up. You know all about what dead people do and don’t do now?”
“Why would they shower? They’re dead.”
“Right, so what di↵erence does it make if you did take a shower?”
“There’s just no point. It’s a waste of time.”
“Oh, I forgot how well you were using your time instead. Staring at the wall doing nothing seems like a great use of your
time instead of caring for your body. Come on.” Kaede tried to place her hands under Jordan’s arms, but Jordan wasn’t
being cooperative.
“I see no use in showering.”
“Yeah, well, I am here with you, right? Regardless of whether or not you are dead, I’m here in the same room as you.”
“Okay. So?”
“You smell. Bad. For my sake, I would like you to smell better while I’m sharing space with you.”
“What if a shower doesn’t help? What if what you are smelling is actually just my body decomposing because I’m dead?”
Kaede rolled her eyes and tried putting her hands back under Jordan’s arms. Jordan stumbled a bit. She didn’t have the
will to fight.
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In the first place, nobody claims that the intransitivity of equality exists on the level of physical stimuli.
Neither does anybody deny that two stimuli whose di↵erence is imperceptible are physically di↵erent, though
indistinguishable psychologically. But it is clearly meaningless to call two sensations qua sensations ‘di↵erent,
though indistinguishable’. For the sensations resulting from two minutely di↵erent stimuli are qualitatively
the same; to affirm their di↵erence despite their imperceivability, does not make sense. A di↵erence which is
neither sensed or felt, simply does not exist psychologically; if we continue to say that two indistinguishable
sensations are ‘really’ di↵erent, we are not speaking of sensations qua sensations, but of their external
stimuli. In other words, we are unconsciously slipping from the language of perceptual data to that of
physical stimuli. The paradox of the intuited continuum cannot be dismissed when we insist that it does
not exist on the physical level; it continues to exist on the psychological level whose paradoxical structure
it reveals. And this level can be called ‘appearance’ only with respect to the physical stimuli, but not with
respect to itself; for as William James stated unanswerably: “A material fact may indeed be di↵erent from
what we feel it to be, but what sense is there in saying that a feeling, which has not other nature than to
be felt, is not as it is felt?” (Capek 65-66)
We encounter another sense of what we mean when we refer to the spatialization of time: the slippage from the language
of perceptual data to that of physical stimuli. Time is engaged through lived experience; we erase the virtual when we ignore
how history grounds and impels the present, how history constitutes (but does not fully determine) the present. The real
line is of spatial continuity, whereas time operates by means of a di↵erent temporal continuity. We affirm our experience
of time and seek to engage this temporal continuity as opposed to denying the reality of our experience and placing the
spatial continuity on a pedestal as “the only real.” Both spatial and temporal continuities are real.
If we follow this perceptual, sensational continuity that Poincaré, Russell, and Capek are engaging, we see how even
though on the spatial continuity, in spatialized time, the present is modeled as an extensionless point, through our lived
experience we have a blurrier sense of the present, from which things are felt together yet successive nevertheless.
In melody, successive tones are perceived in a single durational stretch, not as simultaneous, but as successive,
but nevertheless still “at once,” provided that we understand the words “at once” not in the sense of
durationless instant, but in the sense of enduring present. (Capek 33)
Melody is another simple example that embodies our lived experience of temporal continuity. In one moment, a sound
is playing, a particular vibratory disturbance in the air is being transmitted, but that singular tone is not what we refer
to as the melody. The melody is the string of tones that happen in succession, that come together to form the singular
unit of “melody” because of how the past is inside the present. If the previous tones were not coloring the experience of
the present tone, what we feel as a melody would not exist. We would experience the singular tone being transmitted, and
a moment later we would experience a di↵erent singular tone being transmitted, but the first tone wouldn’t contextualize,
inform, color the second tone into a unifying feeling of a melody.
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53 Reductionism, through Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness, eventually reaches a set of simple parts that it
doesn’t know how to understand or what to do with.

[R]eduction to incoherence by the arbitrary definition of one principle as substantial and the other as
epistemic abstraction [. . . ] Parmenides might exclaim, “Diversity is illusory. There is only unity! There is no
change, only permanence!” while at the same time Heraclitus exclaims, “The only permanence is change!”
and Protagoras, attempting to silence them both, exclaims, “There is no objectively true statement!” The
incoherence of this method is evinced not only by the paradoxical character of these exclamations; it is
also evinced by the fact that unity cannot be defined without reference to diversity, nor diversity without
reference to unity, and likewise for the concepts of permanence and change. This clearly belies the assertion
of exclusive ontological primacy for either concept over its counterpart. (Epperson 22)
One side is taken as more fundamental, more concrete, from which the other is said to be derivative. We can feel the
resonance between this formulation and the one between the possible and the real, where one (the real) is more fundamental
from which the other (the possible) is derivative, in the image of the real.
Popular applications of reductionism include projects like the Standard Model of Particle Physics or Grand Unifying
Theories of Everything (GUTs). These projects are making the same error Deleuze criticizes Kant of making: Kant looked to
exhaustively give the range of “possible experience” indexed to a finite, static, self-identical, delimited, rigid set of categories.
In opposition to this, Deleuze argues that the conditions are in a dynamical reciprocal determination relationship with the
conditioned. The possible and the real are not in a dynamic relationship of this kind, but the virtual and the actual are.
Similarly, the Standard Model of Particle Physics is looking to construct a finite, static, self-identical, delimited, rigid set
of particles and forces from which the entirety of reality, past and future, can be reduced to or deduced from. Any such
GUTs is looking to construct a finite, static, self-identical, rigid, ultimate equation from which the entirety of reality, past
and future, can be reduced to or deduced from. This method of reduction to something static, self-identical, fixed, or going
the other way around the method of deduction from something static, self-identical, fixed, is guilty of erasing the virtual,
guilty of erasing the dynamic relationship between the actual and the virtual, guilty of erasing time, guilty of erasing the
productive nature of time, creativity. Again, we come face to face with the dogmatic deterministic assertion that everything
the universe is, was, will be, is already completely given, that the only problem is our knowledge.
If not reductionism, if not positing static, self-identical axioms from which we reach conclusions by way of deduction,
what is it that we’re doing? Having mutually exclusive, externally related principles (recall an extensionless point) from
which we understand relationships between always already constituted entities with isolable identities as bipolar (objectivity
and subjectivity, necessity and contingency, conceptual and physical, global and local, continuous and discrete, virtual and
actual (Epperson 4)), erases time, the dynamism of time, the creativity of an unending becoming, through referring to any of
these as static, self-identical, isolated terms with static, self-identical, rigid definitions. We’re then left, through Whitehead’s
fallacy of misplaced concreteness, to bicker about the status of these so-called simple parts:
[T]he method of reduction and assimilation rightly recognizes the need to bring into coherence mutually
exclusive, incommensurable categorical principles; but it wrongly grasps for that coherence by arbitrarily
restricting the speculative schematization of the experience of nature to certain preferred categories of
thought, in exclusion of other categories that could just as reasonably be characterized as fundamental. By
this method, nature is always either fundamentally physical or fundamentally conceptual; either fundamentally continuous or fundamentally quantum; either fundamentally finite or infinite; either fundamentally
deterministic or indeterministic. When one considers the increasingly profuse inflations of physical cosmological models into metaphysical cosmologies, their stipulated significance is belied by the fact that one can
casually assemble practically any combination of the above qualifications and find a correlate interpretation
of quantum theory or string theory or some other physical cosmology that can accommodate it. (Epperson
13-14)
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54 Kaede

dragged her to the bathroom. “Are you going to shower if I leave you in here alone?”
“If you leave me in here alone, I won’t need to shower anymore because I won’t be sharing space with you anymore.”
Kaede’s jaw dropped. “You can’t be serious! You didn’t die, you became a toddler again!”
Kaede turned the water on and stripped Jordan of the clothes she had been wearing for however many days it’s been.
“Come on, baby Jordan. In you go.” Kaede was holding Jordan’s hand, leading her into the shower. Kaede stayed outside
of the curtain but grabbed the removable shower head.
The water felt warm. Did it only feel warm because her body was losing its body heat? With no blood pumping through
the body, it makes sense for there to be a substantial drop in body temperature. The warmth felt good. She didn’t realize
how much she took her body heat for granted. Kaede grabbed Jordan’s loofah, scrubbing her back. This would be really
awkward if she was alive. Only one of them was naked, and she barely knew this girl.
“Tilt your head back so I can do your hair.”
There was a pain coming from inside of her, near her stomach. Her body must be breaking down. Maybe this shower will
be a good thing; if she has to be part of a funeral viewing in a few hours, she’ll at least look her best.
“What’s this dot on your ankle?”
They both looked down at Jordan’s ankle. “It’s a birthmark.”
“How long have you had it?”
“Since birth?”
“I’ve never seen it before though.”
“You’ve never seen my ankles before.”
Kaede stared a bit longer.
“Quit staring at my feet, you’re creeping me out.” Jordan shifted her feet behind one another.
Kaede’s expression was rigid.
“How about you hand me a towel?”
“Is the dead girl feeling cold?” Kaede snapped out of whatever trance she was in, poking fun at Jordan.
“No, just wet.” Jordan grabbed the towel out of Kaede’s hands and dried herself before wrapping it around her chest.
“Cold is a feeling, wet is a property. Dead people don’t have feelings.”
“Can you handle getting dressed without me?”
“Yes.”
“Do you even have clean clothes?”
“Somewhere.”
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55 If the qualifier bipolar aligns itself with reductionism, being able to decompose something down to two, determinate,
fixed, eternal, always already constituted, rigidly defined simple parts that are in mutually external relations, we instead
assert mutually implicative, internally related principles (recall the past inside the present, the virtual and the actual)
from which we understand relationships as dipolar (objectivity and subjectivity, necessity and contingency, conceptual and
physical, global and local, continuous and discrete (Epperson 4)). Thus we understand these so-called simple parts through
the dynamic reciprocal determination relationship between each simple part as a process in time whose history matters,
whose history constitutes (but does not fully determine) the simple parts in question, their identities are relational processes
in time.

By this method of ‘dipolar’ relation it is explicitly recognized that the conception of one principle necessarily
requires reference to its counterpart principle. Thus each relatum constitutive of dipolar conceptual pairs is
always contextualized by both the other relatum and the relation as a whole, such that neither the relata
(the parts) nor the relation (the whole) can be adequately or meaningfully defined apart from their mutual
reference. It is impossible, therefore, to conceptualize one principle in a dipolar pair in abstraction from its
counterpart principle. Neither principle can be conceived as ‘more fundamental than,’ or ‘wholly derivative
of’ the other. (Epperson 4)
This is a process-theoretic perspective where nothing is fixed, neither the conditions nor the conditioned, everything is
in flux. But, we know that even though everything is undergoing unending becoming, this doesn’t mean that we can’t say
anything about the structure involved. We refer back to the notion of a topological invariant, a property of a system that
persists amongst constant change, in contrast to a universal property, a property of a system that is not open to change
but rather asserts a lack of change, “always the case. . . ”, an erasure of time, an erasure of creativity.
Thus we advocate against exclusive, (external) bipolar relationships in favor of being inclusive of (internal) dipolar
relationships. An intuitive way of thinking each of these is that an external relationship is putting two objects (already
constituted, x = x) into relation, whereas an internal relationship is the production of an object in process (the becoming of
an object’s constitution, x 6= x). This is felt through our affirmation of time, process, history, creativity. If an object is not
a static, self-identical, timeless, rigidly-defined essence that exists first which is subsequently put into external relationship,
but rather an object is a dynamic, in-time, unending becoming, in-process, constituted (but not fully determined) by its
internal relationships, then we are putting a relational foot forward. What it means to be an object is to be in-process,
in-relationship. If there is no internal relationship, no history, no time, then we are no longer speaking of an object in reality.
Why is di↵erentiation an “actualization”? Because it presupposes a unity, a virtual primordial totality that
is dissociated according to the lines of di↵erentiation, but that still shows its subsisting unity and totality
in each line. Thus, when life is divided into plant and animal, when the animal is divided into instinct and
intelligence, each side of the division, each ramification, carries the whole with it. From a certain perspective
it is like an accompanying nebulosity, testifying to its undivided origin. And there is a halo of instinct in
intelligence, a nebula of intelligence in instinct, a hint of the animate in plants, and of the vegetable in
animals. Di↵erentiation is always the actualization of a virtuality that persists across its actual divergent
lines. (Deleuze 95)
Deleuze explicates how a dipolar relation is such a relation through each of the two “poles” being grounded in a common
unity: the virtual. Two actualizations, two di↵erentiations, two objects that have become into distinct identities, have the
other inside of them, a dipolar relationship, one cannot be separated from the other or their relation, because of their
common grounding in the virtual.
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For Parmenides, the reduction of potentiality to actuality implied related reductions of other mutually
exclusive principle-pairs, such as creativity vs. discovery. [. . . ] The ground of any experience interpreted
as creativity (instead of understood as discovery) is the epistemic restriction or contextualization of all
experience within our necessarily finite observational structures. (Epperson 9)
Discovery is understood here as having everything already completely given, the only thing missing is our knowledge.
Thus nothing is invented, nothing is created, originality does not exist; rather things are discovered, di↵erent configurations
of the same finite building blocks are rearranged, and we claim remixing the already known set of delimited building blocks
into novel combinations for us but not to the universe is what we mean by originality. Again, we feel how this erases time,
the virtual, the dynamic relationship between the virtual and the actual, the productive nature of time, creativity, for the
universe, not just bracketed to a deficiency of consciousness and of our miniscule knowledge.
The ontology of the world is a matter of discovery for the traditional realist. The assumed one-to-one
correspondence between scientific theories and reality is used to bolster the further assumption that scientific
entities are unmarked by the discoverers: nature is taken to be revealed by, yet independent of, theoretical
and experimental practices, that is, transparently given. (Barad 41)
Discovery vs creativity takes the form of revealed by vs created by. Notice, we are encountering another dogmatic assumption in this timeless, discovery, revealed-by, perspective: nature is independent of, separate from our practices, that nature
can be engaged while abstracting away our practices, of our engagement. Recall that the abstracting away of practices
is a rewording of abstracting away processes, histories, time. Nature only has a static, self-identical, fixed, transparent,
completely given reality when we erase time. If nature is also in time, in process, in unending becoming, which is to say that
nature is not completely given, then the way in which nature becomes, how nature moves through time, what the histories
and processes that constitute (but do not fully determine) nature are integral to understanding nature as a nature in time,
as a nature in dynamic relationship, as a nature not completely given, as a creative nature.
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57 Kaede

strode into the kitchen. “Let’s make you something to eat.”
Jordan walked into her room, looking around at the mountains of clothes. Nothing she would choose to wear was going
to matter. How does anyone make a decision about anything when none of their decisions matter?
“All of your food is expired,” Kaede called out from across the apartment. “Have you not been eating anything?”
Jordan came into the kitchen, still in her towel. “Can’t you just leave me alone? I don’t need to eat.”
“I am not leaving you alone for you to just kill yourself.”
“I’m already dead.”
“No. You aren’t. Not to me at least.”
Jordan sighed. She didn’t want to fight but she was sick of pretending like she was alive. It felt so draining. Dead people
should behave like they’re dead, not pretend to be something they’re not.
“Do you need help picking out clothes? Let’s do this together.” Kaede grabbed Jordan’s hand and dragged her back into
her room.
“Do you feel colder or hotter right now?”
“I don’t feel anything.”
“Perfect. Super helpful. Okay, I would say it’s about room temperature in here, maybe a teensy bit below that, and you
clearly are spending a lot of time inside. How about some comfy clothes. Sweatpants? Sweatshirt?”
Jordan didn’t respond.
“Okay. Right on.” Kaede rummaged through the clothes on the floor. “Here.” Kaede sni↵ed the sweatshirt in her hands
and gave a little nod of approval. “This should work.”
Kaede opened the drawers of Jordan’s dresser. “Do you really not have a single pair of clean underwear?”
Jordan shrugged her towel o↵ and pulled the oversized sweater over her head.
“Hold on, I have extra clothes in my car. I’ll grab you some underwear.” Kaede walked out of the apartment and closed
the door behind her.
This was her chance to get rid of her. Jordan could stop going through these exhausting motions that living people
constantly go through. She flipped the deadbolt, locking Kaede out.
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Essence thus becomes the trajectory of stabilization [. . . ]. In contrast, Haraway (1988) emphasizes instability:
it is the instability of boundaries defining objects that is the focal point of her explicit challenge not only to
conceptions of nature that claim to be outside of culture, but also to the separation of epistemology from
ontology. (Barad 41)
Essentialism seems appealing because of the stability o↵ered, x = x, thus we can do work with x. However, as we have
been arguing, in motivation of our mathematical-physical engagement, this erases time in contradiction to our empirical
experience. Thus, despite essentialism o↵ering higher precision through stable, determinate, rigid, static, self-identical, fixed
boundaries to who or what things are, it is the instability of who or what things are, due to being in process, in unending
becoming, in time, that we find higher accuracy when it comes to engaging reality.
Our arguments that nature itself is in time, in process, in unending becoming, not completely given, extend to culture
as it is typically referenced in opposition to nature. This is another mutually implicative pair. Nature and culture are not
isolated, disconnected, fixed, rigid, static, self-identical, timeless objects but are rather always informing, contextualizing,
constraining, mutating, dynamizing one another. And once more, epistemology and ontology are a mutually implicative
pair. What it means to know something is not as clearly cut, disconnected, separated, distanced from what it means to
be something. This is felt in Epperson and Zafiris’s reversal that objects be understood not by their histories but as their
histories.
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59 Where are we and where are we going? We must spend time meditating and sorting out this essentialism, a language
inadequate for time, because we ultimately want to engage time. Essentialism is a default language within much of the
Western natural sciences and analytic philosophy traditions,

[M]ost forms of realism presuppose a metaphysics that takes for granted the existence of individual entities,
each with its own roster of nonrelational properties. As such, realism is often saddled with essentialism.
But realism need not subscribe to an individualist metaphysics or any other representationalist tenet (indeed, I would argue that any realist account worth its salt should not endorse such idealist or magical
beliefs). Realness does not necessarily imply “thingness”: what’s real may not be an essence, an entity, or
an independently existing object with inherent attributes. (Barad 55-56)
We have been arguing, in motivation of our mathematical-physical engagement, that essentialism is aligned with erasing
processes, erasing temporal continuity, erasing becoming, allied with spatial continuity, allied with set theory, allied with
the extensionless point.
Because we seek to engage time we must construct what a “moment” in time is. Through affirming the reality of time we
are disparaging the understanding of time as a spatial dimension, which models a moment in time as a spatial extensionless
point, with no distinction between past and future. In order to shed our essentialist tendencies to better orient ourselves
and motivate our eventual construction of a moment in time, we must better understand why the dominant traditions do
not work for our intended goal.
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door handle jiggled.
“Hey, does your door lock itself when it closes? It’s just me, I got you some clean underwear and I grabbed a pair of my
own sweatpants too.”
The door handle shook again.
“This isn’t funny, Jordan. Let me in. I know you’re there, I was just inside with you.”
“Leave me alone!” Jordan yelled through the closed door.
“I’m not going to do that.”
“Why? I barely know you. You shouldn’t care.”
There was a pause. “Just let me back in, Jordan. I don’t want to cause a commotion for the neighbors begging you to
put on underwear from out here.”
“Why should I care what they think? I’m dead.”
It didn’t matter whether or not Kaede believed her, the truth was the truth.
“Yeah, well, whether or not you think you’re alive, you’re still here interacting with me, right? What do you think is
worse, having to deal with me, or having to deal with the police? If you don’t let me in, I’m going to call them and tell
them you are a danger to yourself.”
Why was this girl trying so hard? It was irritating. Jordan flipped the bolt and Kaede opened the door instantly, not
allowing any room for reconsideration.
“Put these clothes on, okay?”
“Whatever.”
As Jordan was putting them on, Kaede walked back to the kitchen. “So all of your perishables have perished. Where do
you keep your snacks?” She opened one and found a large container of peanuts. “Why do you have peanuts here? Aren’t
you allergic to peanuts?”
“No. Why would you think that I’m allergic to peanuts?”
“I just thought you were for some reason. Never mind. I love peanuts. Do you want to eat some?”
It’s like she wasn’t even listening. “Dead people don’t eat.”
“If you don’t eat some peanuts, I’m going to call the cops.”
Jordan resentfully grabbed a handful of peanuts and put one in her mouth. “Are you always this manipulative?”
Kaede laughed. “Only when you’re trying to kill yourself.”
“I’m—“
“I know, you’re already dead. I got it, Jordan.”
They stood there, leaning against the kitchen counter, munching on some peanuts.
“I’m really not hungry. How many do I have to eat?”
“Finish what’s in your hand.”
Jordan’s eyes went wide, realizing how much she grabbed. She needed this to be over. She shoved her hand over her
mouth, tossing in all of the peanuts at once.
Kaede snorted. “Y’know, not many people would take that as the action of someone who isn’t very hungry.”
Kaede grabbed a glass and filled it with water from the sink. “I guess the silver lining of you being dead means even
though the apartment is dirty, your glassware and plates and utensils are all nice and clean.”
Jordan took the glass of water and chugged it, washing down all of the peanuts in the process.
“I’m proud of you for getting that down! What should we do next? Laundry?”
Jordan looked towards the ground. Drained. Kaede walked forward and wrapped her arms around Jordan, hugging her
tightly.
“Just leave me alone, okay?”
“Okay.”
The hug lingered for a few more beats.
Hemiola. Jordan pushed Kaede o↵ of her and put her hand on her wrist. Nothing.
“I’ll come by later. We can do laundry then.”
Jordan put her hand on the side of her neck. Nothing.
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The idea that beings exist as individuals with inherent attributes, anterior to their representation, is a
metaphysical presupposition that underlies the belief in political, linguistic, and epistemological forms of
representationalism. Or to put the point the other way around, representationalism is the belief in the
ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular,
that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. That is, there are
assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and entities to be represented.
The system of representation is sometimes explicitly theorized in terms of a tripartite arrangement. For
example, in addition to knowledge (i.e., representations), on the one hand, and the known (i.e., that which
is purportedly represented), on the other, the existence of a knower (i.e., someone who does the representing)
is sometimes made explicit. When this happens, it becomes clear that representations are presumed to serve a
mediating function between independently existing entities. This taken-for-granted ontological gap generates
questions of the accuracy of representations. For example, does scientific knowledge accurately represent an
independently existing reality? Does language accurately represent its referent? (Barad 46-47)
Representationalism is a taken-for-granted presupposition of much of our scientific pursuits. Decided ahead of time is
the determinate being of a completely given nature, and what follows as the scientist’s job is to model nature with a
representation. The strength of the model is determined by means of the correspondence between the model and the
determinate, already completely given nature. Thus the only thing “changing” are our models, our knowledge, all the while
we both assume and take for granted the definition, the production of, the creativity of, the boundaries of, the becoming of
who we are and of what nature is, both of which are relegated to a timeless, static, self-identical, fixed realm. As we have
been arguing, in motivation of our mathematical-physical engagement, this framework has already erased time, erased the
virtual, erased the dynamic reciprocal determination between the virtual and the actual, erased the real productivity of
time, creativity. This framework has abstracted away, bracketed aside, the processes, the practices, which constitute (but
do not fully determine) all things in time. In the example of Jordan and Kaede, it would be like saying there always already
exists a determinate essence to who each Jordan or Kaede are in isolation from all other people, things, contexts; then
when someone like Kaede interacts with Jordan, there is merely a knowledge creation process, of Kaede learning about the
determinate, always already rigidly defined Jordan, of Jordan learning about the determinate, always already rigidly defined
Kaede. In opposition to this, we understand who Jordan even is or who Kaede even is is the product of these interactive,
dynamic, relational processes, practices.
Rouse identifies representationalism as a Cartesian byproduct—a particularly inconspicuous consequence of
the Cartesian division between “internal” and “external” that breaks along the line of the knowing subject.
Rouse brings to light the asymmetrical faith in word over world that underlines the nature of Cartesian
doubt:
I want to encourage doubt about [the] presumption that representations (that is, their meaning
or content) are more accessible to us than the things they supposedly represent. If there is no
magic language through which we can unerringly reach out directly to its referents, why should
we think there is nevertheless a language that magically enables us to reach out directly to its
sense or representational content? The presumption that we can know what we mean, or what
our verbal performances say, more readily than we can know the objects those sayings are
about is a Cartesian legacy, a linguistic variation on Descartes’ insistence that we have a direct
and privileged access to the contents of our thoughts which we lack towards the “external”
world. (Rouse 1996, 209)
In other words, the asymmetrical faith we place in our access to representations over things is a historically
and culturally contingent belief that is part of Western philosophy’s legacy and not a logical necessity; that
is, it is simply a Cartesian habit of mind. (Barad 49)
The method of representationalism asserts that there is an “objective” reality that is separate from our interaction with
it. The practice of developing mediating models between us and this “objective” reality is called into question by Rouse,
arguing that if the world exists separate and distinct from us, why is it that we feel we have a more direct access to our
mediating models? Should these mediating models not have their own mediating mechanisms, tested for validity based on
correspondence? How are we to know, determinately, what each word means, what each symbol means? What Rouse is
trying to highlight is that the representationalist is the one who places languages on a pedestal, the one that believes our
words have determinate meanings that perfectly and transparently describe exactly their referent. As we have been arguing,
in motivation of our mathematical-physical engagement, we oppose this.
Representationalism takes the notion of separation as foundational. It separates the world into the ontologically disjunct domains of words and things, leaving itself with the dilemma of their linkage such that
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knowledge is possible. If words are untethered from the material world, how do representations gain a
foothold? If we no longer believe that the world is teeming with inherent resemblances whose signatures are
inscribed on the face of the world, things already emblazoned with signs, words lying in wait like so many
pebbles of sand on a beach there to be discovered, but rather that the mind cannot see its way to objects that
are now forever out of reach and all that is visible is the sticky problem of humanity’s own captivity within
language, then it becomes apparent that representationalism is a prisoner of the problematic metaphysics it
postulates. Like the frustrated would-be runner in Zeno’s paradox, representationalism never seems to get
any closer to solving the problem it poses because it is caught in the impossibility of stepping outward from
its metaphysical starting place. What is needed is a new starting place. (Barad 137)
Words and meanings themselves are in time, in unending becoming, in process, their history matters, the practices of
their usage matters, their boundaries are not determinate. We don’t go out on a word expedition only to discover a word
with its definition like finding already formed pebbles of sand on a beach. Words and their definitions are processes in time.
Calling attention to this fact is not meant to conclude that due to have no fixed, rigid boundaries that everything must be
a jumbled mess where nothing can be adequately engaged because precision is lost. Recall that instability is more accurate
than the precision of stability. Time has a structure that is inclusive of change, becoming, process, instability.
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First, objects are known only relative to theories. A theory does not just explicate a pre-existing essence.
[. . . ] We must resist the temptation to posit static, self-identical essences. Theories do not just transpose the
properties of pre-given essences from static eternity to dynamic present. They actualize virtualities—and this
actualization is a radically novel genesis inflected uniquely in time. Second, identifying mathematical reality
with static essences is, frankly, dogmatic. It is an a priori decision, one that indulges so many biases—such as
those towards identity, immobility, sedentary distribution. [. . . ] Consider again the ellipse: is it an algebraic
equation? Conic section? A “locus of points such that the sum of their distances to the foci is constant”
(Lautman)? Is it the essence containing all possible properties of the ellipse? If we plump for the latter, we
have to commit to the essence being inexhaustible. Who could prove it was exhausted? Who could prove that
no forthcoming theory would reveal anything new about it? Mathematical reality would exceed always a
discursive intellect. But—and here is the problem with static essences—we cast also these “new revelations”
as “not really new”: they were contained already within the essence! Its inexhaustibility is not an “objective”
feature of the essence, only a reflection of a “subjective” condition. But what grounds this dismissal of novel
discoveries if not a bias against the possibility that concepts evolve in time? That they are indeterminate
not just for us but in themselves; that they dissipate errantly a coiled force (which is a function of its aspect
upon a problem) in time—Lautman refuses to conceive otherwise of mathematical concepts. Okay, we forgo
essences. How about reducing the ellipse to a “canonical” equation? But that an ellipse is now an equation,
now a geometrical figure introduces a certain undecidability. Is one specification “more fundamental” than
the other? Who decides? Again, Lautman urges us to take seriously this undecidability: it is expressive of
mathematical reality, not just of subjective ignorance. If an ellipse were essentially geometrical, algebraic
equations would be derivative, almost inessential. Why prioritize geometry over algebra? For Lautman, such
pseudo-problems are symptoms of a tendency to regard mathematical reality as static and complete in itself.
The latter is never a trivial assumption. Besides being philosophically portentous, it countermands the
very character of mathematics: its love of transformation, its startling surprises, the bizarre complicity of
disparate theories. (Paetsch 146)
Going back as far as Plato, mathematical reality is often considered to be static, eternal, timeless, determinate; that
there may not be any perfect triangles in physical reality, but we sure can have a perfect triangle in mathematical reality
and start rattling o↵ the static properties of this essence. What Lautman is highlighting here is that mathematical reality
is likewise not eternal, timeless, static. There is no determinate, static, rigid, fixed definition for what an ellipse is: there
are not only di↵erent ways of defining an ellipse (geometrically, algebraically, . . . ) where crucially none of these have any
fundamental priority over the others, but we cannot determinately say that our definitions capture everything about this
essence of the ellipse. What we mean when we refer to an ellipse is thus in process, in unending becoming, always open,
never exhausted, never reaching a determinate being of x = x. When new things are “discovered” about the ellipse, this
essentialist, representationalist, erasure of time bias says “This property was in the ellipse all along, part of its eternal,
static, globally-defined essence! It was only our knowledge that was lacking! Everything has always been completely given,
we just have to get past our pesky subjectivity, this illusion of time, this emphatically local experience!”
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63 Jordan was working on the dredge again. Kaede convinced her that even the living dead needed to get by somehow.
That was before she moved in with Jordan. Kaede practically forced her way into moving in with how often she came over,
but getting by was easier with a partner, right? Still, Jordan increasingly needed the respect of not being treated like a
living person the way Kaede kept asserting. At first the dredge represented a job, an activity aligned with the living, but
over time became a reprieve, a solitary place where she could just feel dead.
Kaede let herself in with the key Jordan made her. No light spilled in behind her so it must have been night time.
“Do you know what I’ve been thinking about lately?”
“What?”
“Going to a club.”
“Then go.”
“I want you to come with me.”
“Why?”
Kaede grabbed Jordan’s hand and dragged her onto the couch. “Please?”
“It’s pointless.”
“I think it’d be a lot of fun. I used to have a lot of fun.”
“You don’t seem like the kind of girl who would enjoy going to clubs. I mean, I met you at at an uppity piano bar. Those
two scenes don’t usually overlap.”
“I didn’t enjoy going to clubs, but a friend of mine dragged me there and we had a lot of fun.”
“Friend?”
“Yeah.”
“Sort of how like we are friends?”
“Is that what we are, Jordan?” Kaede refused to avert her eyes. Jordan didn’t feel good about being watched like this.
Her thoughts don’t matter. Questions prompt anxiety. She needed this to be over.
“Pick out some clothes for me. I’ve never been to a club before.”
Kaede jumped up smiling, quickly hugging Jordan and then scurrying o↵ to their bedroom to wade through the clean
clothes for a suitable outfit.
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64 “Quantum

physics undercuts reductionism as a worldview or universal explanatory framework.” (Barad 24) Quantum
mechanics is an arena where we can find clear examples to engage on our journey of learning and developing the tools about
this dynamic creative nature in time, the tools necessary for our mathematical-physical engagement of time; an engagement
that does not employ reductionism of the static, self-identical, fixed, in external relation (extensionless points), but rather
an engagement that employs mutually implicative relationships of the dynamic, unending becoming, in internal relation
(past inside the present). We want to be clear: despite turning to quantum mechanics, we are not turning to a separate
“micro world,” as Barad puts it, “To ask whether it is not suspect to apply arguments made specifically for microscopic
entities to the macroscopic world is, in this case, to mistake the approach as analogical. The epistemological and ontological
issues are not circumscribed by the size of Planck’s constant” (Barad 70). Jumping in,
Bohr’s naturalist commitment to understanding both the nature of nature and the nature of science according to what our best scientific theories tell us led him to what he took to be the heart of the lesson of
quantum physics: we are a part of that nature that we seek to understand. (Barad 67)
We are in a dynamic, reciprocally determining, in process, in time, unending becoming relationship with nature. The
process of what nature is is tangled with us. The process of who we are is tangled in nature. If we are to take the conclusions
of our affirmation of time seriously, then we must let go of the desire to construct models as a mediating construction between
ourselves and a completely given nature. We must account for the process by which nature comes to be. We are a part of
that process, thus we must account for our role in nature. Nature is not completely given, awaiting discovery, rather nature
is created, in time, and involves, among so many other agencies, ourselves.
This can be felt from an angle of throwing aside bipolar dualisms whose poles are separated, always already fully constituted, rigidly-defined, in favor of dipolar mutually implicative relational poles.
The realism-antirealism distinction is often drawn on the basis of questions about belief in a correspondence
theory of truth, which is rooted in subject-object, culture-nature, word-world dualisms. The separation of
epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of these dualisms. Bohr’s philosophy clearly contests the
Cartesian (inherent, fixed, unambiguous) subject-object distinction in a way that undermines the very
foundations of classical epistemology and ontology. (Barad 125)
Discovery through, transparency of, separation of, individuality of, completely given except to knowledge passive gazing
versus active, dynamic, in process, creation is specifically what we are engaging here. All of these puzzle pieces became front
and center when quantum mechanics came on the scene.
Representationalism and Newtonian physics have roots in the seventeenth century. The assumption that
language is a transparent medium that transmits a homologous picture of reality to the knowing mind
finds its parallel in a scientific theory that takes observation to be the benign facilitator of discovery, a
transparent lens passively gazing at the world. Just as words provide descriptions or representations of a
preexisting reality, observations reveal preexisting properties of an observation-independent reality. In the
twentieth century, both the representational or mimetic status of language and the inconsequentiality of the
observational process have been called into question. (Barad 97)
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65 “Do

you want a drink?” Kaede shouted over the music.
Jordan responded with a glare.
“Fine. But if I know anything, I know the dead can dance.”
The dance floor was hundreds of eyes. Everyone was in their own worlds but their eyes were transfixed onto her as they
danced and talked with others. Unnerving. The thump of the bass was overwhelming but o↵ered a hopeful escape from this
a↵air. Jordan moved a few inches away from Kaede. She closed her eyes and let herself wander away.
Hands around her waist. Another body pressed up against her. Jordan opened her eyes and spun around. She was
confident that her eyes must have been filled with death and decomposition, anyone should be able to pick out a dead
woman compared to an alive woman. This guy didn’t seem to care. He moved his hands upwards, groping her chest, not
even raising his eyes for any check of approval. It almost seemed to calm the anxiety. Instead of a person she was an object.
It felt true. Someone finally acknowledging the state of things as they were. Dead people aren’t people. Jordan took his
hand and walked him over to the bathrooms.
They still hadn’t even exchanged pleasantries, much less names. He flipped her around facing a toilet in the stall and
bent her over. Jordan’s hands were against the wall just above the toilet. She made no sounds. She felt nothing. But that’s
how objects feel, right? Objects don’t feel anything because they are objects.
“That’s right. Right there. That good?”
He wasn’t asking. Her answer was irrelevant. No lingering pause waiting for a response.
He picked up speed, grunted loudly, and pulled out during ejaculation.
“Thanks,” he said, picking up his pants before walking straight out of the bathroom.
The ejaculate was uncomfortable. Jordan grabbed a wad of toilet paper and started cleaning herself up. Discomfort was
one way to motivate dead people, but she didn’t feel uncomfortable as he was using her, just the lingering fluid left to dry.
Creeping closer to who she knew she really was.
She washed herself up and walked out of the bathroom. Eyes. The peace she managed to get behind in the bathroom
stall only lasted so long.
A new guy walked up to her.
“I’m pretty sure I just saw a guy come out of this women’s room. You alright?”
“Yeah, I didn’t even notice.”
Objects are never alright or not alright. The amount of people treating her like she was alive was infuriating. She wanted
to be used again. Put back on the level she knows herself to be at.
“Listen, I’m sorry for the way our last conversation went. I really didn’t mean to come o↵ the way I did, making it seem
like I cared more about going on a date with you than any of the shit going on in your life. I admit, it was selfish. But it’s
pretty cool seeing you come back here again. I’ve missed you.”
First Kaede thinks she knows her. “I’m sorry, who are you?”
He laughed. “Wow, okay. That’s how you want to play it. I’m Krzys. Nice to meet you.” He extended his hand for a
handshake.
“Say Krzys, are you still into me?” Whoever this Krzys guy was, he already admitted to being selfishly into Jordan. He
dropped from the sky as exactly what she needed to soothe the anxiety of observation right now. Jordan looked around the
room. Kaede was over by a giant speaker, standing still, solemnly looking right at Jordan, just like everyone else was.
He left his hand frozen in front of him. “Is this a trick question?”
Jordan locked eyes with Kaede. She grabbed Krzys’s hand, spun around, and led him into the women’s bathroom.
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66 Let’s

follow Barad through a famous example, the double-slit experiment.

From the perspective of classical mechanics, the two-slit experiment evidences a stark distinction between
particle and wave behaviors. When particles are aimed at the partition with the double slits, we find that
most of the particles land on the detection screen directly opposite each of the two openings in the partition,
with a smaller number scattered o↵ to either side. The bimodal pattern [...] is a graphical representation
of this result: it indicates the number of particles that are collected at each location along the screen and
shows that the bulk of particles are found directly across from the slits. (Barad 101-102)
Waves, on the other hand, exhibit a very di↵erent pattern. When waves impinge on a barrier with two
openings, they spread out as they emerge from each of the slits. The emerging waves interfere with one
another. When the interfering waves reach the screen, the greatest intensity will be at the centerline between
the two openings. As one moves o↵ to the sides, the resulting wave amplitude alternates from areas of
constructive interference (high intensity, e.g., bright lines) to areas of destructive interference (low intensity,
e.g., dark lines). This overall pattern exhibited by waves is called an interference or di↵raction pattern.
(Barad 102)
[W]hat happens if we perform this experiment using electrons? The surprising–indeed, startling–result is that
electrons, tiny particles of matter, produce a di↵raction pattern! [...] Are the electrons somehow “interfering”
with one another? We can in fact eliminate this possibility by sending each electron through one at a time.
That is, we fire one electron at the double slits and wait until it hits the detection screen before sending
the next one. [...] What do we see after sending the first particle through? We find a single mark on the
detection screen indicating the position of the electron as it arrived at the screen. So far this seems to follow
our classical-physics intuition that electrons are little particles. This happens for each and every electron
run that is collected: each electron arrives at a well-defined location on the screen. But here’s the rub: we
collect the data for each event, and look at the overall pattern after a large number of electrons have gone
through, and what do we observe? An interference pattern–the electrons manifest wave behavior! But how
is this possible? unlike the case of water waves, which go through both slits at once, the electrons are sent
through one at a time. Does an individual electron “interfere” with itself? Does a single electron somehow
go through both slits at once? How can this be? Doesn’t each electron go through one slit or the other?
(Barad 102)
Suppose we alter the apparatus in such a way that we can detect which slit an individual electron passes
through on its way to the screen. [...] What do we find? Bohr argued that if we were to perform a two-slit
experiment with a which-path device (which can be used to determine which slit each electron goes through
on its way to the detecting screen), we would find that the interference pattern is destroyed. That is, if a
measurement is made that identifies the electron as a particle, as is the case when we use a which-path
detector, then the result will be a particle pattern, not the wave pattern that results when the original
unmodified two-slit apparatus is used. But this result makes the situation even more confusing than ever–is
the electron a particle or a wave? How can we get di↵erent results using di↵erent experimental apparatuses?
(Barad 102-104)
According to Bohr, either we can find out which slit an electron goes through by using the which-path
apparatus, in which case the resulting pattern will be that which characterizes particles, or we can forego
knowledge about which path the electron goes through (using the original unmodified two-slit apparatus)
and obtain a wave pattern–we can’t have it both ways at once. In some important ways, this all seems very
sensible, but the implications are nothing short of revolutionary. Notice what the complementary nature
of these results means: the nature of the observed phenomenon changes with corresponding changes in
the apparatus. But this is contrary both to the ontology assumed by classical physics, wherein each entity
(e.g., the electron) is either a wave or a particle, independent of experimental circumstances, and to the
epistemological assumption that experiments reveal the preexisting determinate nature of the entity being
measured. Bohr’s conclusion, as we will see, is that classical physics, along with the classical epistemological
and ontological assumptions on which it is based, is fundamentally flawed. (Barad 106)
What we refer to when we say “electron” is thus not a determinate, static, self-identical, rigidly-defined fundamental
building block that the universe can be reduced down to, its nature is in process, dependent on context, what Whitehead
terms “subjective”–it is a mistake to search for a “discovery” of the “true” and “objective” nature of the electron as if this
were an always already determinate particle (or wave) always already with a finite set of delimited determinate properties
such as charge and mass. An electron as particle is a creation between the electron in question and its specific context
(e.g. measuring system with a which-path device), and electron as wave is a creation between the object in question and
its specific context (e.g. measuring system without a which-path device). We place importance on how much work the
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word “between” is pulling: to understand objects not as static essences discovered but as productions of relational processes
created in time.
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Classical epistemological and ontological assumptions, such as the ones found to underlie Newtonian physics,
include the existence of individual objects with determinate properties that are independent of our experimental investigations of them. This accounts for the fact that the process of measurement is transparent and
external to the discourse of Newtonian science. It is assumed that objects and observers occupy physically
and conceptually separable positions. Objects are assumed to possess individually determinate attributes,
and it is the job of the scientist to cleverly discern these inherent characteristics by obtaining the values
of the corresponding observation-independent variables through some benignly invasive measurement procedure. The reproducibility of measured values under the methodology of controlled experimentation is used
to support the objectivist claim that what has been obtained is a representation of intrinsic properties
that characterize the objects of an observation-independent reality. The transparency of the measurement
process in Newtonian physics is a root cause of its value to, and prestige within, the Enlightenment culture
of objectivism. (Barad 106-107)
There is a clinging to a certain constructed notion of “objectivity” — measurement as something transparent, external,
neutral, able to be abstracted away, not part of the constitutive process, not part of the creation, that “objectivity” owes
its strength and truth to an underlying, separate, removed nature to be modeled from without. What gets dubbed “the
measurement problem” is a pseudo-problem that falls out of this dogmatism.
Bohr called into question two fundamental assumptions that support the notion of measurement transparency in Newtonian physics: (1) that the world is composed of individual objects with individually determinate boundaries and properties whose well-defined values can be represented by abstract universal
concepts that have determinate meanings independent of the specifics of the experimental practice; and
(2) that measurements involve continuous determinable interactions such that the values of the properties
obtained can be properly assigned to the premeasurement properties of objects as separate from the agencies
of observation. In other words, the assumptions entail a belief in representationalism (the independently
determinate existence of words and things), the metaphysics of individualism (that the world is composed of
individual entities with individually determinate boundaries and properties), and the intrinsic separability
of knower and known (that measurements reveal the preexisting values of the properties of independently
existing objects as separate from the measuring agencies). (Barad 107)
Bohr’s opposition to the world being composed of already defined, static, determinate individuals resonates with our
process-theoretic temporal engagement we are motivating. Where objects (eventually for us, moments) are created in a
relational process, the boundary of said moment, the meaning of said moment being just as indeterminate as the “objective”
eternal state of the electron in the double-slit experiment, the boundary, the meaning of our moments will be context
dependent (Whiteheadian subjective), not discovered under the umbrella of essentialism. Bohr’s opposition to the act of
measurement being a (spatially) continuous interaction such that it can be abstracted out to leave a revealed, discovered,
separate, “objective” reality resonates with our relational-theoretic temporal engagement.
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68 Jordan knew last night would prompt eyes, questions, anxiety. She ducked out of their apartment before Kaede was
awake, headed for the dredge.
Jordan sifted the loose dirt through her fingers, falling, spreading over the water, but water was too generous a term for
what she was standing in; only a few inches deep and Jordan couldn’t see her feet. Of course, they were really there, barely
under the sea’s surface; Jordan could feel her feet. Feelings often spoke louder than visuals.
The noise of a still-dark, still-empty ocean, ruptured: “You know you’re not supposed to be in the water.”
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The hallmark of Newtonian physics is its strict determinism: given the “initial conditions” (i.e., the position
and momentum of a particle at any one instant in time) and the full set of forces acting on a particle, the
particle’s entire trajectory (i.e., its entire past and future) is determined. Newton’s equations (i.e., the laws
of classical mechanics) are acclaimed for their ability to predict and retrodict the physical state of a system
for all time. According to Newtonian mechanics, the initial conditions can be determined by any one of a
number of di↵erent measurement procedures. (Barad 107)
Notice how we have already erased time (the process of creation of the object in question, the asymmetry of the virtual
and the actual, the dynamic interaction between the virtual and the actual, the conditions and conditioned, that creates
indeterminate-from-the-present novelty and not the realization of a predetermined possible in the image of the present)
in the way we have constructed the problem, entirely from notions that we would argue lie in metaphysics, assumptions,
biases, dogmatisms. If there are no already-constituted, fixed, rigidly-defined, determinate particles that have a list of
similarly qualified delimited properties, Newton’s algorithm breaks. If the past is di↵erent from the future, an asymmetrical
relationship to the present, Newton’s algorithm breaks. If the future of the universe cannot be precisely predicted (strict
determinism), Newton’s algorithm breaks. This engagement of physics, we argue, was constructed out of these uncritical
metaphysics, assumptions, biases, dogmatisms, such to reflect these principles. When the math works out (as constructed)
physicists say it must be correct because math doesn’t lie. Notice, it is said that the math doesn’t lie because math and
physical models are revealing of “objective” reality, a matter of discovery, and thus we can’t discover something that isn’t
there. But if we understand this engagement as a creation, a creation built in a context, in a history, we see how the math
constructed to align with a deterministic worldview would work but not necessarily match reality. It is not enough for the
math to work out, we must hold our mathematical engagements up to empirical experience, and not just the experiences that
are most emblematic of embodying a deterministic machine. Newton’s algorithm says “input determinate, deterministically
output determinate”; this is a much easier algorithm both to understand and to use in practice than “input indeterminate,
indeterministically output indeterminate,” but we cannot be swayed by the temptation of the precision from stability against
the accuracy from instability. We continue to affirm that our indeterminate, indeterministic understanding is not a jumbled
mess that we can’t say anything about, there is still structure, topological invariants, but we will indeed not have the
precision of a determinate, deterministic system, in the same way as saying “the object has one whole” does not precisely
identify between a co↵ee mug and a donut. We embrace this, physics is about accuracy, not precision.
[I]t is often the case that any such disturbance is too small to notice. (For example, we don’t notice the
furniture being rearranged in the room when we turn a light on in a dark room, although this is strictly the
case.) There are, however, situations in which the disturbance is noticeable (e.g., when the accuracy of the
measurement is increased beyond a certain limit or when the object is sufficiently small). But Newtonian
physics is not troubled by this scenario, either. When the disturbance is not negligible, Newtonian physics
argues that the measurement-independent values of the object’s position and momentum can be found
nonetheless because the disturbance can always be determined and subtracted out. According to Niels
Bohr, this account of the measurement process rests on false assumptions. Bohr’s criticism of measurement
transparency is based on two important points: the discontinuity and the indeterminacy of measurement
interactions. (Barad 108)
The Newtonian algorithm’s commitment to inherent separability and timeless, static, determinate objects rears its head
with the way it sets itself up for the self-contained problem of its own construction, “the measurement problem.” Measurements themselves are said to embody this inherent separability and timeless, static, determinate nature as well, thus
in experiments where the measurement is productive of a noticeable disturbance, the Newtonian algorithm says that the
measurement’s separate and static, determinate nature can be deduced and subtracted to determine the separate and static,
determinate nature of the system in question. We call attention to the language adopted by this bias, a “disturbance” being
an external interaction between two already constituted objects, not an internal relationship productive of the objects.
The lack of continuity places a lower bound on how small the disturbance caused by the measurement
interaction can be (e.g., the light can be reduced in its intensity no further than one “photon”—one particle
of light—or else no measurement takes place). In particular, it means that Newtonian physics will have
to face the limits of its ability to ignore measurement interactions by presuming that they can always
be reduced to the point where they are negligible. Hence, the only remaining possibility, if the goal is to
determine the presumed measurement-independent properties of an object, is to determine the e↵ects of the
measurement interaction. (Barad 108-109)
This is the way in which measurement transparency breaks down according to Bohr’s first point: discontinuity. What
the Newtonian algorithm defines as a separate, determinate “measurement” can only be neglected, abstracted out, if the
“disturbance” can be reduced all the way down to a limiting case of zero disturbance. However, due to discontinuity, this
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reduction to zero can never happen, in the case of measuring with photons the furthest point that can we can reduce to is
that of one photon. But a “disturbance” of one photon has contexts where this is a significant impact. Thus what we are
engaging is no longer some “objective” reality that is separated from us, beneath, behind the measurement, rather we are
creating, constructing an experiment such that a measurement refers to this interaction of all parties.
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70 Jordan jumped–was there no escaping her?–focusing on the liquid horizon, pretending she didn’t hear wasn’t going
to poof her away, blood pressure heightening, spinning around to see Kaede walking down from across the dirt mounds.
Privacy was lost. Her last space that could truly be referred to her as her own: gone. Jordan’s heart was pumping loud,
heard, felt in her ears. Kaede knew how to make a dead person experience hypertension. She debated making a run for it
but the Earth gripped harder. She should have joined her hidden feet beneath the opaque glass when she had the chance.
“You know you’re supposed to be asleep,” Jordan countered, doing her best to keep cool. The fastest way out was keeping
cool.
“I didn’t want to leave things the way they ended last night.”
Jordan turned away from her, toward the warmth of daybreak. “Are you coming in or am I safe in the water?”
“The water isn’t safe. Do you do this every morning now? Is this the reason I never wake up next you?”
“It’s only a few inches.” Jordan bent down, peering above where her feet were, focusing her attention, trying to pierce
through her reflection. “Whatever you have to say, can you make it quick, I need to get out there. Big day ahead of me.”
The footsteps never continued. Kaede was staying put. “It’s always a big day with you. I don’t appreciate feeling like my
feelings are inconveniencing you.”
Jordan stared down at her warbly eyes, the boundary, cohesion of her eye constantly renegotiated as the small waves
moved. She couldn’t see Kaede but she felt where this was going. The muck crept further upwards, constricting her ankles. If
she waited long enough her whole being would be trapped. Not fast enough. Or rather, it was happening much too quickly.
Kaede tried again. “What does this relationship mean to you?”

75

71 Like the particle-wave complementarity contingent on apparatus, there is position-momentum complementarity, where
position is determinate when measured with a fixed platform and momentum is determinate when measured with a movable
platform.

[A] measurement of the photon’s momentum requires a movable platform. But this is excluded by the
requirement for the measurement of the position (of the photon on the photographic plate, which marks
the position of the particle in the room): position, as we saw, is necessarily defined by reference to a fixed
platform. Hence it is not possible to determine the e↵ect of the photon on the particle, since we would need
to determine the photon’s position and momentum simultaneously, which is physically impossible given that
the measurements of position and momentum require mutually exclusive apparatuses for their respective
determination. Therefore we arrive at Bohr’s conclusion: observation is only possible on the condition that
the e↵ect of the measurement is indeterminable. Now, the fact that the measurement interaction is indeterminable is crucial because it means that we can’t subtract the e↵ect of the measurement and thereby
deduce the properties that the particle (is presumed to have) had before the measurement. This does not
mean that we can’t measure position accurately; indeed, we can (we just use an apparatus with fixed parts).
What it does mean is that we are not entitled to ascribe the value that we obtained for the position to some
abstract notion of a measurement-independent object (i.e., the object as it presumably would have been
before the measurement). (Barad 113-114)
We are creating systems that, through both their internal and external interactions, are productive of objects and
properties. We are not creating transparent, passive models that are windows to a separated, independent nature. The
di↵erence we are motivating is one of a science-from-within as opposed to a science-from-without. If conducting a sciencefrom-within, where we matter to the process of production, then we cannot be abstracted away. This is another sense in
which we employ storytelling as our embodied example, as our vehicle for experiment, we are not proselytizing speculation
from a removed position, the physics is not simply in coherent math, our engagement of time is one not through mediation
but through lived experience. A moment in time will be relationally, process-theoretically engaged by means of science-fromwithin, experience is emphatically local, and thus the boundary, definition of a moment in time is not universal, global,
determinate, well-defined, static, fixed.
Bohr argues that the indeterminacy of the measurement interaction is of profound consequence: Since observations involve an indeterminable discontinuous interaction, as a matter of principle, there is no unambiguous way to di↵erentiate between the “object” and the “agencies of observation.” No inherent/Cartesian
subject-object distinction exists. [. . . ] The first case [measuring a particle’s position with a photon] essentially
describes the process of taking a picture of a particle with a flash camera. In that case, the light (photon)
is part of the agencies of observation. In the latter case [measuring a particle’s momentum with a photon],
the light’s (photon’s) momentum is being measured, and hence it is part of the object in question. So the
question of what constitutes the object of measurement is not fixed: as Bohr says, there is no inherently
determinate Cartesian cut. The boundary between the “object of observation” and the “agencies of observation” is indeterminate in the absence of a specific physical arrangement of the apparatus. What constitutes
the object of observation and what constitutes the agencies of observation are determinable only on the
condition that the measurement apparatus is specified. The apparatus enacts a cut delineating the object
from the agencies of observation. Clearly, then, as we have noted, observations do not refer to properties
of observation-independent objects (since they don’t preexist as such). (Barad 114)
Boundaries are created, not inherent. We saw this in the example of an electron in the double-slit experiment. Whether
or not the electron was a particle or a wave was not a determinate, static, essence as the ontology and epistemology of
the Newtonian algorithm assumes, it is contextual (Whiteheadian subjective) and indeterminate unless in said context. We
ground this back in our intention of time: we do not expect a moment to be a determinate, static, essence, an entity with
a fixed inherent boundary from which we can say a moment is an extensionless point or a range of extensionless points
on a decided-ahead-of-time “more real” number line. Rather we expect that what constitutes a moment is dynamic and
dependent on the present interacting relationships between moments.
For example, when determining the identity of the moment related to “Jordan and Kaede meet at the piano bar”, in the
immediate aftermath of this moment Jordan would characterize the moment as being the highest degree of embarrassing; a
girl she might end up being interested in spent their first evening together dealing with Jordan having the feeling of diarrhea
and inducing her own vomiting. But now that more time has passed, the identity of this moment has changed. Jordan no
longer feels embarrassed by that first encounter. For starters, Kaede has now helped her through similar situations, like when
Kaede was first helping Jordan when Jordan started feeling dead, such that these kinds of interactions have become more
normal between them. Additionally, related to Jordan feeling dead, Jordan has a high degree of carelessness and ambivalence
towards almost everything in her life, especially herself. The moment once understood as embarrassing no longer holds this
identity. The way in which this moment is felt is part of its identity because it is the way in which this moment is felt that
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contributes to causality – the moment in question when it means one thing, when it has one such identity, is productive
of certain decisions, thoughts, feelings, whereas the same moment at a later time means another thing, having a di↵erent
identity, and is productive of di↵erent decisions, thoughts, feelings, despite the facts of the matter never changing (Jordan
did feel like she was having diarrhea, Jordan did induce herself to vomit, Kaede did drive her home, all undisputed). The
identity of the moment in question is thus in a process of unending becoming, surely to have its identity di↵erent than what
we know of it from the perspective of this moment in relation to a future moment that has not yet occurred. Connecting this
more explicitly back to our quantum mechanical example, we can understand the identity of a moment being contingent on
the perspective, the point of view, of another moment, in the same way that the identity of an electron being contingent on
the context it is in, or the identity of the object versus the agencies of observation being contingent on the context employed,
where all of these things (moment, electron, object, agencies of observation) are indeterminate when outside of any context,
of any productive relationships.
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As we have seen, for Bohr the central issue concerning the nature of measurement is not one of disturbance
but one of resolving an inherent indeterminacy. In other words, in Bohr’s account, the key point is “quantum
wholeness,” or the lack of an inherent/Cartesian distinction between the “object” and the “agencies of
observation.” In the absence of a given apparatus there is no unambiguous way to di↵erentiate between the
object and the agencies of observation: an apparatus must be introduced to resolve the ambiguity, but then
the apparatus must be understood as part of what is being described.
Descriptively, there is a single situation, no part of which can be abstracted out without
running into conflict with other such descriptions (namely, those of complementary situation).
The object cannot be ascribed an ‘independent reality in the ordinary physical sense’ (Hooker
1972, 156; italics in original).
This is a central notion in Bohr’s philosophy-physics, and he uses the term “phenomenon” to designate
particular instances of wholeness: “While, within the scope of classical physics, the interaction between
object and apparatus can be neglected or, if necessary, compensated for, in quantum physics this interaction thus forms an inseparable part of the phenomenon. Accordingly, the unambiguous account of proper
quantum phenomena must, in principle, include a description of all relevant features of the experimental
arrangement” (Bohr 1963c [1958 essay], 4; italics mine). (Barad 118-119)
We are dealing with the ontology of phenomena, not the epistemology regarding essences. This is an important shift
because we are embracing how all of the universe, past and future, is not completely given with only our knowledge missing.
There are novel creations, including those of which we have a role in creating. Again, we are accounting for the role of process
and production, an affirmation of time, instead of assuming from the outset that everything is always already completely
given, timeless, against our empirical experience. The identity of a moment is dynamic, unstable, we affirm time through a
lack of identity, moments having identity in process, in unending becoming, x 6= x. It is thus helpful for us to understand a
moment as a Bohrian phenomenon, but we must emphasize that we are not engaging quantum mechanics, we are engaging
time, thus our “fundamental units” still repel every sense of identity, x 6= x. But a moment understood as a phenomenon is
a step in the relational, process-theoretic orientation that is inclusive of novel creations (moments). In this formulation, the
apparatus in question is the relationship between the present and the past, the actual and the virtual, that is productive of
their subsequent ever-changing identities.
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73 Jordan had done her best to inch further away, now leaning against the gantry, the safety of a workday looming,
threatening to go asea by sheer proximity. Jordan tried again. “It doesn’t feel like we’re getting anywhere and I need to get
out of here, I can’t be late. Already lost this job once. Our conversation is running in circles. Can we please pause and pick
back up tonight?”
Kaede was still on the dirt shore, opting to stay put, a safe distance away. “No.” The anger crept further upwards,
constricting her voice. “I’m going to be thinking about this all day, it’s going to ruin any attempt at productivity, and
then I’m going to wait at home for you to show up in the middle of the night just in time to argue about continuing this
conversation before you decide you’re too tired, that everything is pointless, that you want to be left alone forever, you have
to go to bed, that we’ll continue this later.” Kaede stopped and Jordan met her eyes. “We are continuing this now.”
There was no escape. No back door, no panic room, no muck to sink into. Breathing tighter. Claustrophobia. “It’s not
my fault if you can’t handle being separated from me. Your work is your responsibility, mine is mine. Please let me go.”
“Sometimes I actually like spending time with my girlfriend. Fucking sue me. You realize if we don’t spend any time
together then we,” Kaede violently motioned her hand back and forth between them, “aren’t a thing.”
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Part of Deleuze’s program for “overturning Platonisms” is rejecting Bergson’s residual Platonism! Orthodox
Platonism would insist upon the strict unintelligibility of every flux. If Bergson accepts Plato’s arguments
that becoming is unintelligible, he insists that it is accessible to the non-intellectual faculty of intuition.
Deleuze does not accede to the stark Platonic duality: if becoming is inaccessible to an intellect, it is
inaccessible to an intellect in the thrall of the dogmatic image of thought. If we abandon the diktats of
representational thought, we might discover a non-intellectual thought adequate to flux—one that only
extends the insights of intuition. This non-intellectual thought is no more a negation of it than non-Euclidean
geometry is a negation of Euclidean geometry. (Paetsch 221, Footnote 332)
We can start connecting some dots! These residual Platonisms are essences, Bergson arguing with Plato that if time has
no sense of identity, x 6= x, then time cannot be engaged by the intellect, logic, or math, but only by means of his system
of intuition. But it was on Plato’s terms that the only possibilities were “fully able to be understood” essences and “totally
unable to be understood” fluxes. We oppose this from the outset; time has a structure and can meaningfully be engaged
without subjugating it to the realm of the spatial, which is to say time is not “fully able to be understood” insofar as we
understand this phrasing to be referring to the precision of essentialism, but neither is time “totally unable to be understood”
insofar as we understand this phrasing to be referring to Bergson’s assertion that the intellect, logic, and math cannot engage
time. The dogmatic image of thought is representationalism, the methodology employing essentialism, a presupposition of
separated, determinate, static identities that asserts due to the already-erased time that external interactions (experiments,
models) are themselves separable and determinate, able to provide a transparent look at “objective” (separated, determinate)
reality. Thus we have been arguing, in motivation of our mathematical-physical engagement, and orienting ourselves into a
move that Paetsch likens to an engagement of non-Euclidean geometry – we do not negate the validity or success of these
spatial theories of time like Newton’s and Einstein’s, rather we seek to engage time not spatially but temporally, and this
move requires us to abandon essentialism and representationalism.
Moments in our engagement will thus not be separated, determinate, static identities, rather the identity of a moment
will be contingent on an internal relationship (Baradian apparatus), thus understood as an identity in process, from which
we would say something akin to “moment x from the perspective of moment y”. We thus affirm that x has no inherent,
determinate, static identity of x = x always and in complete isolation from all relations, from all contexts, rather x has an
identity that is (for example) situated from the point of view of y. From a di↵erent moment, let’s say z, we would thus
have moment x from the perspective of moment z. We understand that moment x from the perspective of y is di↵erent
from moment x from the perspective of z, thus we are on our way to better understanding on a conceptual level what
we want to mathematically encode such that we can engage time while affirming a lack of identity, x 6= x. This resonates
with our example of the moment of Jordan and Kaede first meeting at the piano bar, a moment which held an identity of
embarrassment from one moment (we can say x from the perspective of y) and the identity of ambivalence from another
moment (we can say x from the perspective of z).
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Maimon is important to Deleuze because he develops a logic of di↵erence to support a genetic perspective. This perspective weds Spinozist immanence, Leibnizian di↵erential dynamics, and Kantian critique—fearsome! The key to this perspective is that di↵erential intensities enter into relations of reciprocal
determination: “The di↵erential elements unfold their ideal characteristic genetic potential whenever they
enter into appropriate relationships of reciprocal syntheses” (Rölli 2016: 12). Maimon uses Leibniz’s di↵erential calculus to model the genesis of experience from di↵erential intensities: di↵erential intensities (dx,
dy
dy) generate intensities ( dx
), intensities generate qualities (neighborhoods), and qualities compose objects
(surfaces). Except at the final level (that of objects), real di↵erence predominates. There are only di↵erences in kind: no identities, no di↵erences by degree. No need to speak of a “self”, not even a local self:
no global “identity” will unify these pulsating, infinitesimal, local neighborhoods. It is sheer perversity to
subordinate bubbling infinitesimal neighborhoods to a placid global identity. Maimon’s turbulent domain
precludes global identification. Consider a di↵erential element dx. Why does it repel identity? In itself, it
is unproductive. It impels nothing—and what impels nothing has no properties that can identify it or that
can be identified with it. Yet it is not nothing: it becomes productive when it enters into a reciprocallydetermining relation with another di↵erential element dy (Maimon 2010: 21). Thus, “in relation to x, dx
is completely undetermined, as dy is to y, but they are perfectly determinable in relation to one another.
For this reason, a principle of determinability corresponds to the undetermined as such” (Deleuze 1994:
172). Interactions amongst di↵erential elements are local and generative. Determination is not negation,
even if di↵erence is ubiquitous. “Absolutizing” di↵erence is refusing to couple “negation” and “becoming”.
Discarding “negation” is the price di↵erential philosophy must pay to become genetic. One of Deleuze’s key
insights is that negation only affirms the forms of identity. (Paetsch 82-83)
We gloss another point of view of this relational determination of something indeterminate outside of any context in
order to build intuition. A moment, like dx, is undetermined, which is to say lacks an identity. This is good! This allows for
the dynamic aspect that we want. Intuitively, if we want to know what a moment is in general, from some fixed universal
perspective, the answer can be no more specific than “it depends”. A moment dx in a particular context, in a particular
dy
internal relationship, thus generates a sense of identity, the dynamic reciprocal determination of dx
. We can put this in the
language of the virtual and the actual, where the virtual is dx and the actual is dy. The full depth of meaning we ascribe to
an actual moment dy is through the way dy is informed, contextualized, constrained, in dynamic reciprocal determination
with the virtual dx. Deleuze puts this in his own words,
The di↵erential dx affirms the triadic logic of expression: “The symbol dx appears as simultaneously undetermined, determinable and determination. Three principles which together form a sufficient reason correspond
to these three aspects: a principle of determinability corresponds to the undetermined as such (dx, dy); a
dy
principle of reciprocal determination corresponds to the really determinable ( dx
); a principle of complete
determination corresponds to the e↵ectively determined (values of
Footnote 124)

dy
)”
dx

(Deleuze 1994: 171). (Paetsch 83,

The moment related to the morning after Jordan and Kaede went to the club we affirm is indeterminate in itself. Like
our discussions about the moment of Jordan and Kaede first meeting, the identity of this morning-after-the-club moment
is in unending becoming through time and thus lacks a determinate identity, x 6= x, outside of a particular perspective
in time. Choosing the perspective of the moment itself, as in, understanding the moment of morning-after-the-club from
the perspective of morning-after-the-club, we see how this moment is still always already in a relational, process-theoretic,
reciprocal determination. We turn to the virtual and the actual. The virtual, the past, informs, contextualizes, constrains
Jordan in the present such that she knows Kaede treats her like a living person, which is something Jordan is looking to
avoid. Thus Jordan expects this and sneaks out of their apartment before Kaede awakens. This moment came to be in this
way through how the virtual, the past, informed, contextualized, constrained the actual, the present. This novel actual in
turn acts upon the virtual, the past includes this now-gone moment and the whole identity of the virtual changes with
this new piece added in to the mix because, by means of engaging time through a temporal continuity and not a spatial
continuity, every part retains the whole within it, each element interpenetrating every other element, and thus any new
element added to the mix changes the whole.
We depart from Deleuze with respect to using di↵erentials as our mathematical encoding, but we have included the
present discussion as a helpful heuristic.
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77 In order for structures to be built, they must have a ground. Jordan worked the levers up, down, swirling, dancing.
The whole vehicle vibrated, hummed, punctuated by the abrupt arm movements that she was controlling. The first step
was to make a cut. The insides were stuck, locked beneath a surface. It was their business to break barriers, exploiting the
exposed. And here she was, their arm. Jordan jerked her arm, shifting the arm of the dredge. The smell of saline displaced
the stagnant air of the control room as the water sprayed.
Land reclamation is haptic, not visual. Once a cut is made the loose sediment disperses, a noise of muck. Jordan couldn’t
see under the surface of the ocean. The dredge had become an extension of her own body. She scanned her arm’s blades
out in front of her. Jordan desired nothing more than to fade into the prestructured role of a dredge operator. Separated
from all feelings. Machines aren’t living, they aren’t treated as living.
Thunk. The cabin shook. Jordan’s arm found the next chunk of earth. Shifting more levers. The buzzing of the cutting,
pulsing through the whole machinery, drowned out any footing of fixity. Kaede’s previous presence had given what Jordan
thought felt like a heartbeat, which she knew couldn’t be right; she took it as another disrespectful slight, even if unintentional, of Kaede trying to convince her that she was alive. Jordan felt her not-heartbeat mimic the oscillating drone of the
dredge. Entrainment. Returning to the stagnancy of the dead.
Her boss never went out on the dredge. This was grunt work, machine work. Hurt is easier to inflict when you don’t have
to see it. The feeling of the earth beneath her hiked up in resistance. Haptic, not visual. Levers. Pivot. Next line.
Jordan felt her mind mimic the oscillating drone of the dredge. Entrainment. Ripping up the floor through repetition.
The conscious thoughts were embedding themselves as muscle-memory, movement of the body. Hurt is easier to inflict when
you don’t have to think about it. She loosened her grip on the lever, the dredge arm shifting from being her body to an
object. Something she could touch. Something she could see. The trembling of the lever tickled. Was it scared too? Jordan
took a step back, detaching herself from the machine more – who was she? Was her whole identity as simple as being the
operator of this machine?
Jordan broke her fixating glare to look out towards the rest of the sea, briefly thinking of her father and the way he must
have valued this place, remembered this place. She wanted to see blue again, maybe transparent enough to see the fish, the
coral, the urchins, a family of di↵erent entities living together to construct their own home. Instead she saw the black wake
of a corporation. And a rowboat inching its way to the arm. Jordan jumped back to the controls, twisted the key, turning
it o↵.
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Making the ontological nature of this indeterminacy explicit entails a rejection of the classical metaphysical
assumption that there are determinate objects with determinate properties and corresponding determinate
concepts with determinate meanings independent of the necessary conditions needed to resolve the inherent
indeterminacies. (Barad 127)
Learning from Bohrian phenomena and Baradian apparatuses, we understand that through affirming time, including the
lack of identity of a moment in unending becoming, in process, we are affirming an indeterminate ontological nature, which
conclusively puts us outside the realm of essentialism, representationalism, and the Newtonian algorithm.
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Since individually determinate entities do not exist, measurements do not entail an interaction between separate entities; rather, determinate entities emerge from the intra-action. I introduce the term
“intra-action” in recognition of their ontological inseparability, in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which
relies on a metaphysics of individualism (in particular, the prior existence of separately determinate entities).
A phenomenon is a specific intra-action of an “object” and the “measuring agencies”; the object and the
measuring agencies emerge from, rather than precede, the intra-action that produces them. Crucially, then,
we should understand phenomena not as objects-in-themselves, or as perceived objects (in the Kantian or
phenomenological sense), but as specific intra-actions. (Barad 128)
It is helpful to adopt Barad’s language of intra-action. It’s use emphasizes for us that the moment x has no identity in
isolation, it has no essence, but when put in internal relationship, as the moment undergoes its becoming, its process, in
time, as understood through examples like “moment x from the perspective of moment y”, these relationships are productive
of what we understand as the moments x and y. The term “intra-action” stresses and keeps mutually implicative, internal
relationships as productive of relata at the forefront of our intuition as opposed to falling back into old spatial, essentialist
habits of understanding all relationships as external, all relata as constituted prior to relationships.
The primary ontological unit is not independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but rather
phenomena. In my agential realist elaboration, phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of observer and observed, or the results of measurements; rather, phenomena are the ontological
inseparability/entanglement of intra-acting “agencies.” That is, phenomena are ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata. The notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,”
which presumes the prior existence of independent entities or relata) represents a profound conceptual shift.
It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the components of phenomena become determinate and that particular concepts (that is, particular material articulations of the world)
become meaningful. [. . . ] In other words, relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena
emerge through specific intra-actions. (Barad 139-140)
This is felt in our science-from-within as opposed to science-from-without, our embodied example and experiment of
storytelling. We don’t proceed by talking about moment x as if it were an extensionless point on a number line, rather in
order to demonstrate and engage the structure of temporal continuity we walk in the shoes of a character’s story in order to
understand how a moment is in itself indeterminate, how the perspective from a particular moment determines the identity
of the moment from one point of view, and how processes in time are productive of an unending becoming of a moment’s
identity as demonstrated through understanding a moment’s identity from di↵erent perspectives.
[T]heorizing and experimenting are not about intervening (from outside) but about intra-acting from within,
and as part of, the phenomena produced. (Barad 56)
We are not constructing a model from a distance, abstracting ourselves out, we are understanding time through our lived
experience.
What an actual moment dx is is grounded and impelled by its virtual, dy, all of its past moments. To not include dy
in the productive process of dx is to ignore the constitutive role of the process. Di↵erent virtuals in a Bohrian phenomena
relate to di↵erent phenomena, phenomena that produce di↵erent actuals. It is in this sense that we understand what we
said earlier about a moment of the universe never being able to repeat itself, that neither time travel nor a divine ordering
of all particles back to their same positions are able to reach the same Bohrian phenomena of a moment because time must
pass in either of those hypotheticals, and time passing changes the virtual, and a di↵erent virtual involved in our Bohrian
phenomena is productive of a di↵erent actual, which produces a di↵erent virtual, which produces di↵erent actual. . .
We intend to reach constructions about time that are separate from our experience, the topological invariants that persist
across all “modes of being” of time, these topological properties are inclusive of change due to the emphatically local nature
of each instantiation, they are inclusive of variable subjective experience, arrived at through subjective experience.
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It might be said that the epistemological framework that Bohr develops rejects both the transparency of
language and the transparency of measurement; however, even more fundamentally, it rejects the presupposition that language and measurement perform mediating functions. Language does not represent states of
a↵airs, and measurements do not represent measurement-independent states of being. (Barad 138)
Summing up, in our now grounded discussion in relation to time, our Baradian apparatuses are relationships between
lacking-identity, individually unproductive moments, Deleuzian di↵erentials dx, dy, such that a measurement is the productive, determinate, process, internal relationship of creation between the two relata. Thus the moment dx as an essence
dy dy
behind the relationship is not understood from the measurement context of dx
. dx is a Bohrian phenomena, there is no
inherent Cartesian cut between them in reference to two eternal, rigidly-defined essences of dx and dy except in abstraction.
Questioning the basis of the Newtonian tradition, Bohr refuses to take for granted the delineation of the
“object” and the “agencies of observation” and makes the constitution of this “inside” boundary the centerpiece of his analysis. In particular, he emphasizes that the cut delineating the object from the agencies of
observation is enacted rather than inherent. (Barad 142)
Our moments are mutually implicative, reciprocally determining, productive of each other. Using Deleuze’s di↵erential
notation once more, what this means in practice is that the moment dx might have a certain identity, a certain boundary,
dy
from the perspective of dy (encoded as the measurement context dx
), however the moment dx might have a completely
dz
di↵erent identity, a completely di↵erent boundary, from the perspective of dz (encoded as the measurement context dx
).
Thus we can say the identity of the moment dx is in process, in unending becoming. But we must again be clear: dx itself
dy
possesses no identity, the cut made between dx
is in abstract because it is an ontologically whole Bohrian phenomena.
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81 Pushing open the window, Jordan looked down the ten or so feet to the surface of the water. Waves splashing against
the hull finally had their voice now that the drilling and vacuuming procedure was paused. Another voice pierced the
background noise.
“Permission to come aboard?”
The dredge itself wasn’t that large. Sixty feet long, give or take, it didn’t rise too high, the control cabin sat right atop
the deck on the far end. It was safer than the smaller ones. This wasn’t one of those war machines. Maybe that’s where
Jordan needed to be to reach her true mechanical self. The woman in the rowboat could easily pull herself up if she wanted
to. Jordan opened the cabin door to walk towards her, yelling down, ”Sure.”
Jordan helped her onto the deck then watched her tie her boat to a metal beam. “What are you doing out here? Don’t
you know this is dangerous?”
The woman tucked the last of the rope around itself. She looked straight at Jordan. “I was going to ask you the same
thing.”
“I have the necessary training. I have the necessary permits. This isn’t dangerous.”
“Maybe not for you. There’s an entire marine ecosystem that you are disrupting.”
“I’ve got a permit from the state environmental conservation agency too.”
“I don’t care about your permits or what government bodies have approved. I care about what you are doing. Look at
this water.” She motioned her hands around herself.
“It’s agitated sediment. It was always here. It will settle down.”
“But do you understand what you are doing until then? That agitated sediment,” her tone mocked Jordan’s phrasing,
“is adjusting the environment to be less oxygenated. Fish are either dying or leaving. Your vacuum is sucking up fish too
young to swim against it, sucking up eggs before they hatch.”
“Look, this isn’t my decision. Take it up with my boss. I’m just doing what I’m told. I think you should leave.”
She listened, untying her boat. “I didn’t come out here to sabotage. I believe people know right from wrong. I came out
here to make sure you understood what you are doing.”
Being treated like a person was exhausting. Jordan waited a few minutes for the woman to escape the immediate area.
No one should be here unless they wanted to get hurt. She twisted the key; the body pulsed to life. Peering out the window
to make sure she was a safe distance away; the woman did not avert her gaze. Jordan had been here before. Driving people
away. Anywhere but here. Here is where things get hurt. Here is where cuts are made. Here is where they’ll lose oxygen;
asphyxiating, drowning. Jordan gripped the levers and continued the process.
The light on the satellite phone blinked. Jordan shut her body o↵ again, picking up the receiver. “This is Jordan.”
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Performative approaches call into question representationalism’s claim that there are representations, on
the one hand, and ontologically separate entities awaiting representation, on the other, and focus inquiry
on the practices or performances of representing, as well as the productive e↵ects of those practices and the
conditions for their efficacy. A performative understanding of scientific practices, for example, takes account
of the fact that knowing does not come from standing at a distance and representing but rather from a
direct material engagement with the world. (Barad 49)
The way we are engaging in the embodied example of storytelling, where we do not attempt to abstract ourselves away
but rather embrace our role in processes, the way we are walking through the motivational process of how and why we
are engaging time, constructing a mathematical-physical regime that can be empirically felt and tested in our own lived
experiences, these are part of conducting a science-from-within where internal intra-acting relations are productive of their
respective relata, a performative science.
A performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the representationalist belief in the power
of words to represent preexisting things. Unlike representationalism, which positions us above or outside the
world we allegedly merely reflect on, a performative account insists on understanding thinking, observing,
and theorizing as practices of engagement with, and as part of, the world in which we have our being. (Barad
133)
Recall, a story always begins in the middle, Deleuze’s rhizome has neither beginning nor end but always a middle, we are
engaging things from within, from the middle, this is what it means to be a part of the process.
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What often appears as separate entities (and separate sets of concerns) with sharp edges does not actually
entail a relation of absolute exteriority at all. Like the di↵raction patterns illuminating the indefinite nature
of boundaries—displaying shadows in “light” regions and bright spots in “dark” regions—the relationship
of the cultural and the natural is a relation of “exteriority within.” This is not a static relationality but a
doing—the enactment of boundaries. (Barad 135)
Barad is connecting to what we’ve discussed as mutually implicative, dipolar, genetic relationships. The layer we are
adding now is that we are understanding these genetic, internal relationships not as static beings, eternal essences, already
constituted objects, but as processes themselves, an active engagement rather than a passive gazing. To better understand
this we turn to the example of what gender is, what gender means.
Building on Foucault’s critique of representationalism, Judith Butler’s influential theory of gender performativity theorizes the gendered constitution of the subject. As Butler emphasizes, gender is not an attribute
of individuals. Rather, gender is a doing, not in the sense that there is a pregendered person who performs
its gender, but rather with the understanding that gendering “is, among other things, the di↵erentiating
relations by which. . . subjects come into being” and “the matrix through which all willing first becomes
possible” (1993, 7). Gendering, Butler argues, is a temporal process that operates through the reiteration
of norms. In other words, Butler is saying that gender is not an inherent feature of individuals, some core
essence that is variously expressed through acts, gestures, and enactments, but an iterated doing through
which subjects come into being. (Barad 57)
Gender isn’t deduced from who a person is, who a person is is neither completely given nor fixed, rather gender is a doing,
unending-becoming, a process in time, creative and productive of gender identity. Our engagement of time is similarly not
a deduction from something completely given nor fixed. Like the example of gender, a moment has no prior determinate
identity, but rather through processes in time, active doings, a moment and its relations are generative of an identity, an
identity that does not remain fixed but continues to evolve in time; through which we seek to engage by means of the
embodied example of storytelling, through having the reader walk in the shoes of particular lived experiences, through
encouraging the reader to apply our engagement to their own lives, their own experiences.
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almost evening. How’s it coming out there?”
Jordan looked at her watch. Time flew by. ”Pretty much done with the excavation.”
“That’s great, really great. Do you think you could stay out there a little longer? Just leave it running, maybe retread
some of the area around you?”
“Why?”
“We made a deal with the Demersal Aquarium, they’re in the process of building a jellyfish exhibit and I told them we
could help them out.”
“How would we be able to do that? What does running the machine do?”
“Jellyfish are quite invasive and they can thrive in all sorts of environments. If we keep the fish out, the jellyfish will come
through to eat the plankton no one else is eating.”
“Isn’t that deliberately harming the environment?”
“Who’s to say? The aquarium is going to be able to showcase some beautiful stu↵. Maybe the exhibit does more than
o↵set through inspiring environmental action. Jordan, this doesn’t matter. None of this matters. Just do what you’re told,
okay?”
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As Butler notes, the “controversy over the meaning of construction appears to founder on the conventional
philosophical polarity between free will and determinism” (8). She promptly rejects both options, indeed
the very binary conception of causality, and insists that what is needed is a radical rethinking of the nature
of identity. Butler proposes that we understand identity not as an essence but as a doing. In particular,
she suggests that gender is not an attribute or essential property of subjects but “a kind of becoming or
activity. . . an incessant and repeated action of some sort” (Butler 1990, 112). Butler cautions that this
claim—that gender is performed—is not to be understood as a kind of theatrical performance conducted by
a willful subject who would choose its gender. Such a misreading ironically reintroduces the liberal humanist
subject onto the scene, thereby undercutting poststructuralism’s antihumanism, which refuses the presumed
givenness of the subject and seeks to attend to its production. Crucially, the performative “is not a singular
act used by an already established subject, but one of the powerful and insidious ways in which subjects
are called into social being from di↵use social quarters, inaugurated into sociality by a variety of di↵use and
powerful interpellations” (Butler 1997a, 160). As Butler explains, “the ‘I’ neither precedes nor follows the
process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves” (1993,
7). That is, gender performativity constitutes (but does not fully determine) the gendered subject. (Barad
62)
We again ground our unending becoming, our process-theoretic, temporal understanding in the concrete example of gender.
Temporal processes are productive of objects, thus we cannot say that there exists always already an essence to a person, to
Jordan, such that Jordan chooses, wills, acts the part of her gender. Rather who Jordan is, from the perspective of gender,
is generated through the temporal process of the production of gender: becoming-woman is a process that involves both
Jordan’s non-theatrical performance of woman but also of the boundary creating intra-action that Jordan’s performance
draws with respect to the temporal process of what “woman” or “becoming-woman” come to mean.
We are driving towards a new construction of causality. Earlier we discussed that an engagement of time that does not
include the virtual restricts its understanding of causality to the efficiently causal. For example, in physics, an object’s
movement is only understood through the ways it is being directly impacted, either by another object or by a force.
Embracing the virtual, and with it the dynamic reciprocally determining relationship between the virtual and the actual,
having no fixed stability in either the conditions or conditioned, has us embracing an indeterministic picture, where the
future of a system cannot be fully given because the virtual itself, the ways in which the past inform, contextualize, constrain,
is in process, in unending becoming, having no fixed identity, grounding and impelling the actual without fully determining
it because the identity of the virtual and the way in which it is productive of an actual is picked out only when a Baradian
dy
apparatus, a new relational moment, a Deleuzian dx
, is picked out, that is, a relationship that changes, augments, the
continued unending becoming of each the virtual and actual.
Butler is throwing out the binary between determinism and free will, as conceived as being between a strict determinism
(everything is completely given) and strict freedom (no causal determination whatsoever). We agree with this move. Our
indeterministic picture is not one of strict freedom, it is inclusive of the efficient causality that physics currently operates
with.
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As Bohr points out, the inseparability of the object from the apparatus “entails. . . the necessity of a final
renunciation of the classical ideal of causality and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of
physical reality” (Bohr 1963b [1949 essay], 59-60). While claiming that his analysis forces him to issue a final
renunciation of the classical ideal of causality, that is, of strict determinism, Bohr does not presume that
this entails overarching disorder, randomness, or an outright rejection of the cause-and-e↵ect relationship.
(Barad 129-130)
The virtual informs, contextualizes, constrains, the space, the topology of the system in question. We must reconceive
causality. Our first step has been following Barad and Bohr into an indeterministic picture that is neither strictly deterministic nor strictly indeterministic. We retain efficient causality as understood by the Newtonian algorithm, but through Bohr
we understand that quantum mechanics shows inescapable discontinuity and indeterminism with respect to novel Bohrian
phenomena, that is, we understand that objects are not always already constituted but rather in process, in unending
becoming, which is not strictly deterministic but rather constraining of the system. The ontological and epistemological
lessons that we learned through the quantum mechanical examples is the metaphysics that we orient ourselves with when
it comes to time; affirming time’s reality meant affirming the real productivity of time, creation, which meant affirming
creation over discovery, which meant renouncing essentialism.
First of all, it is important to realize that this new sense of causality cannot be founded on a simple
combination of classical options such as the following: there is, on the one hand, absolute freedom in our
choice of apparatus, and, on the other, a strict deterministic causal relationship whereby objects simply
“do their thing” once the apparatus has been chosen. This combination is neither as rich nor as subtle as
what I believe Bohr had in mind, or should have had in mind, because each of these elements is premised
on the contested inherent or Cartesian dualism. But neither is this to suggest that human beings determine
the outcome or play an “interventionist role,” stepping forward, tweaking a few dials, and stepping back to
watch, since these kinds of claims are also conditioned by the same contested dualisms. Second, causality
is too often conceptualized as a binary a↵air: either a situation of strict determinism applies (i.e., causal
determination) or there is a state of freedom (i.e., no causal determination). However, there are more ways
to think about causal relations than the usual choices between determinism and free will. Since traditional
formulations of causality assume that independently determinate entities precede some causal interaction,
we are clearly already on very new ground. Third, the fact that scientific results are reproducible requires (or
at least seems to require) that intra-actions entail some kind of causal structure—that is, something being
the cause, and something the e↵ect—otherwise it would be impossible (or at least very difficult) to account
for the reproducibility of experiments. Finally, it seems important to consider whether it even makes sense
to attribute the notion of agency solely to human beings, since this particular conception already seems
to be undone by the analyses we have been considering. Indeed, the issue is not merely who or even what
gets to have agency or whether or not culture or nature determines a particular outcome, but also what the
notion of intra-actions tells us about the nature of causality such that we will be able to account for how
the distinctions between “nature” and “culture,” “human” and “non-human,” and “science” and “society”
are produced, what that production entails, and how we are to understand the nature of agency. (Barad
130-131)
It is this direction of a reconceived causality, one inclusive of the genetic, internal relationships that characterize how the
virtual informs, contextualizes, constrains the actual, such that we can meaningfully engage not just the actual but also the
virtual, where we now direct our attention.

92

87 Jordan had docked the dredge, standing on the dirt beach looking out at the water. The moon o↵ered no further help,
she still couldn’t see beneath the surface. Reduced to an instrument of someone else’s destruction. Hurting anyone, anything
in her path. Jordan knew that she was dead but she still didn’t want to actively hurt others. It was strange. She waded into
the water. Knees. Waist.
“Mmph,” Jordan’s leg convulsed. Stung. A dull green glow surrounded her. Jellyfish were already here. Thriving in
conditions where nothing else was supposed to. She tried to catch one in her hands, but their bodies were too fluid,
unformed, morphing, always on the move. Free. Not held captive by a relationship, not held captive by a disease, not held
captive by a corporation, not held captive by even any sense of a rigid body. Everything was in flux. A true freedom, one
that couldn’t be co-opted as someone else’s arm of oblivion.
More stinging, all across her arms, even through her clothes over the rest of her body. Consumed by individual small jolts
pain. Blurring together to form a background of static, white noise, a raised noise floor, a new normal. Not really here, not
fully formed.
Jordan sunk herself into the darkness, submerging her whole body.
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88 The erasure of time entails an equivalence between temporal process and logical implication, no time has to pass in
order to know the future because the real production of time, creativity, is erased, rather everything is already completely
given for discovery, which requires no time at all. This can be felt in projects entirely built on methodologies of deduction
and reduction, which as we discussed earlier posit a fixed, static class that allows for these methods to do work (fixed, static
axioms from which to deduce or fixed, static simple-parts to which to reduce respectively, where no temporal process is
necessary to reach conclusions via deduction or reduction, rather those conclusions are always already there and can be
determined in no time via logical implication).

The output is logically implied by the input and the program. [. . . ] This logical determination requires no
time, because no physical process is involved. [. . . ] This is the sense in which time is removed from the
description of physics within the Newtonian paradigm. It is unnecessary to actually run the computer to
know what the output is, because the output can be deduced by a sequence of logical arguments. How the
deduction is carried out is irrelevant; the computer is just a tool exploiting the laws of physics to model
a logical implication through a causal process. [. . . ] What the Newtonian paradigm does is replace causal
processes—processes playing out over time—with logical implication, which is timeless. (Smolin 50- 51)
Thus projections that do work via deduction or reduction are already erasing time with how the problem is being set up.
Against this, we affirm that temporal processes are indeed processes in time and we likewise affirm that time is productive
of novel creation against the view that everything is already completely given except to our knowledge and only requires
our discovery. This means that the virtual must be taken seriously as the virtual is what grounds and impels the actual in
time. What this means in practice is that temporal processes and logical implication are distinct.
However, by this very assertion, a determinist encounters a difficulty which, in my opinion, is insurmountable.
It is known that any logical implication is ex definitione non-temporal. It is a commonplace in elementary
courses of logic to distinguish logical implication, which is outside of time, from the psychological process of
inference by which we deduce a conclusion from premises. Although, psychologically speaking, the conclusion
is preceded by the premises, that is, preceded in the temporal sense, it nevertheless remains true that, logically
speaking, there is no succession, no unrolling, in the temporal sense of the word. And let no one be deceived
by the ambiguity of the word “flow”; there is no logical flow in the temporal sense of the word. If we say
that the conclusion “flows” from the premises, we are using this word only in the metaphorical sense. A
logical antecedent is not a temporal antecedent; a logical consequence has nothing in common with temporal
succession. The premises are not, in the temporal sense, before the conclusion, and, in the same way, the
conclusion does not follow the premises in time. It is more exact to say that the conclusion preexists in the
premises or that it is contained in them logically. We discover it after the premises in the actual process
of human thought, but we do not create it by that process itself. The simultaneity of the conclusion with
the premises can be illustrated in a convincing way by analyzing a form of classical syllogism: All men
are mortal; Socrates is a man; consequently, Socrates is mortal. Or, in symbols: All M are P ; all S are
M ; consequently, all S are P . It is obvious that the expression “consequently” has no temporal meaning.
One is easily persuaded of this if he draws the famous Euler’s circles, which symbolize the classes, or the
logical extensions in question. Not only is class M contained in class P at the same time that class S is
contained in class M but it is easy to see that class S is contained at the same time in class P . In other terms,
the conclusion and the premises are simultaneous. The very possibility of symbolizing logical relationships
of inclusion by spatial diagrams whose parts are, by their very nature, juxtaposed, therefore simultaneous,
is the reason for this. For there is not a trace of succession in the relationship of inclusion, that is, in the
relationship of container and contents. Unquestionably, every conclusion coexists in the logical sense with
its premises, although it is thought and pronounced after the premises. We must not confine our attention
to one particular example of the traditional syllogism, for the pre-existence of the conclusion is postulated
in every valid reasoning. That is why we say that we discover the truth, instead of saying that we create it.
(Capek 152-153)
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The form of the Euler circles demonstrating the logical implication of the Socrates example is thus separate, distinct
from our engagement of time, where through affirming its reality we are affirming the real productivity of time, creativity,
where temporal processes are necessary to reach outcomes due to the dynamic, reciprocally-determining relationship of the
virtual and the actual and the indeterminacy of an actual moment that is informed, contextualized, constrained but not
fully determined by the virtual. We intend to give an example, but must flag at the outset that our example is necessarily
inadequate, a shifting from the virtual-actual to the possible-real. After Jordan docked the dredge she was mesmerized by
impenetrable darkness, tantalized by the ability to ensure her deadness through a suicidal a↵air with the water, perhaps
also wishing to be closer to her father during a time of profound discomfort throughout every corner of her life, the reasons
are indefinite in number, what we care about is Jordan’s decision to go into the water. If temporal processes were equivalent
to logical implication, an erasure of time and the real productivity of time, creativity, then once we had Jordan docking the
dredge we could say, by implication of the current situation, that she would absolutely go into the water and the story of her
life would play out as described. This is not the case. Jordan could have melted into her desired indi↵erence as a machine
operator, Jordan could have gone home to a conversation with Kaede, Jordan could have ran away somewhere, Jordan
could have tempted suicidal ideation in a myriad other ways, all of which would not seem like outlandish, preposterous
paths for Jordan’s storyline to traverse. Jordan’s virtual informs, contextualizes, constrains her actual, we know it wouldn’t
have made any sense for Jordan to get o↵ the boat all smiley, lovey-dovey, buying flowers for Kaede, and proposing an
adventure to go on, it would come o↵ as her history, the story we’ve read thus far that got us to this place, not mattering
to the present moment. We called attention to our shifting to the possible-real because the examples we are giving are all
possibles, given in the image of a specific virtual-actual, backwards projected now that time has already elapsed, and given
by means of mutually external, mutually exclusive possibilities which e↵ace the mechanism of creation from time.
Just as in the classical syllogism the inclusion of class S in class P coexists with the two inclusions
symbolizing the two premises, so in the solving of a mathematical equation, for example, the “unknown”
quantity is determined in advance without any ambiguity; thus it is unknown only to us, and we discover
it in the same way that Columbus discovered America. We say that the solution is simply waiting for our
discovery, that it exists, so to speak, before our discovery, just as the American continent existed before
the voyage of Columbus. In the same way, if the future is determined in all its details and without any
ambiguity, have we not the right to conclude with Laplace that it is already present and that it is merely
waiting to be unveiled to our limited consciousness? (Capek 153-154)
The possibilities are not known ahead of time because each actual moment is grounded and impelled by means of an
ever-changing virtual, where the conditions do not resemble the conditioned. The next moment is created by this dynamic,
reciprocally determining relationship, it is not discovered from the vantage of a homogeneous, static, fixed, eternal temporal
space.
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89 The stinging made each part of her body twitch uncontrollably, independently, on its own reflexes, separating away the
fully formed unit of Jordan’s-body, pushing towards a formless mass of cells. Becoming-jellyfish.
Jordan was alive as long as she wasn’t being held captive by her body, by her job, by love. She came back to the surface
and took a deep breath of fully desired air. The jellyfish were going to be condemned to a life of captivity if she didn’t do
something.
Her arms were now numb, fashioned for the very occasion. Jordan swam to shore and grabbed her bag. Multiple trips
between the ocean and the bed of her truck, dumping the jellyfish in, a portable pool of glowing green slime.
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But, if we read carefully the works of those who defend the indetermination of the universe in the name of the
reality of time, we see that their indeterminism is far from being absolute. The temporalistic philosophers,
or, as they are called in English-speaking countries, the “process-philosophers,” insist vigorously on the
continuity of the past with the present, on the cohesion of the successive phases of becoming. Reread the
passages of William James on the stream of consciousness or on the continuity of the perceptual flux; reread
Bergson, especially that passage, so infrequently quoted, in Matter and Memory, where he affirms that
creation is never creatio ex nihilo because each present moment is colored by its past; reread Whitehead
when he speaks of “causal efficacy” in nature. What, then, is the di↵erence which separates them from the
classical determinists? There is only one: when they speak of connection, of continuity, of cohesion of cause
and of e↵ect, they affirm that this connection, this continuity, this cohesion, is temporal in the true sense of
the word, and as such it cannot be the equivalent of static connection, of logical implication; consequently,
that it must contain an element of irreducible novelty. (Capek 160)
Our reconception of an indeterministic causality comes from this affirmation of the distinctness between temporal process
and logical implication. Because we affirm that time has a structure, that temporal continuity has topological invariants,
when we speak of indeterminism of temporal processes we do not claim to be left with a jumbled mess from which nothing
can be said or can be engaged. The virtual grounds and impels the actual, constitutes (but does not fully determine) the
actual. Understanding the ways in which a system is constrained, informed, contextualized, is much more of an engagement
than not being able to say anything at all about a system whatsoever, but it is admittedly less precise than the deterministic,
essentialist methodologies. We affirm that this imprecision is in fact more accurate, better matching empirical experience
via the affirmation of time, and is a causality inclusive of a wider array of events.
Making clear the distinction between logical implication and temporal causality makes clear the distinction between
discovery and creation, which makes explicit the stakes involved: the existence of novelty and creativity. There is no sense
of temporal succession in logical implication, and as a result, there is no sense of creation as the answer arrived at is not
created as the result of a process in time but rather deduced via a logical implication, which is to say, an answer, an essence,
an already determinate object with a fixed definitional boundary that was always already there from the start has been
found, discovered by a previously deficient subject that has now attained the completely given information available. The
subjugation of temporal causality to logical implication is a tradition we are rebuking. These are two separately meaningful,
independently useful ideas.
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92 “When was the last time you went to an aquarium?” The kind of questions that Ann needed them to think about were
a delicate balance: obscure enough for the brain to undergo a localization process, not a simple verbal regurgitation of a
story they’ve told to others or themselves, something that could uncover details with focus, while not being too obscure so
as to be impossible to answer or impossible to localize. Ann’s patient seemed to be stuck in thought, perhaps this question
was too restricting.
Ann attempted to widen the net. “Have you ever been to an aquarium before?”
“I don’t know,” Victoria said. “I mean, I’m sure I have everyone’s been to an aquarium, right?”
The neuroimaging would be ine↵ective if Victoria wasn’t actively working, swimming, localizing through her own memories,
feelings, thoughts, senses. Ann needed to guide her.
“Tell me about your time there. Was it the one here in town?”
Intensity took over her face once more. Bow out. New approach.
“Why don’t you tell me about a memory that you do remember instead?”
“My daughter and I got into a fight.”
“Concrete details, Victoria, the more specific the better; what’s your daughter’s name?”
“Jordan.”
Ann grabbed the counter, unable to hold herself in place, knotted tongue. She swallowed. “And what did you fight about?”
“My husband’s been dead for as long as I can remember, which isn’t saying much. We go to his favorite beach on the
anniversary every year, we even spread his ashes there at some point. It’s where we go to visit him. She works for a company
that’s going to destroy it, and she’s going to be the one that does it.”
Ann listened intently, flustered, looking for stability in the words presented to her. ”I see.”
“I haven’t been remembering things lately. Jordan used to help me out but I haven’t seen much of her since that fight. I
need to be able to take care of myself.”
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For example, if p = ‘Socrates is in Athens’ and Q = ‘Socrates is in Greece,’ Socrates being in Greece does
not determine his being in Athens, though it does condition the possibility of the latter. (Conversely, his
being in Athens does determine his being in Greece—thus the asymmetry of internal relation via logical
implication.) This is analogous to the case in quantum mechanics such that in the spin 12 system,
|

>= ↵|

"> | "> |e "> + |

#> | #> |e #>

| > is a vector of unit length and thus representative of the actual (though indeterminate) state of the
composite global system and its facts prior to the measurement outcome. | >, for example, thus represents
the implicate in the statement | "> | "> |e "> =) | > (read, | "> | "> |e "> only if | >). These
facts subsumed by
condition, but do not determine, the novel predicative outcome fact (in this case,
either eigenstate | "> | "> |e "> or | #> | #> |e #>) generated by measurement. This indeterminacy
is reflected, for example, in the fact that each eigenstate (i.e., each implicans of the internal relation) is
always evaluated as a probability, via the complex coefficients ↵ and , respectively ↵| "> | "> |e ">
and | #> | #> |e #>–with |↵|2 + | |2 = 1. (Epperson 141)

In the example of Socrates, if we determine that Socrates is in Greece, we cannot say with any certainty that Socrates
is in Athens, however, we do change the system we are exploring such that the probabilities for us to determine Socrates
is in Athens before determining Socrates is in Greece is di↵erent than the probabilities for us to determine Socrates is in
Athens after determining Socrates is in Greece. We can intuitively understand this by guessing that the chances Socrates
is in Athens after knowing he is Greece is much more likely than if he were to be anywhere at all.
However, the example of Socrates uses ontology and epistemology of the Newtonian algorithm, that there are always
already constituted objects, essences (here Socrates) that have fixed properties associated with them (here position). We’ve
followed Barad through orienting ourselves on the problems these ontological and epistemological stances take in quantum
mechanics so that we could better orient ourselves for engaging time which, similarly, we have motivated and argued does
not operate within essentialism or representationalism. In the example of the quantum mechanical system given, we have
constructed a particular system such that our particle in question can either read upon measurement ‘spin up’ or ‘spin
down’. | > encodes the entire wave function complete with the probability distribution between these two possibilities,
↵ and
are coefficients related to the weight of each probability for each of these possibilities, | > | > |e > is the
system, apparatus, environment respectively, all put together because, as we saw with Barad and Bohr, there is no inherent
distinction between these in quantum mechanics. Thus we could imagine replacing this triple with a single encoding that
stands for a ‘Bohrian phenomenon’ which we understand to be the inherently inseparable combination of these three
components: system, apparatus, environment. We understand that our measurement outcomes are not the discoveries of
properties that are eternal and static of always already constituted, well-defined objects, but are rather the creation of
particular measurement outcomes that were previously indeterminate in reference to the whole Bohrian phenomenon which
subsequently constitutes the relata involved, what was before an indeterminate probability density becomes a determinate
measurement, and we can understand and ground this as a process in time as opposed to dealing with deduction via logical
implication, the experiment has to run to get the real output.
The specifics of the situation, what our system is, what our apparatus is, and what our environment is, condition what
probability states there are (spin up and spin down) and what each of their respective probabilities are (↵ and ), but these
specifics do not determine if the system is spin up or spin down. This is the sense in which we seek to reconceive causality.
The virtual informs, contextualizes, constrains the actual in the same way that our choice of system, apparatus, environment
(Bohrian phenomenon) conditions (but does not fully determine) the possible states and their respective probabilities.
We make reference to our previous discussion regarding the causal chain of Jordan’s life after docking the dredge. There
are clearly “possibilities” that would not make any sense given the virtual that is grounding and impelling her actual, but
the virtual does not fully determine what will happen next, temporal processes are not equivalent to logical implication,
and thus we can understand Jordan’s future in that moment as being similar to the quantum mechanical system above,
where there are a number of possible options (spin up, spin down) that make sense given the virtual for that particular
moment, each having an associated probability, and through which the only way to determine the outcome is by running
the experiment of Jordan’s life in that moment. We must flag again that we have entered the realm of the possible-real. If we
were to stay in the realm of the virtual-actual, as is our intention, there would not be a delimited set of mutually external,
mutually exclusive possibilities each with an associated probability such that the principle of excluded middle (at least one
is true) and the principle of noncontradiction (at most one is true) hold; these are features of the actual in separation of
the virtual.
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Thus, quantum mechanics requires a di↵erent kind of probability conditionalization rule than its classical
analog—namely, one that depicts the evaluation of quantum observables as a fundamentally asymmetrical
relational process. To further clarify this point, consider that the conventional ontological implication of
commutativity in classical mechanics is that the order of observation (i.e., the order of predication via
measurement) is irrelevant because all observables are thought to possess well-defined values at all times,
regardless of whether or not they are measured. But in quantum mechanics, this is not the case; asymmetrical
probability conditionalization evinces that the act of observation is generative of novel facts, not merely
revelatory of pre-existing facts. That is, outcome states yielded by quantum mechanical measurement are
not merely revealed subsequent to measurement, but rather generated consequent of measurement, as evinced
by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations as well as other equally fundamental principles of quantum theory.
The outcome states generated by quantum mechanics, then, are properly understood as ontological events,
not merely epistemic qualifications, and as such, their asymmetrical relational dependencies are likewise
ontologically significant. For example, if a = ‘opening a screen door’ and b = ‘walking through a screen
door,’ it is quite obvious why (a b) 6= (b a). Each conjunction represents a possible physical state, but
these states and their ingredient conditional probabilities are quite di↵erent (as anyone fortunate enough
to witness this particular demonstration will verify). Thus the order of generation of predicative facts in
quantum mechanics yields asymmetrical potential relational dependencies among these facts and among
their measurement contexts. (Epperson, 45)
The asymmetry of the evaluation of quantum observables is due to this sense of internal relation that we are looking to
engage. In the humorous example provided, where (a b) reads “a after b,” the series of opening a screen door followed by
walking through a screen door gives a di↵erent outcome than walking through a screen door followed by opening a screen
door. To make the sense of internal relationship even clearer, we can isolate this down to just walking through a screen
door (b) versus walking through a screen door after opening a screen door (a b). Having the event a happen conditions
the situation such that di↵erent states with new probabilities are available. Without a, then b is fundamentally di↵erent
with respect to what states are available with what probability density. In the context of quantum mechanics, through our
analysis with Barad, we understand a as a novel event, a Bohrian phenomena, what Whitehead calls an “actual occasion”.
Thus, the outcome at b is not discovered, “revealed subsequent to measurement,” rather it is created, “generated consequent
of measurement,” an event whose actuality was conditioned by its asymmetrical internal relationships.
Thus, when searching for Socrates (‘measuring his position’) the probability of discovering him in Athens is
nonlocally, logically conditioned by his sighting in Crete. Classically, of course, this intuition is unremarkable since by that worldview, still regnant in our common sensibility, all physical observables are thought
to possess precise values at all times. But quantum mechanically, as we have seen, measurement outcomes
can only be understood as generated consequent of measurement, not merely revealed subsequent to measurement—an understanding that has been consistently confirmed empirically, against every attempted imposition of classical intuition upon quantum theory. The actualization of a potential measurement outcome,
in other words, is always understood as a novel fact in quantum mechanics. (Epperson 74)
Finding Socrates in Athens with no prior information has a probability that is di↵erent than the probability of finding
Socrates in Athens after finding him in Crete. But notice, as Epperson points out, we are already framing the problem in
terms of the static: there is always already a determinate entity “Socrates” who always already has a determinate property
“position”, we are discovering, finding, revealing these always already determine things. Thus, this example does not force
us to think outside of the bounds of a timeless essentialism as we must in order to affirm time. Quantum mechanics does
force us to think outside these boundaries. A novel event, a Bohrian phenomenon, a Whiteheadian actual occasion is not
something that is determinate ahead of time, we saw with Barad that Bohrian phenomena are creations, not discoveries.
After the creation of an event, Bohrian phenomenon, Whiteheadian actual occasion, the topological space of subsequent
events is altered (confer the opening of a screen door changing what it means to walk through a screen door). It is this
changing of the space, the space that is productive of the possible states and their respective probabilities, that we refer to
when we speak of a changing virtual that is informing, contextualizing, constraining an actual.
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More broadly, then, the concept of ‘evaluation of observables via quantum measurement’ entail the totality
of the process by which an initially indeterminate, uncontextualized actual state , defined as an abstract
integration of countless potential outcome states (where neither [principle of noncontradiction (PNC)] nor
[principle of excluded middle (PEM)] hold) evolves, by way of its local Boolean contextualization in terms
of some particular observable a, to become a reduced integration of probable outcome states a1 or a2 ,
thus satisfying PNC and PEM, and terminating in the actualization ↵1 or ↵2 according to the probability
valuations of a1 and a2 respectively. Thus in quantum mechanics probability presupposes actuality (as it
does in classical mechanics) and actuality presupposes probability (which it does not in classical mechanics). Likewise, evaluation presupposes Boolean contextualization and Boolean contextualization presupposes
evaluation. Evaluation and contextualization, in other words, as ontologically relational features of actuality
and potentiality, are thus mutually implicative in quantum mechanics. Indeed, it is in light of this mutual
implication that quantum indeterminacy can be more comprehensively understood—that is, beyond just
the probabilistic character of quantum measurement; for while it is true that the evaluation of observables
presupposes Boolean contextualization, it is never the case that the latter determines the former. Rather,
evaluation is conditioned by Boolean contextualization, and this conditioning is indeterminate. (Epperson
50)
Our indeterminate, uncontextualized actual state
is the encoding of having an actual that is currently undetermined
and uncontextualized. This does not adhere to PNC or PEM because of its lack of contextualization: if were referring
to a system of an electron such that we want to measure a position, but we don’t have the contextualization from the
rest of the Bohrian phenomenon (no apparatus , no environment e), then we don’t yet have a finite delimited set of
possibilities with which we can ascribe determinate probabilities. Once we contextualize (that is, specify , e) we obtain
a set of possibilities each with an associated probability. The conclusion here is that evaluation and contextualization are
another mutually implicative pair, such that neither side is a fixed, static, essence from which deduction from or reduction
to can happen. Thus evaluation and contextualization are in their own dynamic reciprocally determining relationship as
a process in time. This dynamism, this lack of a fixed ground, means that evaluation is conditioned by contextualization,
but that evaluation is not determined by contextualization. As we saw in the earlier spin up, spin down example, the
context of our
e does not determine spin up or spin down, rather it constrains the completely indeterminate
into the
informed, contextualized, constrained, conditioned understanding of having two possibilities (spin up, spin down) each with
an associated probability.
It is this asymmetrical internal relationship that conditions but does not determine what we understand the relationship
between the virtual and actual to be. The virtual conditions but does not determine the actual. The actual conditions but
does not determine the virtual. The past is in the present by means of internal asymmetrical relational conditioning. This
is distinct from an external relation of an efficiently causal picture, which has been up through now the full extent of the
causal picture from the physicist’s perspective. Our engagement of time thus requires a generalization of causality from how
it is typically thought. We are engaging Epperson and Zafiris to understand this causal mechanism of internal relationship
that the virtual and actual use, but we must again caution that within the virtual-actual there is not a distinct set of
possibilities each with an associated probability such that realization abides by PNC and PEM. We are intent on learning
about internal relationships while being aware of this wrinkle.
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96 None of the indicators showed up. Ann had introduced a stony coral fluorescent protein, Kaede, into Victoria’s brain.
The idea was to find the presence of certain cells, certain proteins she had been researching such that during memory recall
if they appear, if they activated then the Kaede will be with them, following them, not letting them go out of sight, glowing
red for Ann.
Jordan was never meant to be sick. That was the whole point.
The past was behind her, it needed to stay there. No indicators, no tags. The past doesn’t attach itself to Ann, glowing
red when present. It’s gone.

103

97

An internal relation is one in which the objective properties of a relatum are modified by the relation.
They are relations, in other words that are constitutive of a given relatum, rather than external to it.
For example, a child’s genetic history is understood to be internally related to that of his grandfather,
since the grandfather’s history is internally constitutive of the child’s. Conversely, the grandfather’s genetic
history is externally related to that of the child, since it is objectively independent of any relationship
with the latter. [. . . ] In precisely the same way, in quantum mechanics, the outcome state of a measured
system is internally related to its initial state, with its particular contextualization. Further, since relata
are qualified as probabilities in quantum mechanics, probability conditionalization in composite quantum
systems is another example of asymmetrical internal relation. While classical conditional probabilities are
not the same as quantum conditional probabilities (it can be argued, however, that the latter are properly
understood as a generalization of the former), they are sufficiently analogous to employ the simpler classical
notation here: P(A|B)—the probability of A given B—entails that A is internally related to B. When it is
also true that B is externally related to A (i.e., A and B are not mutually internally related) this asymmetry
is reflective of the non-commutativity of quantum observables, such that P(A|B) 6= P(B|A). (Epperson 52)

Internal relations are the mechanism by which the virtual informs, contextualizes, constrains the actual. Ann’s is haunted
by her past, she thought she had sufficiently outran it but the past has resurfaced. These past events, whatever she did that
she is haunted by, informs, contextualizes, constrains the present moment in her research lab with Victoria, stronger, the
virtual and its internal relationship to the actual is constitutive of the present moment. The present moment is grounded
and impelled by the Ann’s past, the present moment is only happening this way, only means what it means, because of
the ways that the virtual informs, contextualizes, constrains. We must be careful not to ascribe full determination of the
present by the past or else we will slip back into the equivalence of temporal processes and logical implication, erasing time.
In the case of the virtual and the actual, they are each asymmetrically internally related to one another. In our previous
discussion of the way in which the moment of Jordan and Kaede meeting at the piano bar informs, contextualizes, constrains
the present for Jordan, we noticed that from the perspective of one particular moment y the identity of the moment of their
meeting x was filled with embarassment, whereas from the perspective of another particular moment z the identity of the
moment of their meeting x was filled with indi↵erence. As time elapses, novel actuals become part of the virtual, which
subsequently change the virtual in its entirety as a result of virtual being a temporal continuity: each part contains the
whole within it, each element interpenetrating every other, where what distinguishes each part is its particular perspective
on the whole. Thus the example of this moment of Jordan and Kaede meeting x is an example of the internal relation going
from the actual to the virtual, as novel actuals subsequently changed the identity of the virtual, of the past, by means of
our understanding of the morphing identity of the past moment x.
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Epperson and Zafiris through an example of entangled particles,

Once a measurement outcome has been registered by one of the detectors—say A—the integration of
potential outcome states at B is revised via its internal relation to the outcome at A, and this revision
is manifest as a probability conditionalization (Epperson 61)
In the example of having two entangled particles, once one of the particles is measured at a detector given by A, this event
(which is not the discovery or revealing of an always already determinate quantity but rather a novel creation) conditions
the potential outcome states and their probabilities of the measurement of the entangled particle given by B. In this sense,
B is in an internal relation with A.
What these experiments reveal is that while there is, indeed, no measurable nonlocal, efficient causal influence
between A and B, there is a measurable, nonlocal probability conditionalization between A and B that
always takes the form of an asymmetrical internal relation. For example, if A registers first, the outcome at
B is internally related to the outcome at A. This, again, is manifest as a probability conditionalization of
the potential outcomes at B by the actual outcome at A. (Epperson 62)
No efficient causal process is happening in our example of entangled particles because the only way that the potential
outcome states and their probabilities could be impacted via efficient causality after the measurement at A is if the particles
or forces involved were superluminal, faster than the speed of light, since we can keep our entangled particles a distance
away from each other and see these results at B faster than a light signal could reach B. The potential outcome states
and their probabilities are already conditioned before any particle or force going the speed of light could causally a↵ect our
system. Thus our system is being causally e↵ected in a way that is not restricted to the efficiently causal.
From this perspective, in summary of the present example, the equivalence class of Boolean subalgebras
representing the integration of potential outcomes at B is ‘logically a↵ected’ (or better, ontologically revised)
by the measurement outcome at A, thus exhibiting B’s internal relationship to A, even when A and B are
spacelike separated. This nonlocal revision entails no propagation of energy of any kind from A to B and
is thus not properly understood as an efficient causal influence of the actualized outcome at B by that of
A; rather, it is a logical conditioning (viz., a nonlocal probability conditionalization) of the contextualized
potential outcomes at B via the internal relation of these outcomes to the actualized outcome at A. (Epperson
63)
We are here making clear the distinction between internal, genetic relation and external, coordinate relation. The internal,
genetic relation functions through logical conditioning, once A has been measured, the probability distribution for measuring
B has already changed. The external, coordinate relation functions through efficient causality, that is these causal relations
must travel through spacetime, bound by the speed of light. But notice, these internal, genetic relations are allied to the
process of what it means to become an object, as it is by means of internal relations that the dynamism between the virtual
and actual is in place. These internal, genetic relations constitute (but do not fully determine) our outcomes. We can see
this in our entangled particles: the measurement of A does meaningfully impact what the subsequent measurement of B will
be, but measuring A does not alone tell us determinately what the measurement of B will be, everything is not completely
given though we do have constraints.
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It is crucial, however, to distinguish between ‘logical antecedence’ and ‘temporal antecedence’ here, for
these are often casually assimilated. Temporal antecedence refers to an asymmetrical metrical relation of
events—that is, a ‘distance’ relation of events as objects according to the parameter of time (or more
accurately, spacetime).
We interject to make clear to the reader that when Epperson speaks of the temporal being metrical and involving a
distance, he is referring to spatialized time, to spacetime, and not to the construction of durative time we are engaging
presently.
Logical antecedence, by contrast, refers to an asymmetrical logical supersession of events which are
themselves internal relational structures—that is, an internal relation of relations, such as that implied
by the notion of conditional probability or more broadly, propositional logic, operative quantum mechanically. For example, in a classical conditional probability P(B|A), ‘the probability of B given A,’ there is no
requirement that A’s logical conditioning of B be understood as a supersession of events A-B since classical
conditional probabilities are purely epistemic; that is, as classically conceived, conditional probabilities presuppose that all observables have precise values at all times, such that any logical dependency of B upon
A is reflective only of one’s knowledge of A and B as already extant facts. The historical significance of the
EPR argument and its modern experimental incarnations is the definitive demonstrations that this classical
conception of conditional probabilities is entirely invalid in quantum mechanics, where measurement must
be understood as generative of novel facts (measurement outcome events) and not merely revelatory of
already extant facts. Thus in quantum mechanics, logical dependence depicted by a conditional probability
like P(B|A) can only be understood as a Boolean logical conditioning of potential measurement outcomes
at B by an actual measurement outcome A, such that P(B|A) depicts a supersession of ontological events
and their asymmetrical logical relation. [. . . ] In this way, the traditional conflation of temporal and logical
antecedence, and more generally, the causal and logical orders—a conflation that has dominated the philosophy of nature since the Enlightenment—has been definitively invalidated by quantum mechanics. (Epperson
75-76)
Spacetime events, objects measured metrically a distance away from each other, has to do with efficient causality. Internal
logical conditioning rather is the causal mechanism by which the past constrains, informs the present. A picture that only
includes efficient causality via spacetime events misses the way in which the past constrains, informs the present through
internal logical conditioning.
To connect back to what we are motivating as our engagement of time, we disagree with Epperson with respect to the
temporal realm not containing the asymmetrical logical relation. It is only the realm of spatialized time where this is true.
Our engagement of time is inclusive of both of these causal dynamics. One of the asymmetrical logical relations of time in
our engagement is history, the past inside a present, a virtual informing an actual (the other being the actual back upon
the virtual). Thus time is not limited to extant objects in strictly efficient causal external relations on a metrical distance
grid; time is inclusive of the history that has an internal logical relation that constrains a system’s output, of the history
that is productive of what something is (in unending becoming), of who someone is (in unending becoming).
The novelty of an event A and the novel conditioning that it has on a potential event B is the takeaway we are looking to
orient ourselves around. This is the mechanism through which an unending becoming, a dynamic reciprocally determining
process, like that between the virtual and actual, is understood, with an actual changing the virtual, which changes what
can be an actual, which once actualized changes the virtual, ad infinitum.
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100 Ann knew which beach Krzys belonged to. She drove up to a nearby cli↵side, a lookout point. The water was indeed
disturbed. Kaede absorbs green, emits red; here was blue absorption, emitting black. As if what had been ignored, asserted
to be long dormant, grew in mass, eating everything around it, until it was too big to ignore. The railing was cold. A few
cars sped by.
The parking lot was visible. Nearly empty, the black tumor having driven away those that couldn’t deal with the past.
It’s been over twenty years since Ann was last here. With Krzys. And Krzys’s truck was the lone occupant of the parking
lot. Jordan was here.
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The central concept by which [Epperson and Zafiris’s] formalism can be understood within the context EPR
is that whereas temporal antecedence in causal relations is formally expressed metrically and set theoretically, in [Epperson and Zafiris’s] framework logical antecedence in causal relations is formally expressed
topologically and category theoretically as an antecedence of internal relations. (Epperson 77)
If our engagement of time is to include the past in the present by means of an internal asymmetrical logical conditionalization, then like Epperson and Zafiris we turn to the domains of topology and category theory. Metricized spaces are a
special case of topology, similarly set theory is a special case of category theory, and so the efficient causality that physicist’s
are familiar with will be incorporated into this engagement of time.
Against many popular interpretations of [EPR-type nonlocality], [Epperson and Zafiris’s] interpretation
depicts EPR nonlocality as a non-metrical, topologically formalized logical conditioning of potentia; this
is in sharp contrast to other interpretations that depict EPR nonlocality as an efficient causal influence
requiring a superluminal physical-dynamical mechanism, or as evidence of ‘retro-causality’ requiring the
abandonment of temporal asymmetry and its presupposed correlation with logical asymmetry. (Epperson
143-144)
We respect the actual metrical spacetime limitation of the speed of light as well as seek to affirm our experience of time
that involves the past inside the present.
In sum, we have followed our way out of the discussion with Barad regarding the split between discovery and creation,
through our discussion with Epperson regarding the distinction between efficient causality and logical conditioning and its
resonances with discovery and creativity, external relation and internal relation. For our engagement of time we are thus
working within an indeterministic picture, which is neither strictly deterministic nor strictly indeterministic, where we have
reconceived our understanding of causality to be inclusive of both the spacetime efficient causal and the internally related
logical conditioning such that we can include the past inside the present, where our understanding of this causality is one
wherein these factors constrain, inform the present but do not determine the present.
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102 We depart from orienting ourselves within the context of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics, as argued by
Epperson and Zafiris’s relational process-theoretic formalism, involves itself with self-identical objects, with these objects
being events, or in Whiteheadian language, actual occasions. The move that they make is embedding these actual occasions
into a history that matters, and the way in which this history matters is by means of the mechanism of internal relations
of logical conditioning. Where we left o↵ in our engagement of time is taking seriously the ousting of a law of identity as
asserted by Bergson and Deleuze. What this means in the context of our relational process-theoretic tools is that the past
itself is not a fixed, static, eternal thing that constrains, informs the present. The past itself is also in unending becoming,
constantly changing, by means of the way in which the past is present. To be clear, the efficient causality does not change,
and in this way there is a degree of static, eternal quality to events and moments of the past. Jordan going into the water
and transferring a bunch of jellyfish to her truck will always have happened as Jordan going into the water and transferring
a bunch of jellyfish to her truck; the light cone of this physical event must still abide.
But we have now a more generalized understanding of causality, and so it is not enough to say that because the efficient
causality of the transferring jellyfish into her truck possesses a static, eternal quality that this event of the past is static
and eternal. It is in fact not static and eternal, because of the other dynamic involved: the internal, genetic relations of
logical conditionings. This is illustrated by means of how a past event is present. In the example of Jordan and Kaede’s first
meeting at the piano bar, that event constrained moments immediately afterwards by means of an identity of embarassment,
but this same event constrained moments at a later time by means of an identity of indi↵erence. The way in which the past
is present is the identity of that past moment from the perspective of that particular present moment, and this identity will
necessarily morph and mutate in time.
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If there is no more fixity in a life than there is in the milieux conditioning it, how could its conditions not
be uniquely variable? No fixed, universal categories and an invariant “transcendental subject”: only actual
milieux that, once captured by virtual problems, occasion local geneses of transcendental fields that secrete
novel sets of categories, each articulating their own intrinsic logic. There are at least two “logics” here: the
primary logic of genesis and the secondary “formal logics” that, as functions of variable sets of categories,
supervene upon this genesis. We are amply familiar with the latter: they are the systems of formal logic.
The primary logic of genesis (or, equivalently, the logic of expression) does not just determine the becoming
of formal logical systems, it leaves its mark upon them: formal systems must maintain a certain openness,
they must not calcify completely—their incompleteness is a mark of their debt to this superior genetic
logic. Every formal system is not just open to (or in advance of) other systems but actively solicits them to
envelop it—and such envelopment can alter profoundly its character. Incompleteness is a birth-mark. It says:
No formal system that’s not an inadequate bolus of slowed flux! If the secondary logics accompanying the
various sets of categories are captured well by topos logic, then Deleuze will have accomplished the dream
of “grounding” formal “subjective logic” in a superior but implicit “objective logic” (as we will see, Deleuze
upends severely the metaphorics of “ground”). We can assume that the primary logic of genesis resembles
secondary logics only on pains of dogmatism! Deleuze’s “critical correction” of Kant hinges on rejecting this
assumption: the ground does not resemble the grounded. (Paetsch 29-30)
Topos logic need not be seen as just the generalization of formal logic, this is the mistake Colin McClarty warns against
in “The Uses And Abuses of Topos Theory”. It is true that topos is a generalization insofar as it includes the secondary
logics, but it is far more than that, the way in which it exceeds secondary logics is not by simple extension of the same. The
topological space associated with its topos logic is general and can be specified, this includes the ability of having a pointfree topological space. Additionally, we use this area of topology and category theory to engage temporal continuity, where
each part retains the whole, each element interpenetrating every other, where each part is distinguished by a particular
perspective on the whole. We are no longer in the realm of generalized formal logic, of generalized set theory; we are in new
terrain. We use topos logic while simultaneously heeding Deleuze’s and Paetch’s own warning: the ground does not resemble
the grounded. Our ground is point-free, our ground is a temporal continuity, in accordance with the lack of identity of a
moment, x 6= x, in accordance with the ground (the virtual, temporal continuity, point-free) not resembling the grounded
(the actual, spatial continuity, extensionless points).
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104 Ann was waiting outside the lot’s entrance, inside her car. She needed to get closer. Verify if Jordan was actually sick,
or if Victoria’s recollection was a trick of the memory, the past haunting her present, the stable ground shaken, earth in
upheaval, a darkness sucking in and consuming any Kaede red beacons, no navigation, lost at sea.
Headlights. Ann shrugged lower in her seat, though she wasn’t sure why, Jordan couldn’t possibly remember her. Perhaps
Ann was hiding from his car, the high beams dredging up the past, exposing her role. The truck came out of the lot and
turned away from Ann. The bed was glowing green, as if it were radioactive. What was this beach creating?
Keeping her distance, she followed Jordan.
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As this formalism applies to actual occasions as predicative facts in Whiteheadian metaphysics, recall
that predication is ‘dipolar’ because each potential quantum actual occasion / predicative fact comprises
both [1] a causal-physical pole, by which the potential novel fact is spatio-temporally coordinated with,
and efficient-causally influenced by, the actual facts of its relativistically restricted dative world (‘coordinate
division’); and [2] a logical-conceptual pole, by which the potential novel fact and its unique subjective context
are logically coordinated via asymmetrical internal relation with the totality of actual facts constitutive of
its dative world—including these facts’ own subjectively contextualized internal relations to their dative
worlds (‘genetic division’). Type-theoretically, as we have seen, these dative worlds are properly understood
as lower order totalities relative to the subject occasion. But category-theoretically, it must be recognized
that these internal relations, whether analyzed coordinately or genetically, cannot be formalized as ‘intrinsic
elements’ of the actual occasion as some ‘terminal’ object relatum. Unlike set theory, which can provide such
terminal internal formalization of an object (e.g. as a Cartesian product, or other ‘internal’ pair structure),
category theory can only define objects via their relations to other objects and other relations. Formally, this
is precisely representative of the philosophical notion that an actual occasion as ‘object relatum’ is, itself,
an integration of internal relations with other dative occasions, which are themselves integrations of internal
relations, such that the structure of these dative internal relations, no matter how far down, is preserved
throughout. In other words, the classical and set-theoretically definable conception of an object relatum as
possessing some ‘objectively and sheerly intrinsic constitution’ is as incompatible with [our] definition of the
dipolar, subjective-objective (i.e. relational) actual occasion as it is with the category-theoretic definition of
an object relatum. In the category-theoretic formalism, even the most primitive objects cannot be defined
this way; rather object relata are always fundamentally understood as relations themselves. (Epperson
131-132)
Epperson and Zafiris include both external, coordinate relation and internal, genetic relation in their formalism of quantum
mechanics; this is resonant with our engagement of time that includes both of these as well. Similarly, external, coordinate
relation is of the causal-physical pole bound by spacetime limitations like the speed of light, in which we have the efficient
causality already familiar to us in physics. Internal, genetic relation is the way in which the virtual informs, contextualizes,
constrains the actual through a logical conditionalization. The way a novel objective-subjective event, Whiteheadian actual
occasion, is framed type-theoretically to be an order higher than its dative world, than the internal relations that condition
(but do not fully determine) it, is resonant with our understanding that the virtual is in unending becoming, a process of
accumulation that does not stop, growing larger with each passing moment, with this novel virtual conditioning (but not
fully determining) a novel actual.
Category theory diverges from set theory at a fundamental level with respect to definitions. Set theory is resonant with
essentialism: essences, extensionless points, axioms are static objects defined by means of static definitions. For example,
we might say something like x = 5, or x is an integer, or e is an electron, each of these identities comes with a fixed list
of properties that each possesses in isolation. We oppose the essentialist, representationalist, timeless, notion that there
exists a static, rigid, fixed, definition of, for example, the electron from which a list of static, rigid, fixed properties are
listed. Contrary to this, the objects of category theory are only ever defined through relationships, not as inherent, fixed
definitions said to be there all along or bestowed from outside the system. For example, we might say that x is defined
through a set of relationships {f, g, h} where each of these relationships engages x from a specific point of view, a specific
perspective. Notice, this meshes very well with an antiessentialist physics: we learned that, contrary to classical ontology
and epistemology, an electron does not have an always already determinate existence as either particle or wave. Rather, the
nature of the electron is dependent on context, on the Bohrian phenomenon constructed. Thus if we were to say e is our
categorical object for an electron, how is it defined?
eO

o

f

P

g

W
We can say that there is a perspective on the electron, the point of view of P , that engages the electron as a particle,
indicative of, for example, using a double-slit apparatus with a which-path device attached. We can also say that there
is a perspective on the electron, the point of view of W , that engages the electron as a wave, indicative of, for example,
using a double-slit apparatus without a which-path device attached. The definition of e is no longer a list of static, inherent,
essentialist properties, but rather a function of its relationships, dependent on the point of view taken. What e is in
isolation of these points of view is unintelligible, as it is defined by means of these relationships. Notice that this relational
understanding allows us to account for processes, for internal relations, where the definition of an electron is not simply a set
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of external relationships between the electron as an essence to other essences. Rather we are accounting for the production
of what the electron is through the specification of the processes, practices, apparatuses. We can thus put the definition of
e succinctly by collecting all of the relationships e has together, and defining e as the set of all of those relationships.
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106 We are wading into the mathematical-physics waters. Knees. We now understand conceptually what we are trying
to do with the mathematical-physical engagement of time, but we don’t yet have the mathematical tools to conduct this
engagement. We start with mathematical definitions in order to springboard o↵ of them discussions about how these tools
interface with what we are engaging conceptually and how these tools interface with examples of lived experiences.
A category C consists of

Objects A, B, C, ...
Objects are in our electron example as e, P , W , and we understand an object’s definition through its relationships. We
refer to the collection of all objects in a category C as Obj(C).
Arrows f , g, h, ...
Arrows are in our electron example as f , g. An arrow is a relationship between objects. We refer to the
collection of all arrows in a category C as Arr(C).
Every arrow has a domain and codomain such that the operation

/ Obj(C)

dom : Arr(C)

assigns a domain to each arrow f in the category C given by dom(f ) = A and the operation

/ Obj(C)

cod : Arr(C)

assigns a codomain to each arrow f in the category C given by cod(f ) = B, thus giving us the form of each arrow as
/B.
f : A
Arrows adhere to what we call composition. The intuition of composition is best grasped with a diagram.
g h

A

h

/B

g

/C

f

/D
A

f g

An arrow g h is read “g after h”. This is the composition of g and h in this diagram. Composition of arrows satisfies
associativity, which means that (f g) h = f (g h). The diagram above demonstrates how both sides of this equation
return the object D.
/ A . Diagrammatically,
For each object A there exists an identity arrow idA : A
f
idA

9Ao

g

/B

such that an arrow composed with an identity is itself, as seen with f idA = f and idA g = g. We often do not include
identity arrows in our diagrams in the interest of cleanliness as we understand they are there.
As mentioned previously, category-theoretic elements (such as objects and arrows) are all defined through their relationships, in terms of arrows. This means that there is no requirement for an element to have an inherent, static, essence. This
is important, as it means the elements of time, moments, do not have to have an inherent, static, essence, a rigid boundary
to their definition.
How does this kind of definition work in practice? Let A be an object in C. A variable element of A is an arrow in
C whose codomain is A. The domain of this arrow is called the stage of definition, a point of view of A, a particular
perspective of A. Recall that the elements in a temporal continuity are mutually interpenetrating, each part contains the
whole, such that the whole cannot be arrived at through a sum of its parts. What distinguished each part of this whole was
its particular perspective on the whole, its point of view on the whole.
/ A is then a variable element of A as it is defined over B, from the stage of B, from the point of
An arrow f : B
view of B. Recall that our relational definition of an object was its set of relationships. Thus we write that f is a part of
the definition of A, from the stage of B, point of view of B, as
f 2B A

where the definition of A is a set of relationships {f, g, h, ...}, each from a particular stage, point of view.

114

We can already feel the ways this will mesh with moments, interface with lived experience. Our example of the moment of
Jordan and Kaede first meeting at the piano bar can be encoded as the object A, where A lacks any inherent, rigidly-defined,
fixed, static identity but rather its identity is understood by means of relationships to other moments that change in time.
Thus a particular one of these perspectives, of these definitions of A, can be understood as the relationship, as the arrow f .
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107 She

watched as Jordan walked into what Ann assumed was her apartment, leaving the fluorescent vehicle behind. Ann
slowly, carefully got out of the car, a lysed plasmid, where she was inserting herself as a fused gene. She crept towards the
window and peered inside: Jordan was covered in welts. She keeled over, looking like she might be vomiting into the kitchen
sick.
Darting her back against the wall, completely out of view, needing a moment to calm down. What did Ann do to them?
Or Krzys? How many lives has she ruined? Ann had cultivated a self-imposed darkness, nothing was wrong if she couldn’t
see it, but Kaede, or rather the green light was waving its arms now. Too big to ignore. The ground was shifting beneath
her feet. What Ann thought was safe was only safe for a short while. Everything changes.
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/ E , ..., are arrows, relationships, between categories that preserve the
/ D maps objects A, B, C, ..., in the category C to objects
structure of composition and identity. A functor F : C
/B,g: B
/ C ..., in the category C to
F (A), F (B), F (C), ..., in the category D, and maps arrows f : A
/ F (B) , F (g) : F (B)
/ F (C) , ..., in the category D. Diagrammatically,
arrows F (f ) : F (A)
108 Functors

F : C

/D, G : D

A

F (A)

f
g f

F (f )

✏

✏

F

B

/

g

F (B)

F (g) F (f )

F (g)

✏ 

✏

C

F (C)

F

C

/

D

On the left we have objects and arrows in the category C and on the right we have objects and arrows in the category D. A
functor F maps each object A in C to an object F (A) in D that preserves composition and identity. Beneath this expanded
version of this functor we have included a consolidated encoding of the functor, a mapping, an arrow, a relationship between
C and D.
/G, : G
/ H , ..., are arrows, relationships, between functors that preNatural transformations ↵ : F

/ G maps objects A, B, C, ..., in C to arrows ↵A : F (A)

serve structure. A natural transformation ↵ : F

/ B , ..., in C the following relation holds

in D for each object, and for each arrow f : A
↵B

F (f ) = G(f )

↵A

Diagrammatically
F (A)
F (f )

✏

F (B)

;
A

F (g) F (f )

F (g)

✏ 

F

F (C)

f
g f

✏

B

↵

↵◆

g

! ✏

C

G

#

G(A)
G(f )

✏

G(B)
G(g)

✏ 

G(C)

C

F
G

// D

G(g) G(f )

/ G(A)
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Like before, in lower part of our figure we ground ourselves in the consolidated understanding of C on the left and D
on the right. We have two functors F , G, that take our objects A, B, C, in C to their respective objects in D, either
F (A), F (B), F (C) or G(A), G(B), G(C). Our natural transformation ↵ maps an object A in C to an arrow ↵A in D,

/ G(A) , understood as an arrow, a relationship between our two functors F, G. To distinguish
given by ↵A : F (A)
natural transformations from other arrows we employ a double-barred arrow as seen above.
We turn to a more condensed diagram for developing our intuition about natural transformations on arrows in C.
F (A)

F (f )

/ F (B)

↵A

↵B

↵◆

G(A)

G(f )

↵◆

/ G(B)

We are looking at a diagram in D but we understand this to be a more particular diagram within the complete context
/ B , in
illustrated above, where functors F, G take objects in C as their domain. We said that for each arrow f : A
C that the following relation holds
↵B

F (f ) = G(f )

↵A

Our “zoomed in” diagram is thus the commutative diagram that expresses this relation. We say a diagram “commutes” or
is “‘commutative” when the di↵erent paths we could take agree at their intersections. In the example above, the diagram
is commutative because both paths, ↵B F (f ) and G(f ) ↵A , agree on G(B).
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109 The truck. Ann snuck over to the bright green illumination, as if the bed of the truck was a treasure chest, the kind she
used to put inside of her fish tanks as a kid. The whole back was filled with slime. Thick and opaque. Pulsating. Invaginating.
Folding in on itself, over itself, through itself, flows that seemed to lack a particular start, particular end, particular direction.
The slime was alive. A living light, marking o↵ the active relevant cells, marking o↵ what Ann took to be relevant to her.
This was as clear of a sign as any. Green was the opposite of red — the stony coral fluorescent protein, Kaede, must be the
wrong marker. Ann scooped up some radiating sludge and dumped it into her bag, enveloping all that it came into contact
with, suspending her wallet, pens, lipstick, fusing, becoming a hybrid. Plasmid ligated.
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110 An isomorphism is the “kind” of equality that we use within category theory, encoded ⇠ and reads “is isomorphic to.”
=
The equals sign that we are used to = is a set theoretic equality, which is teeming with the essentialism we have previously
discussed. When we say something like 5 = 4 + 1, we are referring to an inherent, static, definition of 5 that is defined in
relation to nothing else, it is the fixity of the number 5. When we say that 5 = 4 + 1, we are saying that the inherent, static,
rigid definition of the left side (understood in complete isolation, an essence, completely given) is identical to the inherent,
static, rigid definition of the right side (understood in complete isolation, an essence, completely given). In category theory,
we are not required to have these kinds of isolated, inherent definitions, we are not comparing essences to see if they are
identical. Rather, as we have discussed, definitions in category theory are constructed by means of relationships. It is not
the case that the object A has a fixed, static, inherent definition, rather A is defined by means of the set of all relationships
{f, g, h, ...} of A, over various stages of definition, points of view on A, such that, in the particular example of a relationship
f , A from the point of view of B, f 2B A. It is this set of relationships being compared when using ⇠
=. This means that our
sense of equality is no longer referring to some inherent, static, rigid definition of A, but rather to the internal structure
of A, all of the relationships that make up the definition of A. As a crude, mixing together uncritical set-theoretic and
category-theoretic ideas in the pursuit of our intuition, we could imagine an object A defined through its relationships
/ A ,g : C
/ A where we understand B to be Jordan, C to be Kaede, and f, g each a relationship of the
f : B
flavor of sweetness. Diagrammatically,
f

B

/? A
g

C
If both Jordan and Kaede consider mangos and candy bars to be sweet, we can then say that a mango and a candy bar
are isomorphic ⇠
= to A because they are “equivalent” by means of solely the definition of their relationships, where here
any object (mango, candy bar, ...) only has to satisfy being sweet from the perspective of Jordan and Kaede in order to be
isomorphic to A, in order to have the same definition in the ways that matter. This might seem superfluous in our example
that involved set-theoretic identities, essences, fixed definitions (mango, candy bar, Jordan, Kaede), but our intention is to
engage time. A moment, as we have argued, does not adhere to the law of identity, x 6= x. Thus we need a way to define
and to understand what a moment is, where we explicitly have no such set-theoretic identity, essence, fixed definition.
We often encounter a special object in our categories known as the terminal object, encoded as 1. The definition of our
terminal object always has exactly one element for each stage of definition, point of view on 1. Thus we can think about
1 as the generalization of the one element set {∗}. This means that for the category of Sets, which is the special category
of set theory, that 1 ⇠
= {∗}. Thus the set-theoretical elements a of a set A are in bijective (one-to-one) correspondence to
arrows from the one-element set to A,
a2A
1

,

/A

a: 1

In any category C with a terminal object 1 we have x

g : Y

/ X for any arrows g : Y

/ 1 and x :

/ X . Diagrammatically,

x

X `o

1O
g

x g

Y
If two di↵erent elements of A are defined at the stage of our terminal object 1, from the point of view of 1,
A

oo

a

1

b

/ 1 such that a x will di↵er from b x, each from the stage of
then for any X there exists a unique arrow x : X
X, from the point of view of X. What these mean is that for any category with a terminal object, the elements defined at
the terminal stage, from the perspective of 1, can be uniquely translated to elements at any other stage, any other point
of view. This means these elements are globally observable. We can understand what this means by engaging our favorite
tension between set theory and category theory again: essentialism. If there is a fixed, static, eternal, rigid definition that
is inherent, defined in total isolation of what the essence of a mango is, then we can claim that this essence is something
that all perspectives on the mango can agree on, that it doesn’t matter who you are, where you are, what you are, the
mango doesn’t care, the mango has a fixed, static, rigid definition to be discovered by anyone or anything clever enough.
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These essences, these elements defined from the stage of 1, from the point of view of 1, thus do not depend on any stage,
on any point of view, they are global. But recall, we’ve been arguing and motivating that experience is emphatically local.
What it means to be someone is in stark contrast to being anyone amongst everyone. Alice is Alice and no other. Reading
a narrative through Alice’s eyes, if she were to feel real, would not read like a narrative through Bob’s eyes, if he were to
feel real. A moment distinctly lacks this kind of global identity. Thus in our engagement of time, we expect to have more
than just global elements
x 21 A

but to also have variable elements

x 2B A

because the identity of a given moment, the identity of the element in question, will always be dependent on the perspective
it is being relationally engaged from, whose experience we are referring to, whose perspective we are understanding, whose
memories inform, contextualize, constrain the definition of the moment in question, whose virtual overflows, possesses the
moment in question. Victoria’s appointment with Ann was a fairly standard visit in the pursuit of trying to become more selfreliant as her memory degrades. What we can globally say about this moment involves the efficient causality we know and
love in physics. The particles and forces involved follow our laws in the realm of the actual, they must abide by restrictions
like not being able to travel than the speed of light. This efficient causality is something that anyone amongst everyone
agrees on. However, this event, this actual occasion, a↵ects Ann insofar as it brings back a tsunami’s worth of thoughts,
feelings, and memories that she has done her best to outrun, repress, ignore, escape. This is a local experience of Ann, it is
particular to the experience of what it means to be someone, of what it means to be Ann in this moment, Victoria does not
share this same experience of the appointment. Thus the way in which this appointment a↵ects Ann in particular is not a
global observable, is not something that anyone amongst everyone agrees on. Regardless, the way the appointment a↵ects
Ann in this unique, local, experiential way influences, contextualizes, constrains–Ann’s subsequent decisions are causally
informed by this emphatically local experience. Going further, Ann clearly has other moments on her mind, moments of the
far past, twenty years ago, informing her decisions, thoughts, feelings too. As we saw with the example of the identity of
the moment of Jordan and Kaede first meeting at the piano bar, the identity of these past moments for Ann are necessarily
di↵erent now from what they were at the time, as they are contextualized by the twenty years of time in between up through
this appointment with Victoria that triggers their avalanche back into the forefront of her mind. Confer Bergson’s example
of thinking about a stationary object from the same angle in the same lighting, yet a moment’s identity is still morphing
due to the virtual that contextualizes it.
Let us be clear, there are still global definitions, “the facts of the matter,” which we understand when we exclusively
engage spatially, they have a fixed identity, x = x, and are placed on a fixed spacetime diagram and given fixed properties
like position. It is not up for debate whether or not Victoria went to Ann for an appointment. Diagrammatically,
1

✏

X
Where we understand X as the moment in question, Victoria’s appointment with Ann, and the relationship with 1 to be
engaging the global elements of this moment, the definitional relations of X that everyone agrees on, the efficient causality
that we are familiar with. However, at a later moment Y , when Ann follows Jordan back to her apartment and grabs a
bagful of the jellyfish, we again have its global elements, our efficient causality,

o

Y

1

✏

X
but in order to engage the virtual, in order to engage time temporally, we must understand how the past, the virtual,
informs, contextualizes, constrains, a future moment. This is decidely not a global element.
Y

`o

1
v

✏

X
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We have labeled this new arrow v to call to mind the virtual, as this is the relation of how the virtual, the past, X, informs,
contextualizes, and constrains Y . Notice, it is not global, out terminal object 1 cannot “see” the arrow v other than
through its engagement of Y , the eventual e↵ects, consequences of v; the arrow v is from the perspective of X, not from the
perspective of 1. Thus it can globally be seen, agreed on, understood that Victoria had an appointment with Ann, and that
Ann followed Jordan and grabbed a bagful of jellyfish, but we have to infer how the past, the virtual, a↵ected, informed,
contextualized, constrained Ann such that Ann’s decisions were made, decision that are not fully explainable when restricted
to efficient causality, decisions that are colored by the morphing, unending becoming identities of past moments from the
unique, local perspective of Ann. And from Ann’s local perspective, Ann’s local experience, she does “see”, understand,
know, feel how the past, the virtual, the moment X, her appointment with Victoria, has a↵ected, informed, contextualized,
constrained, grounded and impelled the moment Y , her subsequent decisions, but still, only on a local level, only Ann’s Y
from Ann’s X, only from her perspective, her point of view. How X is defined, the moment of Victoria’s appointment with
Ann, what X means, how X a↵ects, informs, contextualizes, constrains, grounds and impels is not the same for everyone,
in fact it is di↵erent for everyone, x 6= x. We no longer can be either Alice or Bob, anyone amongst everyone. We must
be someone. Perhaps that’s Alice, perhaps that’s Bob, but it can’t be anyone. However, the internal structure of how the
past is in the present, of how the virtual and actual are in dynamic reciprocal determination, despite being emphatically
local, is the same, inclusive of all our elements being di↵erent from every which perspective and never retaining an identity,
this structure is a topological invariant of an autonomous time, separate from any particular subjectivity, possessing each
emphatically local experience. We are abandoning identity, x = x, in favor of embracing internal structure, x ⇠
= x.
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novel, di↵erent fluorescent protein: absorbing blue, emitting green. This could be the indicator that connects the
dots. Ann owed it to Krzys’s family to set things right. Victoria’s memory issues will be more precisely diagnosable, more
treatable, more able to be engaged if all the relevant pieces were better understood, separated and flagged, if the neuronal
component parts could be distinguished, traced, and followed.
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homewrecker

/
9

Aequorea victoria

source of green fluorescent protein

o

stinger of life
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current model of time can be structured as such,
f

X

g

/Y

/Z

Grounding this in our lived experience example, we can understand X to be the moment where Jordan and Kaede first
meet in the piano bar, the moment Y to be Jordan struggling on the toilet as Kaede tries to help her, and the moment Z
to be Kaede driving her home. The arrows f, g are the efficiently causal relationships of particles and forces following the
laws of physics. Given that everything involved in this scenario is made up of particles and forces, the current model of time
understands this flow of events as being entirely causally determined by the laws of physics of these particles and forces, that
the only thing that matters any one instant is the current, immediate positions and momentums of the elements involved,
f

g

/Y
/ Z play out. Thus we understand our moments X, Y, Z
and out of that we would find this exact scenario X
to be extensionless points with causal relationships bound to contiguous relations of extensionless points along the timeline.
The directionality of these causal relationships is included but we note that the pseudo-problem modern science has gotten
itself into regarding what is called the problem of “the arrow of time” is not well agreed upon. For why we believe this to
be a pseudo-problem, a problem that modern science has created for itself, we refer back to our earlier discussion regarding
the bias of a faith in determinism, an affirming of the mathematical real line as being more real than our own empirical
experience, from which our experience is bracketed away as an illusion.
A representable functor is a special functor whose domain is an arbitrary category C and whose codomain is the
special category of Sets. Our simple example of the current model of time can be understood set-theoretically as a set of
objects {X, Y, Z}, which we understand to be extensionless points, and a set of arrows {f, g}, which we understand as the
efficiently causal relationships. We can thus construct a category-theoretic understanding of this model.
Before we assemble our category-theoretic diagram, we must figure out what the domain of our representable functor for
the current model of time will be. It turns out that the category of graphs is what we are looking for, which can be felt
considering our current model of time is indeed a graph. But what is the category of graphs?
idA

⇠

A

s

t

OZ
idO

The category of graphs should contain the internal structure of any possible graph, such that we can instantiate our
specific graph of the current model of time. Does this category do that? Every graph can be decomposed into a set of its
objects and arrows which we did above. In our category of graphs, the object A can be understood as the set of arrows
in our graph. Note, we continue to mix set-theoretic and category-theoretic understandings in the interest of building up
intuition with category theory; thus we call attention to how A is not inherently defined, as an essence, to be the set of
arrows, but rather the relationships {idA , s, t} that provide our relational definition of A are such that arrows in a graph are
isomorphic ⇠
= to the object A. How do these relationships give an isomorphic definition to any arrow in a graph? Let’s
check one by one. The relationship idA is our identity arrow such that any arrow in our graph has an identity, x = x, where
it is always itself. This is true. We might notice that our objects in our graph, our extensionless points, also possess an
identity, thus we have not yet concluded that A is isomorphic to only the arrows of our graph. The next relationship is s
which sends an element of A to an element of O. What does s tell us? We invoke mixed set-theoretic and category-theoretic
understandings again to help us get there: if we understand A as our set of arrows and O as our set of objects, we say that
s is an arrow that picks out a source point. Following the diagram, we start in the domain of s with an arrow in our set of
arrows A and the process of s returns an object in the codomain O that corresponds with the source point of our chosen
arrow. We return to a strictly category-theoretic understanding which tells us that our arrow s means any element of A has
a relationship to an element di↵erent from itself O as understood by s. Does this make sense for an arrow? Yes, the arrow
itself has a di↵erent identity from the source point that is included in the arrow, thus we can encode the relationship between
an arrow and its source point in this way. Can the same be said for the objects of our graph, the extensionless points? No,
they have no internal relationship to anything but themselves, thus our set of points {X, Y, Z} are not isomorphic ⇠
= to A.
We might notice that we haven’t yet encoded enough internal structure for what makes an arrow in a graph: we have an
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identity of the arrow itself, we have the source point of the arrow, but what about a target point? This is what t encodes, a
relation that takes an element of A and returns an element of O. We now have encoded the entirety of the internal structure
required such that our set of arrows {f, g} is isomorphic ⇠
= to A by means of our relational definition (having an identity, a
source, and a target), and our set of objects {X, Y, Z} is isomorphic ⇠
= to O by means of our relational definition (having
an identity). We might notice that our labels s, t are arbitrary, after all, as we continue to argue, there is no inherent, fixed,
essentialist definition, and both s and t have the same relational structure. This is true. We label s and t in the interest of
being helpful and intuitive, but all that matters category-theoretically is that there are two such arrows whose domain is A
and whose codomain is O such that arrows in our graph can have a source point that is di↵erent from its target point. We
of course still have the case where s and t pick out the same point, where the arrow in our graph is a loop that starts and
ends at the same point.
We can now more confidently construct our representable functor, our category-theoretic engagement of the current model
of time, by means of a particular instantiation of a graph from the category of graphs
idA

⇠

A

s

t

G

/X

f

/Y

g

/Z

OZ
idO

C

G

/ Sets

Beneath the expanded diagram we have put the consolidated understanding to build intuition: we have a representable
functor G whose domain is a category C and whose codomain is the category Sets. Above, on the left is our category
of graphs, G is our representable functor that goes from the internal structure of any possible graph and constructs the
particular instantiation of the graph we are using as our simple current model of time, and on the right we have that specific
graph of our current model of time.
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was in again, the green fluorescent protein already in her brain, awaiting interaction, awaiting a signal.
Ann explained, “We’re going to try a di↵erent trial. A di↵erent indicator protein that will hopefully mesh with what
we’re looking for and be of better help.”
No response.
“When was the last time you saw Jordan?” Ann needed to find the memories that were still just about there, barely
holding on, on the edge of being totally lost, such that she could understand the mechanism of what was happening cellularly
in the transitional process.
Victoria looked at Ann and said nothing. Her facial expression looked less consumed by thought, as if recalling the memory
were easy, less consumed by an e↵ort to communicate, as if speaking were easy, but nevertheless she remained silent. The
dementia squeezed its grip on Victoria’s brain, growing new branches, tendrils, thrust into the language lobes. Ann was
running out of time, losing her opportunity to make everything right, or as right as it can be.
“Victoria, are you able to understand what I’m saying to you right now?”
E↵ort returned to her face, what Ann imagined was an intent focus on each word being said, or perhaps a battle with the
awareness of such a question being asked being indicative of something very troubling. This was the worst condition Ann
had seen Victoria in since they began their trials together. The gravity of the situation, the past coming back to haunt her,
a situation Ann felt at least partly responsible for, squeezed its grip on Ann’s brain, growing new branches, tendrils, thrust
into the language lobes.
“How many daughters do you have?”
Go for broke. This was the opportunity to find out how much Victoria knew of what happened, or at least how much she
remembered.
Victoria didn’t respond, her attention diverting to brain anatomy posters on the walls. New approach. Ann grabbed a
clipboard with a blank piece of paper and wrote the numbers zero, one, two. She handed the clipboard to Victoria, which
she took instinctively, finding something more interesting than the posters in it, inspecting the writing in front of her.
Ann picked up Victoria’s right hand, isolated her pointer finger, and waved it around the three options. “How many
daughters do you have?”
Her fingers danced, mimicking more circles around the options as if Victoria thought she was being given an instruction
on how to move more than being given a question for her to answer. Her finger stopped at the number one. Ann looked at
Victoria who looked up at Ann. This was communication. She felt it. Nonverbal connection. Either Victoria’s memory can
only recall one daughter or Krzys never told her what it was they did all those years ago.
She took the clipboard back and turned away towards the brain anatomy posters herself. Recentering. Old approach:
back to helping the current situation, determining the puzzle pieces for her dementia. As Ann went to turn around, a new
question being formed to tease out an optimal brain signal, it occurred to her that she wasn’t just going back to the old
approach of five minutes ago, rather Ann was returning to the old approach that created this mess. Jordan needed help
badly and Ann broke the rules to do something about it, going to whatever lengths she deemed necessary. Is this not another
impulsive, even if well-intentioned, experiment, pushed through on the back of necessity? Of needing to help Victoria during
an admittedly dire time? Ann felt like she owed Krzys then and now she feels like she owes Krzys’s family after everything
she’d been a part of. How many more lives was she prepared to ruin in the name of fixing her previous mistakes? Who
knows what cold come out of the use of this jellyfish fluorescent protein without more proper studying? This had to stop.
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115 Let us now formally argue that our category of graphs is indeed the category of graphs. A hom-set C(X, ) is a
representable functor of the set of all arrows within the category C whose domain is X and whose codomain is arbitrary.
In order to argue that our category of graphs is indeed the category of graphs, we must follow the qualitative argument
that we gave above, namely we must argue that the object A is isomorphic to arrows in graphs and that the object O is
isomorphic to objects in graphs. To do this, we will investigate the hom-sets of each of our objects, A, O, such that we can
conclude that the relational definition matches what we are looking for.
Let’s start with our object A. To do this, we specify the X in C(X, ) to be A so that we can look at the relationships that
are constitutive of its definition. We have a total of two objects in our category, A, O, so we will be creating two di↵erent
sets, where the codomain of the arrows in our hom-set are A and O respectively.

C(A, A)

C(A, O)

idA

s

t

The set at the top is the hom-set C(A, A), the set of arrows in C that go from A to A. We only have one of these arrows,
the identity idA . The set at the bottom is the hom-set C(A, O), the set of arrows in C that go from A to O. We have two
of these arrows, the source arrow s and the target arrow t.
Next we must investigate the hom-set C(A, s). This move pushes on our set-theoretic intuitions–what does it mean to have
an arrow that goes from an object A to an arrow s? Recall, set theory has inherent, isolated, fixed, static, rigid definitions
whereas category theory has definitions constructed out of relationships. When we inquire about the relationship between
A and s, we are not inquiring about the relationship between some fixed, isolated, rigidly-defined entity A and some other
fixed, isolated, rigidly-defined entity s, where the definition of each might cause us immense confusion in how they relate
(where one is an object and the other is an arrow). Instead, we must remember that our definitions in category theory are
built out of the relationships. This means that A is defined as its set of relationships {idA , s, t}. Okay, what about s? Notice,
s is a particular relationship in our set of relationships that define A and O, specifically it is a relationship whose domain
is A and whose codomain is O.
s: A

/O

When we refer to s, we are referring to O from the stage of A, from the point of view of A, and in distinction from t. We
can imagine the set of arrows that have O as codomain {idO , s, t} as a definition of what O is and then restricting to the
particular relationship of s. This then o↵ers a particular point of view on O, a narrower definition amongst a larger definition.
Thus, when we speak of s, we are speaking of a particular point of view on O, namely the one from A that is distinct from
t. In our example of the electron, understood from the points of view of the relationship f of the electron as a particle and
the relationship g of the electron as a wave, we can understand an arrow that goes from an object A to an arrow f to be an
arrow that goes from the object A to the object e, the electron, as understood from the relational perspective as a particle,
which we know isn’t the full definition of e, which would have to include the contexts where the electron is also a wave. In
our example of objects that both Jordan and Kaede find sweet (mango, candy bar, ...), the arrow f was specifically the
relationship of what Jordan found to be sweet and the arrow g was specifically the relationship of what Kaede found to be
sweet, thus we can understand an arrow that goes from an object X (we momentarily avoid using A as A had a definition
within the example) to an arrow f to be an arrow that goes from the object X to the object A, objects that are sweet, as
understood from the relational perspective of Jordan. Coming back to our category-theoretic argument of the category of
graphs being the category of graphs, what does it mean to have an arrow that goes from A to s?
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idA

A

/A
s

s idA

✏

O

/s

A

Along the bottom we have the consolidated version of what our diagram is constructing, an arrow from A to s. At the top
we have A on the left and s on the right, where we understand s to be O from the stage of A, from the point of view of A.
To determine what the arrow is that goes from A on the left to O as understood from the perspective of A, all encoded as s,
on the right, we complete the commutative diagram. We know how to go from A to A along the top, that is our identity of
A arrow. We can then conclude, through the commutativity of the diagram, that the arrow that goes from A to s (otherwise
understood as O from the stage of A, from the point of view of A) is the composition s idA . Notice, what this composition
is saying is that the relationship encoded in our hom-set C(A, s) is one that goes to s after idA . We can thus add C(A, s) to
our diagram as an arrow that goes from idA to s.
C(A, A)

idA

C(A,s)

C(A, O)

⇤

s

t

By an identical argument, this time for t instead of s, we can conclude that the hom-set C(A, t) is a relationship that goes
to t after idA and can be added to our diagram.
C(A, A)

idA

C(A,s)

C(A, O)

s

C(A,t)

⇠
⇤

t

We can now construct the representable functor that encodes the entirety of the internal structure of our object A! This
is the representable functor C(A, ).
C(A,

)

s

idA

/t

Our identity arrow on A is an arrow, our objects s and t are our source and target objects respectively, and our hom-sets
C(A, s) and C(A, t) pick out the source and target for our given arrow idA . Recall that s and t are arbitrary labels given
to two identical relationships that are distinct such that we can construct arrows with a source point that di↵ers from its
target point. Thus, through our decision to label each as s and t, we can encode the directionality of our arrow going from s
to t. Notice, we have constructed a generalized arrow. This is the form of any arrow in any graph! The full internal structure
of what makes an arrow in a graph an arrow in a graph! We can now, as confidently as ever, conclude that our set of arrows
{f, g} in our graph is isomorphic ⇠
= to A.
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Let us quickly run through the relational definition of O in the same manner.
C(O, A)

C(O, O)

idO

Above we have the set of arrows that go from O to A, which when we consult our category we understand to be empty.
Below we have the set of arrows that go from O to O, which we know to be the single arrow our identity on O. We don’t
explicate the arrows from O to either s or t as, at least in comparison to our case of A, they are trivial and simply return
idO . We can now construct the representable functor that encodes the entirety of the internal structure of our object O!
This is the representable functor C(O, ).
C(O,

)

idO

Our identity arrow on O is an object with an identity and that’s the entirety of our internal structure for O! Notice, we
have constructed a generalized object. This is the form of any object in any graph! We intuitively understand the objects
of our graphs to be points and so we can understand this generalized object for graphs to be to be a generalized point. We
can conclude that our set of objects {X, Y, Z} in our graph is isomorphic ⇠
= to O.
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116 Through this intuition-building exercise we have gotten ourselves close to an important lemma in category theory that
will similarly be important for our purposes in engaging time, the Yoneda Lemma. The Yoneda Lemma states,

/ Sets

For object X of category C and arrow G : C
⇠ G(X)
Nat[C(X, ), G] =

Let us tackle this one step at a time. On the left hand side we have a natural transformation between the hom-set C(X, )
and a representable functor that is a specific instantiation of our category, G. Recall that G in our example of the current
model of time is a representable functor that is a specific instantiation of our category of graphs, and so we can continue to
use this example to ground our understanding. Because of this, we have already constructed both C(X, ) and G. The left
side speaks of a natural transformation between them, so let’s add that in to our current example. We will look at C(A, )
first.
idA
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Along the bottom we have the consolidated version to ground our intuition, we have two representable functors C(A, ),
G that go from C to Sets. Above, we have our category of graphs on the left hand side. To the right, we have two
representable functors, C(A, ) is our generalized arrow and G is our specific instantiation of a graph, the current model
of time. The Yoneda Lemma says that our natural transformation ↵ maps our generalized arrow C(A, ) to arrows in our
specific instantiation G. This makes sense as we have already concluded that our generalized arrow contains the entirety of
the internal structure of any arrow in any graph. Thus we can imagine our generalized arrow picking out an arrow in our
graph G such that, for example, idA picks out f and with it s maps to X and t maps to Y . The same can be done with our
generalized point
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Here our generalized object C(O, ) is mapped to objects in our graph G, which again makes sense as we have concluded
that our generalized object contains the entirety of the internal structure of any object in any graph. Thus we can imagine
our generalized object picking out an object in our graph G such that, for example, idO picks out X.
Now let’s turn to the right hand side of the Yoneda Lemma. X is the object of our choice from our category C (in
our example we’ve been using A and O), so G(X) for us is either the set of arrows in our specific instantiation G(A) or
the set of objects in our specific instantiation G(O). Putting it altogether, the Yoneda Lemma states that our natural
transformation ↵ is isomorphic ⇠
= to G(X). Let’s ground this in our specific example of the category of graphs C with our
specific instantiation graph G of the current model of time, and within this example let’s ground this in choosing G(X) to
be G(A) while considering the relationship s between A and O.
C(A, A)

C(A,s)

/ C(A, O)

↵A

↵O

↵◆

G(A)

↵◆

G(s)

/ G(O)

Along the top we have our generalized arrow C(A, A) which follows the relationship C(A, s) to our generalized object C(A, O),
which in this case due to the relationship we’ve chosen is the source object of our generalized arrow. Along the bottom we
have an arrow in our graph G(A) which follows the relationship G(s) to an object in our graph G(O), which in this case due
to the relationship we’ve chosen is the source of our arrow in G(A). Along the left we have our natural transformation ↵A
that maps our generalized arrow C(A, A) to an arrow in our graph G(A). Along the right we have our natural transformation
↵O that maps our generalized object C(A, O) to an object in our graph G(O). We can verify that this diagram commutes
by choosing a specific arrow, so let’s choose f in our graph G. Starting from the top left, we have a generalized arrow, we
follow the natural transformation ↵A down which picks out our example arrow f , and then we follow the arrow G(s) which
returns the source of our arrow f , the object X. Going the other way, we have a generalized arrow, we follow C(A, s) to
our generalized source object C(A, O), and then we follow the natural transformation ↵O down which picks out the source
object of our example arrow f , the object X. The diagram commutes! Now the crux of the matter: the Yoneda Lemma
states that as a result of this commuting diagram, our natural transformation ↵ is isomorphic ⇠
= to the elements of our
graph G. Another way of saying this is that it is equivalent to refer to our example source object X in our graph G as being
the source G(s) of our arrow f from our arrows G(A) or as being a mapping ↵O of our generalized source object C(A, O)
such that all structure (relationships) is preserved. We’ll say it in a third way, inching closer to why this is so important,
the understanding of our object X from the perspective of G is an internal definition and the understanding of our object
X from the perspective of C(A, O) is an external definition. Specifically, the internal definition comes from an inherent,
essentialist definition: we say that G is already completely given and then we can break it up into sets of simpler parts
that themselves are completely given. But the external definition is demonstrative of how we’ve discussed defining things
category theoretically: there are no inherent, essentialist definitions, rather we define things relationally, always from the
stage of somewhere, from the point of view of somewhere, and our subsequent definitions are not a closed rigid boundary
but rather simultaneously all-encompassing and open through its definition being the set of all relationships, which are
relationships that can change, that can grow in number, that can shrink in number.
The conceptual significance of [the Yoneda Lemma] is that it has the following relational process-theoretic
interpretation: An object of a category is determined uniquely up to equivalence by the network of all
internal relations that the object has with all the other objects in [the category]. (Zafiris 231)
The Yoneda Lemma states that we can define anything in this external, relational way and lose nothing through doing so.
This is important for us because we have argued that we do not want to understand a moment in time as an extensionless
point, the epitome of essentialist, rigidly-defined, timeless mathematics. The Yoneda Lemma tells us that we can always
define something relationally as opposed to the essentialist picture. Let’s put this into action.
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117 The

first revision of time we seek to make is having the past inside of the present. Our current model of time
f

X

g

/Y

/Z

understands our moments X, Y, Z to be extensionless points whose causal relationships are bound to contiguous relations
of extensionless points along the timeline. The past being inside the present violates the definition of an extensionless point;
a point has a rigid boundary, a clear dividing line between what is inside (nothing) and what is outside (everything). We
have discussed at length both how the past is involved in our present and how the present itself is not like a razor-edge
extensionless point (confer our discussion on melody). We thus start our revision by understanding our moments X, Y, Z
not with internal, fixed, x = x identities. Rather, using our lessons of categorical relational defining and the Yoneda Lemma,
we will understand the definition of our moments relationally. Instead of the moment Y , which we recall in our example is
the moment of Jordan struggling on the toilet as Kaede tries to help her, being understood as some inherent, fixed, static,
rigid definition in itself, we will define Y through the set of its relationships. At present this means understanding Z not
as Z in itself, but understanding Z as g, which we can read as “Z from the point of view of Y ”, g encoding the moment of
Kaede driving Jordan home grounded and impelled by the moment of Jordan struggling on the toilet and Kaede trying to
help her, where crucially Z as an isolated, separated, clearly divided, inherently defined, fixed, rigid identity does not exist,
Z is grounded and impelled by its past moment Y .
In order to include the past inside of the present, we must have more than just the immediate preceding moment,
more than just the efficiently causal, informing, contextualizing, constraining our moments X, Y, Z. The first revision thus
manifests itself
f

X

g

/Y

/8 Z

h

The moment X, Jordan and Kaede first meeting at the piano bar, is now directly and explicitly present for moment Z, the
moment of Kaede driving Jordan home, grounding and impelling this moment Z, causally influencing Z. Our relational
definition of Z is thus {g, h}, which we can understand as Z being informed, contextualized, constrained by both the
moments X and Y , the moment of Jordan and Kaede first meeting and moment of Jordan struggling in the bathroom with
Kaede trying to help. This first revision of time preserves consistency of the relationships that might not seem explicitly
involved. For example, thinking of Z as {g, h} explicitly shows Z’s f dependence, even though f is not explicitly included
in our set of relationships of Z. Diagrammatically,
Y

g

/Z
>
h

X
this is how we understand the moment Z. But the past is present for each moment, not just Z. Each part contains the
whole within it, and so Z being entwined with X and Y means X and Y should each be entwined with the other two in
our temporal continuity. Thus we must make this diagram commute if we are to properly engage temporal continuity, such
that the past is in the present.
YO
f

g

/> Z
h

X
The diagram is made commutative through the existence of f , thus if we are properly engaging temporal continuity, our
moment Z relationally defined as {g, h} includes the existence of f for consistency, such that our diagram commutes.
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118 The second revision of time we seek is having reciprocal determination between the virtual and the actual. Mathematically, we can understand time progressing as new moments added to our diagram that are likewise in relation to every other
moment
k
j
f

X

g

/Y

/8 Z

i

/% A

h

We can understand A here as a future moment of Jordan’s after being driven home by Kaede, like when she refused to
answer any calls or texts, this moment having a relationship to, being grounded and impelled by, the past. As we have
discussed, as time progresses so too does our relationship to past moments; during the moments immediately after the
events of Jordan and Kaede’s first meeting, after moment Z in our example, the identity of these events were colored by
embarassment and meaningfully impacted Jordan in this way, but by the time of moment A, when Jordan feels dead, the
identity of these moments is di↵erent, one of indi↵erence, and thus influences the decisions, thoughts, and feelings of Jordan
di↵erently, but still meaningfully. The virtual is what informs, contextualizes, constrains, grounds and impels the actual,
but recall that the virtual and the actual are in a dynamic reciprocally determining relationship. The ways in which an
event of the past is present, how it is present, the way it is understood, felt, the way it informs, contextualizes, constrains,
grounds and impels decisions, thoughts, and feelings changes in time. Thus the identity of a past moment is not a fixed,
static one, the identity of the virtual is also in process, in unending becoming, x 6= x. We thus need to encode explicitly
that past moments are undergoing this process of change, this unending process, lacking a fixed identity due to the dynamic
reciprocally determining relationship between the virtual and the actual. The second revision thus manifests itself
f
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Let us be clear, our elements repel every sense of an identity. Although we label our moments with self-identical labels
like {X, Y, Z}, the identity of each of these moments is explicitly not self-identical in time, X 6= X, Y 6= Y , Z 6= Z, as
the creation of a new moment is the inclusion of a new part to the whole, of which all other moments have an internal,
constitutive, evolving, morphing, changing relationship with. Thus when a new moment A arrives, we have
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Previously, the relational definition of our moment Z was {g, h}. With the addition of moment A, the relational definition
of Z is now {g, h, ī}. Not only is this a di↵erent definition on the face of it, but the moment A has a relationship with
each of the stages, each of the points of view, from which we understood the relations {g, h} in the first place. Thus if X
has a di↵erent identity, then h has a di↵erent identity; if Y has a di↵erent identity, then g has a di↵erent identity. Thus
Z’s definition is in total flux, in unending becoming, in process due to the added relationship of ī as well as the shifting
identities constitutive of {g, h}. But we still retain the internal structure as diagrammed above.
In a temporal continuity, we cannot sum the parts to reach the whole, every element is mutually interpenetrating, the
whole is in each part, where each part has a particular perspective on the whole. Recall our category-theoretic definition of
an identity arrow: an arrow composed with an identity arrow returns itself f idA = f and idA g = g. Relationally, we can
understand an object to be isomorphic ⇠
= to another object if there exists an arrow in one direction and an inverse arrow
in the opposite direction
f
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o

f¯

/Y
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such that f¯ f = idX , f f¯ = idY . Thus X and Y are isomorphic ⇠
= objects. Notice, our whole diagram of our twice-revised
engagement of time is composed of this kind of isomorphic relationship. Each of these parts, moments, are not distinct
atoms, they are not building blocks that we have reduced our analysis of time down to, they are not mutually external
identities in external relation: they are elements of a whole, a singleton, where the diagram as a whole is our single element
in question; each of these isomorphic ⇠
= elements of the whole thus contains the whole within itself; the way in which each of
these elements di↵er is by means of their perspective on the whole that each of them retains. Consequently, we understand
every moment (whole) to be a novel creation. The conditions are just as varying as the conditioned, the virtual is changing
in a dynamic reciprocal determination with the actual, and thus a novel virtual grounds and impels a novel actual. Each
novel moment is unlike any other moment in history.
By shifting to a relational category-theoretic perspective, we are able to include how the past constrains the present
explicitly and how the past mutates in time explicitly. However, having constructed relational definitions is not enough. The
Yoneda Lemma states that internal and external definitions are isomorphic ⇠
=, but we know from our empirical experience
that there is no internal definition for a moment that works without subjugating time to the realm of space, there is no
fixed, static, inherent, rigidly-defined identity for a moment in time, x 6= x. Thus if we were to only use the Yoneda Lemma
to understand a spatialized time relationally but still spatially, where moments have fixed identities instead of temporally
changing, unending becoming, in-process identities, we would not yet be engaging time as we intend to. We must press on.
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119 What was wrong with her? Victoria was sitting down in her library, taking in the books around her. She found great
solace in the grounding that the past provided. Histories as orienting mechanisms. She knew what was happening, she
had dementia. As a child, she remembered her grandmother living with them as she underwent the same. So many school
projects about family trees; Victoria always misspelled her fracturing identity as dimentia.
As Victoria got older, she turned towards the past, towards history, more and more. There was always rhetoric about
keeping her mind engaged to stave o↵ the ossifying of her own fracturing identity, of losing her sense of the past, being
confined to, trapped in, the present. Atlas turned to stone. She took up Latin, Greek, etymology, the origins of much of the
language around her. One way of making making sure she always had one foot in the past was through seeing the words
around her as all having one foot in the past, that nothing was so simply its surface understanding.
mentior, mentiri — Latin — to lie, to deceive. Her appointment with Ann bubbled back into view; what was she talking
about? How many daughters did she have? Did she know something about her daughter? Did she know something about
her husband? Her husband—her husband? Her husband. . . Victoria grabbed a photo on the end table beside her. Krzys.
The two of them were in the hospital, with their tiny daughter—daughter, Jordan, unable to hold her. Her immune system
wasn’t doing what it was meant to. They thought they were going to lose her. But they didn’t. Victoria was now more
concerned about losing herself. Mentior could also be translated as to invent, typically in the realm of making up lies,
making up stories. Victoria found that sometimes not knowing the true history of a word, but inventing a history of a word
could be just as helpful. Both put into practice the embracing of the past, which was what really mattered. The stories she
told herself may have been technically false, but they spoke a profound truth, the one she needed.
Victoria chose to be with her past, holding her own hand from when she was just a girl, and in so doing fought o↵ the
fracturing of identity through the empowering statement that comes with claiming her own identity. She refused; Victoria
did not have dementia, she had dimentia.
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If we aspire to complement Bergson’s inquiry into duration with mathematics, it is not to domesticate
duration—and certainly not to displace the first-person experience of it. It is to amplify the alien otherness
of time. Why mathematics? Will it really amplify the alien character of time? More than Cage’s I-VI or
Tarkovsky’s Stalker ? Does not mathematics, like Bergson, separate us from habitual images [...]? Even
as it extends the intellect, mathematics might be alien to it—as alien as duration. Deleuze casts organic
wholes and virtual problems as continuous multiplicities. This identification lets him circumvent Bergson’s
prohibition upon using mathematics to inquire into time. Topology was indispensable for divining the
dynamics of problems. Problems are structurally isomorphic to organic wholes. Thus, topology expresses
something of the dynamics of duration. (Paetsch 206)
Physics strives to describe the universe as accurately as possible, and the fundamental building block being an extensionless
point is a move made in the name of the more precise our description equals the more accurate description, as nothing is
more precise than an extensionless point. However, in the realm of time this accuracy is not true: turning to topology, the
imprecision of an open set is more accurate for our engagement of temporal reality than the precision of an extentionless
point.
In category theory we learned to define things relationally, but found that we were still defining extensionless points in a
relational manner. In topology we will explore the importance of proximity to our definitions. “[T]he fundamental question
concerns proximity: what do you consider to be a neighborhood, without necessarily appealing to any quantitative means”
(Sha Xin Wei 164). Quantities are the localizations of an extentionless point on the spatial continuity real line, thus if we
are not using an extensionless point nor a spatial continuity, we do not anticipate temporal analysis to involve quantitative
means. What do we mean when we refer to proximity?
One example comes from atmospheric and geophysical boundaries: where does the planet Earth end and
space begin as one ascends into the atmosphere? One could apply all sorts of criteria. The point at which
one loses consciousness in a rising high-altitude balloon? The barometric pressure? The flux of ultraviolet
light or cosmic rays intersecting a meter held in the hand? The visibility of the people waving their hands
goodbye? Take the barometric pressure for example. A macroscopic body intersecting the atmosphere at
extremely high speed (tens of thousands of miles per hour) and at a shallow enough angle may even glance o↵
the atmosphere the way a rock can skip o↵ the surface of a lake, but the same body brought slowly through
the atmosphere will easily penetrate it. So the manner in which one approaches the planet certainly a↵ect
the boundedness of the planet. [...] Of course accepted boundaries are conventional, but the conventionality
underlines the material fact that there is no sharp atmospheric boundary around the planet Earth. (Sha
Xin Wei 165)
The boundary to the definition of the Earth is not inherent, fixed, rigid. It’s blurry, dynamic, based on the current specific
context for this boundary-creation (confer the choice of a Baradian apparatus for a Bohrian phenomenon) and based on
how this process is enacted (a body approaching the Earth at a high speed and shallow angle versus a slow speed and steep
angle are productive of di↵erent boundaries for the Baradian apparatus of barometric pressure chosen as one such boundarydrawing to the definition of the Earth). The takeaway here, as it has been elsewhere, is that boundaries, definitions, are not
fixed, inherent, rigid. But intuitively when we speak of the Earth, we understand what is meant. The acknowledgement of the
lack of a rigid, fixed, inherent boundary is not the same as acknowledging that nothing means anything, that communication
is impossible, that we’re left with a jumbled mess. We are able to generally know what is meant when the Earth is mentioned,
subject to di↵erent contexts, to di↵erent processes, and to its constantly changing identity, x 6= x, in time. The topological
tool of an open set captures this notion well.
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To bolster our understanding, we start with a nonrigorous intuition. An open set is our boundary-drawing definition
unit that concerns itself with proximity, a boundary that is open to the lack of fixed identity in an unending becoming, in a
process, across variable contexts. An open set is a set of extensionless points where each extensionless point is surrounded
by other valid extensionless points. We want to directly contrast an open set to an extensionless point in our seeking of a
fundamental object by which to engage time. An extensionless point has a fixed, rigid boundary, it is an extensionless point
surrounded by no other valid points. Pictorially,

The open set allows the blurriness, the dynamism, the fluctuation that we seek for the definition of a moment in time. An
open set is never defined in isolation, rather it is always defined relative to a topological space. A topological space is a
set X defined together with a collection of open sets T on that space. We use T as our letter of encoding because we refer
to our specified collection of open sets as a topology on a topological space. Our open sets abide by three axioms
1)

X ✓ X is an open set in T and ? ✓ X is an open set in T .

This first axiom states that it is always the case that the whole topological space X is itself an open set in our topology T
(we call this the trivial open set) as well as it always being the case that the empty set ? is an open set in our topology T .
2)

Any union U [ V of open sets in T is an open set in T .

This second axiom states that it is always the case that, given two open sets U, V in our topology T , their union U [ V is
also an open set in our topology T .
3)

Any intersection U \ V of a finite number of open sets in T is an open set in T .

This third axiom states that it is always the case that, given a finite number of open sets U, V in our topology T , their
intersection U \ V is also an open set in our topology T .
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121 “Yerka!” Victoria opened a new can of cat food. The plate from yesterday’s food was still full, barely touched, though
wet from being recently licked. Victoria washed the dish in the sink and placed down the new food.
Victoria sat down in her library, taking in the books around her. She found great solace in the grounding that the past
provided. Histories as orienting mechanisms. She knew what was happening, she had dementia. As a child, she remembered
her grandmother living with them as she underwent the same. So many school projects about family trees; Victoria always
misspelled her fracturing identity as dimentia.
Krzys was the one who encouraged her mother to stay with them. She faded so early. Krzys sold his boat to pay for
treatments, researching all kinds of experimental options, from internationally renowned researchers trying something brand
new, to holistic healers known amongst their circles. Witnessing the gradual loss of my mother was draining, and nothing
was o↵ the table for Krzys when it came to someone she loved. The memory brought a smile. Victoria grabbed a photo on
the end table beside her. Krzys. The two of them were in the hospital, with a tiny Jordan, unable to hold her. Her immune
system wasn’t doing what it was meant to. They thought they were going to lose her. But they didn’t. Victoria had been
more concerned with how Krzys would take the loss of their daughter than she was with herself. Krzys was near obsessive
when it came to finding a way to keep Victoria’s mother with them. He would say how madly in love he was and that
nothing could petrify madness.
dimensio, dimensionis — Latin — the process of measuring dimension. More memories of Krzys bubbled back into
view; each memory, each shade of the past further deepening the supposed dimensions of what she previously thought she
understood, who Krzys was, who she was, what their marriage meant. The dimensions of what counted as an identity
blurring, the memories bouncing around as echoes of noise as they layered upon themselves, amplifying each other, the
next memory starting before the last one finished, contradicting and complementing themselves simultaneously. Andromeda
unchained from stone. Victoria sunk herself in her past, holding her own hand from when she was just a new mother, and in
so doing fought o↵ the fracturing of identity through the empowering statement that comes with claiming her own identity.
She refused; Victoria did not have dementia; she had dimentia.
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122 We seek to understand a moment as an open set, so what is this topological space, the set X, that our open sets are
defined relative to? We have a clue: we want this set X to be the union of all of our open sets (moments). Thus

O(X) ⇠
= the whole past, inclusive of the present

We read the left hand side as “the open sets on X” where X is our topological space. We are using an isomorphism ⇠
= and
not an equality = because we are looking to capture the relational definition of the internal structure of time, one that is
open to a lack of identity, a fluctuating identity, whereas an equality is specifically referring to fixed identities. We include
the present in the past as we affirm that the present itself is a moment among the entirety of all moments that make up time.
It may be helpful to recall that an actualization of the virtual is the way that the virtual di↵erentiates itself, the actual
is “part” of the virtual insofar as each “part” of the virtual contains the whole within it, the present included, but what
makes an actualization is its becoming into being, the moment becomes di↵erentiated, from which this novel di↵erentiated
identity feedback loops back into the identity of the virtual, because any change changes the whole, from which a novel
actualization is grounded and impelled, di↵erentiated.
The notation O(X) might give the impression that our topological space X is more fundamental than the opens sets, “open
sets on X,” that a topological space X populated by extensionless points exists first from which open sets are constructed
upon. Even all of our intuition-building remarks thus far have defined our open sets from extensionless points! This mirrors
the denial of time:

The notation is deceptive! It is not the case that the extensionless points of a topological space are more fundamental or
more real than the open sets. This mirrors our argument:
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123 “Yerka!” Victoria opened a new can of cat food. The plate from yesterday’s food was still full, barely touched, though
wet from being recently licked. Victoria washed the dish in the sick and placed down the new food. Once the plate hit the
countertop, she felt that she had already done this. Today. Numerous times. She checked the pantry and saw that she was
almost out of cat food. She remembered that she picked more up only two days ago. She remembered that Yerka was not
here. She remembered.
Her past continued to tumble in, overwhelming her present with an indefinite number of dimensions that were always
there, yet somehow out of her reach. The objects around her were changing. The photo of a tiny hospitalized Jordan colored
by not having seen Jordan in weeks. Books of her library colored by not having read any of them in years.
What changed? What switch flipped? She remembered that Ann spoke of a new something-or-other being used in her
brain.
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124 We seek to understand the nature of our topological space X such that we can understand and leverage the fact that
we need not assign a more fundamental reality to extensionless points of a space. We turn to lattice theory in order to
construct a topological space from scratch. A partially ordered set is a set A equipped with a partial order, a binary
relation 6 which is

1)
2)
3)

reflexive: for all a 2 A, a 6 a
transitive: if a 6 b and b 6 c, then a 6 c
antisymmetric: if a 6 b and b 6 a, then a = b

Let A be a partially ordered set 6 and S a subset of A. We say an element a 2 A is a join for S, written as a =
1)
2)

a is an upper bound for S, i.e. s 6 a for all s 2 S

W

S if

if b satisfies 8s 2 S(s 6 b), then a 6 b

W
We define the least element of a partially ordered set 6 as ? = 0. Let A be a partially ordered set 6 in which every
finite subset has a join. Then the binary operation _ and the least element 0 satisfy
1)
2)
3)
4)

a_a=a
a_b=b_a
a _ (b _ c) = (a _ b) _ c
a_0=a

for all a, b, c. Intuitively it is helpful to think of our binary operator as the logical-‘or,’ but we must remember that our
formal logics that use _ as a logical-‘or’ are operating within a system of intrinsically defined identity, x = x, of extensionless
points. Notice, our use of the binary operator _ between elements a _ b is resonant with our use of the union [ between
two open sets U [ V . We are in the process of building a topological space that allows for open sets (our moments) to be
fundamental. We’ve not once claimed that the elements of our partially ordered set a, b, c are extensionless points. It will
be instructive for later to think about a, b, c not as extensionless points but as open sets.
A join-semilattice is a partially ordered set A equipped with our binary operation _ and a least element 0. We encode a
join-semilattice as (A, _, 0). A simple example is as follows
06a6b6c
In order to ground intuition, we turn to our example of time with the caveat of not including our second revision of
reciprocal determination. In the above join-semilattice we can imagine having the same scenario we’ve been using, of Jordan
and Kaede meeting at the piano bar encoded in a, of Jorden struggling in the bathroom with Kaede trying to help encoded
in b, of Kaede driving Jordan home encoded in c. We can then understand that a comes before b comes before c. However,
the boundary to what these moments are isn’t so clear. Do we include the moment where Kaede demands to drive Jordan
home as part of b? c? Both? Neither? Context dependent? Ever-changing? This is part of the fuzziness we are looking to
embrace. Recall our discussion on melody, limiting our moments down to extensionless points in order to affirm a number
line that is more real than this blurriness as an attempt to clear up this blurriness does not clear the blurriness up, rather
it denies the reality of our experience, denies the way in which this unified blurry moment, like hearing a melody instead of
isolated and unrelated tones, e↵ects, a↵ects, grounds and impels Jordan, Kaede, ourselves. V
The same constructions can be made
V for an element a 2 A being a meet, written as a = S, the dual of our join. We
subsequently have a greatest element a = 1 and a binary operation ^ that we can intuitively engage by calling to mind
from formal logic the logical-‘and’. Our binary operator ^ between elements a ^ b is resonant with our use of the intersection
\ between two open sets U \ V . Again, the elements of our partially ordered set a, b, c need not be extensionless points but
rather open sets and we advise for this to be latched onto. Thus a meet-semilattice is a partially ordered set A equipped
with our binary operation ^ and a greatest element 1. We encode a meet-semilattice as (A, ^, 1).
Putting our join-semilattice and meet-semilattice together, a lattice is a partially ordered set A that is equipped with
both operations _, ^ and both a least element 0 and a greatest element 1.
Thus we can refine our example to be
06a6b6c61
There is nothing inherently special about either the least element or greatest element in practice, the lowest element in a
partially ordered set can be understood as 0 and the highest element in a partially ordered set can be understood as 1.
Thus we can say 0 is the moment of Jordan driving her mother home, a is the moment of Jordan and Kaede first meeting
at the piano bar, b is the moment of Jordan struggling in the bathroom with Kaede trying to help, c is the moment of
Kaede driving Jordan home, and 1 is the moment of Jordan ignoring all texts and calls, when she is feeling dead. Without
reducing any of these moments to extensionless points, we understand our logical-‘or’ _ as being the union of open sets, of
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moments, that what is being referred to is amongst the union of these two moments where each retains the blurry identity.
Similarly, we understand our logical-‘and’ ^ as being the intersection of open sets, of moments, that what is being referred
to is amongst the shared pieces of the moments in time, where each moment retains the blurry identity, where we might
say, dependent on context, that the moment of Kaede demanding to drive Jordan home belongs to the intersection of b and
c, b \ c.
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125 “You’re

aware of who I am?”
“I don’t know how long this will last.”
“Victoria, do you think—“
“Listen to me. I need more of the green trial.”
“I got rid of it all.”
“But we had just started using it?”
“I was going to tell you that we were stopping. I can’t do it anymore.”
“Well you must have just thrown it out, which bin is it in? I need it.”
“I dumped it all back into the ocean.”
Victoria dropped the garbage lid she was holding. “Why did you ask me how many daughters I have?”
Ann fell silent. “Jordan was so sick, you know this.”
“Yes, she was. She got through the worst of it though.”
“We expected her to die. There was no other path, every which way we looked at the situation it ended the same. It was
that dire. You remember, don’t you?”
“What is it that you’re saying?”
“We needed to think outside of the box. We were grasping at straws to save her life.”
“Did Jordan die?”
“I don’t know.”
“What does that mean?”
“Krzys killed himself shortly after.”
“After what, Ann? I’m sick of living in the dark.”
“One of them has a mark on her ankle. I don’t remember which. We didn’t make records.”
Victoria stared at the woman in front of her a bit harder. She was furious but had trouble putting her finger on the what.
Awareness fading. Snatching a pen attached to a clipboard, scribbling on her hand.
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126 A

subset I of a join-semilattice A is said to be an ideal if
1)
2)

I is a sub-join-semilattice of A; i.e. 0 2 I and a 2 I, b 2 I imply a _ b 2 I
I is a “lower set”; i.e. b 2 I and a 6 b imply a 2 I

Returning to our example
06a6b6c
we can say that the ideal at a refers to the moments that start at the beginning of the partially ordered set (0, Jordan
driving her mother home) up through a, the moment of Jordan and Kaede first meeting at the piano bar. Similarly we can
say that the ideal at b goes from 0 up through b. For any a 2 A, the subset # (b) = {a 2 A|a 6 b} is an ideal of A. This is
the smallest ideal containing b, so we call this the principal ideal generated by b.
A semilattice arrow is a map that preserves structure, i.e. a map that preserves, in the example of a join-semilattice, the
distinguished least element 0 and the binary operation _ such that all relationships that existed with _ still hold. Notice, we
are discussing a relational definition again, like what we did during our excursion into category theory. A semi-lattice arrow
is a mapping that preserves the internal structure while letting go of any notion of a fixed identity. Recall our intuitive
discussion on topological invariants when we engaged a co↵ee mug and a donut.

The internal structure, defined by means of the topological invariants, for these two objects is the possession of exactly one
hole, the handle of the co↵ee mug and the center of the donut respectively. Thus one object can be changed into the other,
evolve into the other, morph into the other, thus no longer retaining the sense of identity we ascribe to “co↵ee mug” or
“donut,” x 6= x, but still retaining the internal structure. This is another example of an isomorphism ⇠
=, we say the co↵ee
mug and donut are isomorphic ⇠
= if the only thing we care about is having an object with one hole. We are learning how to
engage something that possesses no fixed identity, x 6= x, we do so via the internal structure between isomorphic ⇠
= objects;
the lack of a fixed identity does not leave us with a jumbled mess, we can still engage time on time’s terms, there is internal
structure.
/ B be a semilattice arrow. Then the set {a 2 A|f (a) = 0}, what we call the kernel of f , is an ideal of
Let f : A
A. However, a surjective lattice arrow, i.e. one where every element of the arrow’s codomain is mapped to by at least one
element in the arrow’s domain, is not determined by its kernel. For example, if A = {0, a, 1} is a totally ordered set, there
is a lattice surjection from A to the two element lattice {0, 1} having kernel {0}, the same kernel as the identity mapping
on A.
{0

✏

{0

a

✏ 

1}

1}

{0

✏

{0

a

1}

✏

1}

a

✏

Each of these lattice arrows have the same kernel and thus the lattice arrow can’t be determined from only access to its
kernel. Pausing, what is it that we’re trying to do here? We are inching towards constructing a topological space X that has
open sets (moments) as fundamental rather than extensionless points as fundamental. Part of both our reason for doing this
and the process of doing this involves an embracing of a lack of identity, x 6= x, as both our moments and the whole union
of our moments, the virtual, the past, change in time. We are looking to engage the internal structure of time such that we
can meaningfully engage time without spatializing time, i.e. subjugating time to a domain of fixed identity, where we have
equalities = and formal logics relating timeless, inherently, rigidly defined extensionless points, where the methodologies of
deducing from static axioms or reducing to static eternal simple parts dwell. We are building our topological space (the
virtual) through lattice theory. In accordance with the lack of identity, x 6= x, of the virtual, we need to understand what
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of the internal structure is necessary to have in order to preserve isomorphism ⇠
= of our lattice, of our topological space
X, of the virtual, of the past. What we have just concluded is that it is not enough to have the kernel of our lattice arrow
because the kernel is not enough to recover the way in which our topological space X is changing. Understanding what we
need to have for our lattice arrow to be an isomorphism ⇠
= is important because there will eventually be a fork in the road
where the elements of our lattice can become fixed, extensionless points, recovering point-set topology and the intuition
that the extensionless points of our topological space are more fundamental or more real and all of the similar set-theoretic
baggage we are trying to shed for engaging time, and it is at that point that we will choose not to have our elements become
extensionless points.
/ B we thus have to look at the inverse
Continuing, to determine the surjective part of our lattice arrow f : A
images of other elements of B besides 0. In particular, we may consider {a 2 A|f (a) = 1} which satisfies axioms dual to
those defining an ideal. We call this subset of A a filter.
Let I be an ideal of a lattice A. The following are equivalent:
1)
2)
3)

The complement of I in A is a filter
12
/ I and (a ^ b 2 I) implies either a 2 I or b 2 I

I is the kernel of a lattice arrow f : A

/ 2 where 2 denotes the two element lattice {0, 1}

An ideal which satisfies these is called a prime ideal; dually, its complement a prime filter. Prime here refers to an ideal
or a filter which is maximal amongst ideals disjoint from filters, amongst filters disjoint from ideals.
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127 The past was being rewritten. The story Victoria knew, the story she’d been living, was a lie. The last truth she felt
she knew, the last foothold of stability she can rely on, a memory to fall back on, was the limitless love of Krzys, his
love for her mother, for Jordan, for her. The life Victoria had lived was crumbling, getting foggier, hazier, what was it all
built on? She felt the dementia threatening to take away her memories. She felt the dimentia threatening to reduce the
available dimensions. Clinging onto names teeming with history: Who was her daughter? The one she’s raised? Is she her
real daughter? Does she have a second daughter, real or otherwise, living out in the world?
Victoria parked the car at the beach. Nightfall. Jordan’s truck adjacent. Victoria walked towards the shore, the black
abyss of the agitated foundation blending with the horizon where a foggy, starless sky loomed over, threatening to swallow
the sea by sheer proximity. The water was still an impenetrable murk, but there was a dim, persistent glow of green,
incubating beneath the surface. Jellyfish bloom. Each crystal jelly lighting up the area directly around them. The green
light was enough to see directly in front of her. Holding her hands up, she read her own handwriting
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128 If

our lattice arrow f : X
1

/ Y is continuous, then by the definition of continuity, f 1 is a structure preserving
/ O(X) . We now return to category theory! The category of frames is the
: O(Y )

arrow which restricts to f
category whose objects are complete lattices satisfying the infinite distributive law
a^

_

S=

_

{a ^ s|s 2 S}

and whose arrows are continuous maps that preserve structure, the finite meets and arbitrary joins. Our continuous lattice
/Y .
arrow is thus a frame arrow f : X
The category of locales is the category that is the opposite of the category of frames. In category theory, the opposite
of a category is the construction where all of the arrows are reversed. Thus, by the definition of continuity, our inverse
/ O(X) .
continuous lattice arrow is a locale arrow f 1 : O(Y )
Notice, the objects of our locale are composed of open sets in contradistinction from the extensionless points that compose
a frame. Working within the category of frames is thus the domain of point-set topology, whereas working within the domain
of locales is, well, di↵erent. The fundamental unit being an open set means that a point-set space, a frame, can only hope
to, at best, approximate the locale in question, as it tries to put fixed, rigid boundaries of precision on something whose
fundamental objects were not so fixed. We could say this is a form of spatializing. Depending on where we start, we can
approximate extensionless points out of the open sets of our locale, or we can construct open sets out of the extensionless
points of our frame; neither frame nor locale, extensionless point nor open set is more fundamental or more real than
the other. Our understanding of the state of the field is that locale theory is mostly pursued by those involved in pure
mathematics, exploring the area “because it’s there”. It is our argument that locale theory finds an application within
physics: it is the appropriate topological space used to engage time on time’s terms, where there is unending becoming, no
fixed identity, x 6= x, inclusive of the virtual and the actual and the dynamic reciprocally determining relationship between
them. To do otherwise would be to spatialize time, which is exactly what we are pushing against.
And so, we’ve done it, we have a locale O(X), a topological space where open sets are fundamental. We retain the entirety
of our understanding and usage of open sets in a topology T , where we understand the elements of our locale to be the
open sets in our topology. Crucially, converting this locale into a frame would be an approximation, the worst consequence
of which involves fixing the identity of our moments into extensionless points or even setting up a mathematical regime
that is a hop, skip, and a jump away from affirming extensionless points in time as more fundamental, concluding that our
empirical experience is an illusion. We clarify, we do not assert that open sets are more fundamental across all of physics,
rather we are learning from our excursion through lattice theory and locale theory that point-set topology and point-free
topology are meaningfully di↵erent, with neither having a claim at which is more fundamental, where each has to be used as
the appropriate tool for the appropriate occasion. Thus we do not claim that our empirical experience of time is an illusion,
rather we learn and develop new tools that better engage time in accordance with our empirical experience. This being said,
that means the spatialized times of Newton and Einstein are still important, productive, and immense feats. We embrace
them on the condition that we acknowledge them to be spatialized times and not time understood temporally, inclusive of
the virtual and actual and the dynamic reciprocally determining relationship between them. Thus we would like to be able
to understand the mechanism of approximating a locale with a frame, as we expect this process to extract spatialized time.
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130 We

know that an extensionless point of a space X is the map

/X

1

By analogy, we claim that it is reasonable to say that a “point” of a locale A is the map

/A

O(1)

where we have open sets on 1 because the fundamental objects in locales are open sets. Through the axioms of open sets,
we understand O(1) to be the 2 element set {0, 1}, the empty open set and the trivial open set. We can then rewrite our
localic point as

/A

2

The category of frames is the opposite category of the category of locales, so if we want to know what an extensionless point
is in our frame that approximates our locale, we can flip the arrow in our definition of a localic point. Thus we get that a
point p of our frame that is approximating our locale is understood as the frame arrow

/2

p: A

1 (0)

We’ve learned that a frame arrow is determined by its kernel p
and its dual kernel p 1 (1), which are respectively the
prime ideal and the prime filter of our locale A as they are each the maximal ideal disjoint from a filter and maximal filter
disjoint from an ideal. We know that our prime ideal is also a principal ideal
p(

_

(p

1

(0))) = 0

which says that the join of all elements of A whose p-image is 0 that are then taken along p return 0. This is a principal
ideal because it is the smallest ideal we can generate. Thus
p

1

(0) =# (

_

(p

1

(0)))

our ideal is a prime principal ideal. The same argument can be run dually to conclude that our filter is a prime principal
filter.
What this means is that the extensionless points of our frame approximating our locale A are in bijective (one-to-one)
correspondence with our prime elements, i.e. with our prime filters that generate prime ideals (the inclusion of the qualifier
principal is a special case we’ve considered). Diagrammatically,

?0
A

1

/X

where we understand our one element set involves our prime filters, which generate prime ideals in the locale via its
complement, and our prime filters are our extensionless points of the space X. Note that this process is dependent on what
our starting locale A is, so it is possible to have a locale A that maps nothing to 1, consisting only of ideals and no filters.
We say that these locales “don’t have enough points” to be approximated by a frame.
Notice the clever reversal! Instead of regarding open sets as sets of extensionless points, we regard extensionless points
as sets of open sets. Namely, the set of open sets that map to 1 is our definition of an extensionless point, constructed
out of a locale. To be clear, if X is a space and p a point of X, then the prime filter in O(X) which corresponds to p is
{U 2 O(X)|p 2 U }, the neighborhood filter of p.
We can encode the arrow of filters of a locale A to the extensionless points of its corresponding space as
: A

/ p(X)
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131 “Mom?”

The feelings were too complicated, too tangled in a series of lies, stories, the process would be too difficult. She didn’t
have the will to fight. Victoria barreled past Jordan and into the water.
“What are you doing? There are jellyfish in there, they sting! Mom!”
Jordan was following her in but this wasn’t her decision. She had to live out her own life, her own lie, her own story,
making it real.
Medusa, the mortal Gorgon. Of the realm of the living, of the realm of the lying, of the realm of invention, of the realm
of time. She wielded the power of condemning those around her to the realm of the eternal, the timeless, as she continued
her journey of movement, flight, unable to be fixated, grounded, not stone herself but turning those around her to stone.
Victoria knew jellyfish were medusas, able to turn her living body into a mountain, like Atlas, like the stone Andromeda
was shackled to.
Victoria sunk herself into the light, submerging her whole body. She looked up at the daughter she had raised. Neither
of them had any footing on the ground, it was far beneath. The water and the jellies blurred her vision but her daughter
was still visible, the boundary of her being blurred, distorted. Jordan was flailing, no doubt trying to interfere.
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132 Returning to time, we want to understand a moment as an open set and the virtual as the collection of all moments,
and see how this meshes with our spatial understanding of time. We define

X ⌘ the spatial past, (inclusive of the spatial present)
p(X) ⌘ a particular extensionless point of X, which we choose to be the spatial present
O(X) ⌘ the virtual, the moments of the past (inclusive of the actual)
A ⌘ a particular moment of O(X), which we choose to be the actual, the moment that di↵erentiates itself
as the present
We must be clear, understanding the virtual as an integrated sum of all of our moments would be to think spatially. Each
moment contains the whole within it, we are engaging a temporal continuity. Thus each novel moment a↵ects the identity
of the whole and each of its parts, as each contains the whole.
If we encode the mapping that restricts to, picks out the actual from the virtual as f and the mapping that restricts to,
picks out the spatial present from the spatial past as f¯, together with our arrow that maps the spatial approximation of
our localic moment A to p(X), we construct the following diagram
X

O(1)

O(x)

/ O(X)

f¯

f

/ p(X)
O
/A

We include more moments than spatial extensionless points because there is always a virtual that is informing, contextualizing, constraining the actual, we are always in the middle, never at the beginning. Let’s understand this through
our example, where our 5 moments are the same moments that we used before in our lattice. We can understand t1 as
being the spatialized time extensionless point associated with the di↵erentiated moment M3 , which we know involves the
interpenetration of M1 , M2 , all of which informing this moment. We can relate the efficiently causal relations at t3 in all
of their precision to this blurry, dynamic, temporal moment. The same holds for t4 with M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 and t5 with
M1 , M2 , M 3 , M4 , M 5 .
X = {t1 , t2 , t3 }
p(X) = {t3 }
⇠ {M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , M5 }
O(X) =
⇠ {M5 }
A=
We again pay a reminder that despite A looking like a single element set, M5 in fact contains the whole of the virtual
within it, in this example {M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , M5 }. We delineate A as the set {M5 } to communicate the particular perspective
that M5 has on the whole. We again pay a reminder that we use isomorphism ⇠
= instead of equality = for our definitions of
the virtual and the actual because we are not fixing their identities, rather we are engaging their internal structure, allowing
the identities of M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , M5 , A, O(X) to change, morph, become in time.
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133 Fracturing–

Bi — Latin —a prefix meaning two. Di — Greek — a prefix meaning two, but with nuance, often meaning between or
through. Did she have two daughters, or raise one between them? Did the so-called “truth” matter regarding which was
her real daughter? Was she herself two di↵erent people, one living a truth and one living a lie? Does the so-called “truth”
enact this dividing line between the two or reinforce their inseparability? Victoria chose to be with her past, holding her
own hand in this very moment, and in so doing fought o↵ the fracturing of identity through the empowering statement that
comes with claiming her own identity. She refused; Victoria did not have dementia, she had dimentia.
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134 We

can now put our category-theoretic and our topological puzzle pieces together! Let us remember our key takeaways
1)
Our moments will be defined relationally such that a moment can be informed, contextualized,
constrained, grounded and impelled by the whole past, not just the immediately preceding contiguous
extensionless point, including the unending becoming of past moments themselves by means of reciprocal
determination, and such that a moment is not defined in itself as an inherent, fixed, static identity. We
acknowledged that the latter part only lead to us defining a moment relationally as an inherent, fixed, static
identity, which prompted
2) Our moments will be open sets on a locale, such that they embrace a lack of an inherent, fixed, static
identity.

Let us bring back the twice-revised category theoretic model we constructed.
f

X]

o

/Y o

f¯

g

/Z
A

ḡ

h̄
h

We said that we could refer to a moment Z as the set of arrows whose codomain is Z. Let’s formalize this.
A covering of an object Z is an arrow into Z. We can then define or construct the object Z as the total set of coverings
of Z

/ Z }i2I

{ Zi

Notice the resonance with topology, a topological space is likewise defined or constructed as the total set of open sets on
the space.
/ Z and g : Y
/ Z , understand as the moment Z, the moment
In our example, our set is composed of h : X
where Kaede drives Jordan home, is related to, defined through, grounded and impelled by the moments X and Y .
We have motivated and argued that relationships are fundamental and productive of objects, productive of identities,
so it is both beneficial and clarifying to define an object not as an object in relation to other objects (which keeps the
object-oriented, set-theoretic, always already constituted eternal essences backbone), but for an object Z to be the set of
all arrows into Z. We encode this as
{

i

/ Z }i2I

: Zi

which we consolidate down, both for cleanliness and to better bolster our arrow-oriented understanding, to
{

i }i2I

⇠
=Z

We call this a sieve, and in our specific case a sieve on Z. Our moments are now defined through a sieve, a set of coverings.
Let’s better understand the properties of a covering in our category.
A Grothendieck topology on a category C is a collection of collections
⌧ (Z) ◆ {

i }i2I

for all coverings and for each object (where here we’ve only specified the object Z as an example), such that the following
properties hold
1)

If a covering

0

: Z0

/ Z is an isomorphism ⇠
= then

0

is a covering in ⌧

/ Z is a covering in ⌧ , and a covering ✓ : Y
2) If a covering
: X
then the intersection of the coverings is a covering in ⌧ . Diagrammatically,
X \Y

b

/Y

a

✏

X

/ Z is a covering in ⌧ ,

✓

✏

/Z

We can understand this diagram by choosing a particular perspective in our Grothendieck topology such
that we can define our sieves
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⌧ (Z) ⇠
= { , ✓}

⌧ (Y ) ⇠
= {b}
⌧ (X) ⇠
= {a}
3)

If a covering ✓ : Y

⌧ (Y ), then ⌘ : X

/ Z is a covering in ⌧ (Z), and a covering
/ Z is a covering in ⌧ (Z). Diagrammatically,
X

/Y

✓

: X

/ Y is a covering in

/8 Z

⌘

where ⌘ = ✓
A site is a pair (C, ⌧ ), a category and a Grothendieck topology. In a site, we can understand and treat our objects in the
category as open sets, defined relationally and understood arrow-theoretically via sieves of coverings.
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135 Holding

her breath, the lack of oxygen making her head feel lighter. Her thoughts were fracturing, bouncing around
as echoes of noise as they layered upon themselves, amplifying each other, the next memory starting before the last one
finished, contradicting and complementing themselves simultaneously. Losing her identity. She felt it. The dementia, the
dimentia, there wasn’t going to be much time before she lost her agency. Jordan was thrashing around. She could hear
faintly a string of apologies, desperate pleas not to leave, hysteria, confusion. Victoria opened her mouth. Jordan noticed,
stopped, treading water, staring down at her mother beneath the surface, surrounded by layers of translucent green. Victoria
had lost the ability to speak for weeks, she felt how important final words would be, she felt how important an explanation
would be.

156

/ p(X) can now be understood not simply as a categorical locale, but
actual moment A of our arrow : A
as a site (C, ⌧ ) whose elements that inform, contextualize, constrain, infect, define, overwhelm, its virtual are understood as
open sets, open sets that change, evolve, become in time, embracing a lack of any inherent, fixed, static identity. We can
rewrite this arrow as
136 The

C

/ Sets

X

/ t1

C

/ Sets

Recall that an arrow of this form is a representable functor. Here we will be even more specific, when our category C is
equipped with a Grothendieck topology, that is, when it is a site, then this arrow is called a presheaf. We were interested
in this arrow as a way of connecting the temporal virtual and actual to the spatial understandings of past and present.
Diagramming a moment from the beginning, not the middle, is related to an experience of time where the amount of
past that is present is a limit case of as little as possible. We have on the mind a piece of inorganic matter, whose causal
trajectory is entirely determined by the spatialized time of physics. We must be clear, this is a particular experience of time,
one such “mode of being” in time; but our engagement of time as an autonomous property of the universe must be able to
include all experiences of time from which each “mode of being” is a particular restriction of. Our presheaf diagrams this
limiting case moment as

We can see that the virtual, the past that informs, contextualizes, constrains, grounds and impels this actual moment is
just the moment itself, thus we can understand our spatial extensionless point t1 as being causally related to the immediate
moment. The next moment in such a system looks like
Y

/ t2

which is exactly what we would expect given our familiarity with classical causality. However, let’s look at what this second
moment looks like in general, that is for time itself, before restricting down to a particular “mode of being” like inorganic
matter. This more nuanced, more complicated diagram should resonate more closely to our own “mode of being” as humans,
where we have a more nuanced, more complicated experience of time than inorganic matter.
X
O

f¯

f

Y

✏

/ t2
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This thus encodes how the past moment X and the present moment Y both causally inform the spatial present t2 . This
engages the internal structure of time as an autonomous property of the universe, the past, the virtual, history amassing –
it is via a particular “mode of time,” be it the experience of being Jordan or the experience of being Kaede, the experience
of being Ann or the experience of being Victoria, where we understand each of these “modes” as being possessed by some
degree of the one, whole, unified virtual, di↵erentiated in its actualization, the actual being discrete, not sharing their own
“personal” virtuals with anyone else. The virtual is accumulating, its identity morphing with every moment it swallows, the
novelty of this identity grounding and impelling its next meal, the unending becoming of time itself, the ground was shifting
beneath its feet stably in place of currents sweeping gyres inside its head...

G XO
f¯

Y

⌥

ḡ

X
OW

f¯

f

Y

i

o

✏⌥

ī

j
h̄

/A
GO
h
k
j̄

g

o

/ t3

/ Z✏

g

o

h

f h̄

ḡ

⌫
/ Z✏

k̄

/ t4
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137 Her mind fleeting–trying to capture, to nail down, to stabilize any phrase of love, of acceptance, of forgiveness, of
anything. But nothing stuck, nothing calcified. There was no time. Victoria inhaled. Lungs filled with silt and slime.
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ō

l̄

B

i

> XO W o

n

Y

✏⌥

g

o

ḡ
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homewrecker

/
9

source of green fluorescent protein

o

Aequorea victoria

stinger of life

e
unifier of loved ones
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141 What makes a narrative satisfying? When it feels satisfying. When there are themes repeated, character’s that progress
through emotional arcs, self-references and call backs, a circle that closes by returning to the beginning, a beginning and
end always understood as middle. In a phrase: the past is present for the story. The past is present for the experience of
the story. If all that was written was a string of sentences of the form, “Alice sent x to Bob” it is overwhelmingly apparent
that this is neither a narrative through Alice’s eyes nor Bob’s eyes, even if it could be. Experience is emphatically local.
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143 A

text is an already formed object, something to engage. Footnotes are our experience with a text, our own engagement
of a text, writing in the margins, underlining, drawing faces, adding question marks.

There is no text of time. Only footnotes of time.
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